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ABSTRACT
New security breaches in vehicles are emerging due to software-driven Electronic Control
Units (ECUs) and wireless connectivity of modern vehicles. These trends have introduced
more remote surfaces/endpoints that an adversary can exploit and, in the worst case, use to
control the vehicle remotely. Researchers have demonstrated how vulnerabilities in remote
endpoints can be exploited to compromise ECUs, access in-vehicle networks, and control
vehicle maneuvers. To detect and prevent such vehicle cyber attacks, researchers have also
developed and proposed numerous countermeasures (e.g., Intrusion Detection Systems and
message authentication schemes). However, there still remain potentially critical attacks
that existing defense schemes can neither detect/prevent nor consider. Moreover, existing
defense schemes lack certain functionalities (e.g., identifying the message transmitter), thus
not providing strong protection for safety-critical ECUs against in-vehicle network attacks.
With all such unexplored and unresolved security issues, vehicles and drivers/passengers
will remain insecure.
This dissertation aims to fill this gap by 1) unveiling a new important and critical
vulnerability applicable to several in-vehicle networks (including the Controller Area
Network (CAN), the de-facto standard protocol), 2) proposing a new Intrusion Detection
System (IDS) which can detect not only those attacks that have already been demonstrated
or discussed in literature, but also those that are more acute and cannot be detected by
state-of-the-art IDSes, 3) designing an attacker identification scheme that provides a swift
pathway for forensic, isolation, security patch, etc., and 4) investigating what an adversary
can achieve while the vehicle’s ignition is off.
xii
First, we unveil a new type of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack called the bus-off
attack that, ironically, exploits the error-handling scheme of in-vehicle networks. That is,
their fault-confinement mechanism — which has been considered as one of their major
advantages in providing fault-tolerance and robustness — is used as an attack vector.
Next, we propose a new anomaly-based IDS that detects intrusions based on the extracted
fingerprints of ECUs. Such a capability overcomes the deficiency of existing IDSes and
thus detects a wide range of in-vehicle network attacks, including those existing schemes
cannot. Then, we propose an attacker identification scheme that provides a swift pathway
for forensic, isolation, and security patch. This is achieved by fingerprinting ECUs based
on CAN voltage measurements. It takes advantage of the fact that voltage outputs of
each ECU are slightly different from each other due to their differences in supply voltage,
ground voltage, resistance values, etc. Lastly, we propose two new attack methods called
the Battery-Drain and the Denial-of-Body-control attacks through which an adversary can
disable parked vehicles with the ignition off. These attacks invalidate the conventional
belief that vehicle cyber attacks are feasible and thus their defenses are required only when
the vehicles ignition is on.
xiii
CHAPTER I
Introduction
Contemporary vehicles are usually equipped with 40–100 Electronic Control Units
(ECUs), which are interconnected on various in-vehicle networks to exchange data for
making maneuvering decisions [19]. Such internally networked ECUs improve response
time, safety, control precision, and fuel-efficiency for vehicles.
Internally wired ECUs are now being connected/exposed to external entities. Through
vehicle-embedded Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and cellular connections, drivers and passengers are
provided with various types of infotainment and other applications/services. Moreover,
Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communications are used
to introduce new functionalities such as remote diagnostic/prognosis, crash avoidance,
and traffic management to enhance safety and mobility, and reduce environmental
impact [27, 39]. Thanks to its substantial benefits to vehicles and drivers/passengers,
external connectivity has been continuously gaining popularity and even starting to be
considered for a regulation [12].
1.1 Security Threats for Connected Vehicles
Vehicles with more external interfaces, however, prove to be a double-edged
sword. While they provide a wide range of benefits, they also open up more remote
surfaces/endpoints that an attacker can exploit and, in the worst case, control the
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vehicle [29, 31, 69, 70, 76]. Researchers have demonstrated how vulnerabilities in
such endpoints are exploited to compromise an ECU, access the in-vehicle network,
and take control of the vehicle (e.g., control its brake or steering) [31, 50, 56, 58].
These vulnerabilities, unfortunately, seem to be inevitable due to the inherent nature of
automotive manufacturing: in-vehicle components and software codes are developed and
written by different organizations, and thus vulnerabilities emerge naturally at interface
boundaries [31]. Such a reality of vehicle cyber attacks has made automotive security one
of the most critical issues that need to be resolved by industry, academia, and governments.
Checkoway et al. [31] experimentally evaluated various remote attack vectors (e.g.,
CD, PassThru, Bluetooth, Cellular) and have shown that they can indeed be exploited to
remotely compromise ECUs and thus seize the control of a vehicle. Moreover, the authors
of [57] analyzed internal network architectures of 20 different vehicles, and have shown
the practicability and feasibility of remote attacks. Exploiting the compromised ECUs,
researchers have also shown to be able to control vehicle maneuvers by packet injection
in the in-vehicle network [50, 56]. Recently, researchers have been able to compromise
and remotely kill a Jeep Cherokee running on a highway [25, 58], which triggered a recall
of 1.4 million vehicles. In 2016 and 2017, researchers were able to hack Tesla model S
and X cars, and control their maneuvers [26]. The authors of [76] also succeeded in a
remote attack via a vehicle’s tire pressure monitoring system (TPMS). An ECU is shown
in [56] to be reprogrammable by injecting forged diagnostic messages. Also proposed is
new hardware that can generate/fabricate magnetic fields, spoof the wheel speed sensor of
a running vehicle, thus activating the Anti-lock Braking System (ABS) [82].
1.2 State-of-the-Art Defense
As a countermeasure against attacks on in-vehicle networks, two main lines of
defense networks — akin to those in the Internet security — have been pursued: message
authentication and intrusion detection.
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1.2.1 Message Authentication
Providing message authentication in in-vehicle networks is, however, difficult due to
limited space available for appending a Message Authentication Code (MAC) in their
messages’ data field. For example, in Control Area Network (CAN) — the de facto
standard in-vehicle network protocol — its payload field provides space for only up to
8 bytes of data, making it difficult to implement strong security primitives.
Several schemes have been proposed to overcome such a difficulty. Truncating MAC
across multiple frames has been proposed in [83] to overcome the limited room for MAC.
Instead of appending MAC in the limited data field, exploitation of an out-of-band channel
was suggested in [86] for exchanging authentication messages. The authors of [71]
proposed a delayed authentication protocol that uses multiple 16-bit CRC fields to include
a 64-bit CBC-MAC with the KASUMI algorithm.
Although such preventive measures provide some degree of security, they alone
cannot guarantee complete security due to their inability to handle certain critical attacks,
e.g., Denial-of-Service (DoS). Moreover, their operations not only require a significant
amount of processing power but also increase message latencies and bus utilization.
Since in-vehicle networks must operate in real time and ECUs are resource-limited for
cost reasons, unlike in the Internet, these “costs” of preventive measures hindered their
adoption [33, 65].
1.2.2 Intrusion Detection
To overcome such limitations of preventive measures, different Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDSs) have been proposed. The authors of [65] proposed a method of measuring
the entropy of an in-vehicle network and used the result as a specification of the behavior
for an IDS. Similarly, a method of modeling the distribution of message intervals was
proposed in [56] to define a norm behavior. In-vehicle sensors were exploited in [66] to
verify message range, frequency, correlation, consistency, etc. Abnormal measurements
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on brake-related sensors were detected by using the tire-friction model [34]. The authors
of [45] monitored not only message frequency but also obvious misuse of message IDs as
well as low-level communication characteristics.
The essence of such state-of-the-art IDSs is to monitor the contents and the periodicity
of in-vehicle messages and verify whether there are any significant changes in them. Since
they are either constant or predictable in in-vehicle networks, such approaches are feasible
in most circumstances.
1.3 Problems
Various efforts from the academia, industry, and governments have been made to
make vehicles more secure. However, as vehicle/automotive security directly relates to
drivers/passengers’ safety, we must further enhance the security of in-vehicle networks
— the core of vehicles. So, it is essential to investigate 1) whether there exist any
undiscovered attacks/vulnerabilities on in-vehicle networks and 2) whether state-of-the-art
defenses provide a high enough level of security.
1.3.1 Undiscovered Vulnerabilities of In-vehicle Networks
With control of a compromised ECU, an attacker is shown to be able to control the
vehicle maneuver via packet injection in the in-vehicle network(s). However, in order
to launch such existing/known attacks, the attacker is required to first reverse-engineer
messages (i.e., figure out the meaning/purpose of messages) or their checksum algorithms.
Since the messages and the implemented checksum algorithms are different for different
vehicle manufacturers and models, such reverse-engineering can be very painstaking,
when the adversary wants to mount attacks on different vehicles. Based on the facts that
not only mounting vehicle cyber attacks is very painstaking and thus difficult (especially
for a relatively novice adversary) but also there exist various state-of-the-art defense
schemes against them, one might (mis-)believe that vehicles with such defense schemes
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are already secure enough. However, as there is no one silver bullet in solving (any)
security problems, we must think from the adversary’s perspective and question whether
there remain any undiscovered vulnerabilities of in-vehicle networks. If so, vehicles and
its drivers/passengers still remain insecure.
1.3.2 Failure of Intrusion Detection and Attacker Identification
While investigating whether there remain any unknown vulnerabilities of in-vehicle
networks, we must also understand the level of security that state-of-the-art defense
schemes can provide. That is, it is imperative to figure out which functionalities they lack
in mitigating any possible threats.
While state-of-the-art defense schemes provide a certain level of security, they all
lack one important functionality: they do not know whether or not the messages on
the in-vehicle network were sent by the genuine transmitter, and hence cannot detect
any changes of the message transmitter. This is because in-vehicle networks are mostly
configured as broadcast buses and their messages do not carry any information on the
transmitters. If in-vehicle messages do not carry any information on their transmitters, one
may question how IDSs can identify them and detect acute attacks/intrusions such as when
the attacker ECU masquerades another.
Even in those scenarios where the state-of-the-art defense schemes are capable of
determining whether or not there is an intrusion in the in-vehicle network, another
important feature that they lack is determining which ECU is actually mounting the attack,
i.e., incapable of identifying the attacker ECU. Accurate identification of an attacker,
however, is imperative as it provides a swift pathway for forensic, isolation, security patch,
etc. No matter how well an IDS detects the presence of an intrusion in a vehicle, if we still
do not know which ECU is mounting the attack and hence which ECU to isolate/patch,
the vehicle remains insecure and unsafe. It is much better and more economical to
isolate/patch the attacker ECU, than blindly treating all ECUs as (possible) attackers.
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1.4 Dissertation Contributions
Motivation and Approach
Enhancing the security of in-vehicle networks and thus vehicles is of vital importance
since it directly relates to drivers/passengers’ safety. Thus, it is important to look at
the problem from two different vantage points: attack and defense. That is, we must
think from the attacker’s perspective on how s/he might exploit vulnerabilities in attacking
vehicles, design their countermeasures, and help OEMs/suppliers implement them before
the vulnerabilities are actually exploited by an adversary. Also, we must think from the
defender’s perspective and see whether there are any threats that state-of-the-art schemes
fail to handle. Through such an understanding, we must design new defense mechanisms
that can mitigate those threats, thus securing vehicles better.
Focus of This Dissertation
In-vehicle networks can be in the form of Local Interconnect Network (LIN), Controller
Area Network (CAN), CAN with Flexible Data-Rate (CAN-FD), Media Oriented Systems
Transport (MOST), FlexRay, Ethernet, etc. Among such various protocols, in this
dissertation, we primarily focus on CAN, since it is the de facto standard for in-vehicle
networks due to its maturity, low cost, efficiency, and robustness. CAN was mandated by
the U.S. regulations to be outfitted on all 2008 and newer model-year vehicles. Almost
every new European car also comes with the CAN bus equipped. In 2016 alone, an annual
installation of 1.8 billion CAN interfaces were reported to be made [30]. In fact, CAN is
used in not only passenger cars but also in trucks, buses, ships, planes, drones, submarines,
and even in prosthetic limbs. Considering such a ubiquity of CAN in various safety-critical
systems and its direct relationship with the people’s safety, it is imperative to properly
secure CAN. Although this dissertation focuses on CAN, the new attacks and defenses
proposed in this dissertation are applicable not only to CAN but also to other in-vehicle
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networks, which we discuss further in the following chapters.
The Dissertation Statement
We enhance in-vehicle network security by discovering new attacks that are yet
unknown but practical and by designing new defenses that outperform the state-of-the-art.
In this dissertation, we look at the vehicle security problem from two perspectives: as an
attacker and a defender. Specifically, we (i) unveil three new attacks that existing defense
mechanisms cannot detect nor prevent, (ii) design and implement a new IDS that can detect
various types of attacks — including those that state-of-the-art schemes cannot — and (iii)
design and implement an attacker identification scheme that provides a swift pathway for
forensic, isolation, security patch, etc.; something that existing defense schemes have not
been able to achieve.
1.4.1 Error Handling of In-vehicle Networks Makes Them Vulnerable
We discover a new important vulnerability called the bus-off attack that, ironically,
exploits CAN’s error-handling scheme. That is, its fault-confinement mechanism, which
has been considered as one of its major advantages in providing fault-tolerance and
robustness, is used as an attack vector. The attacker periodically injects attack messages
to the in-vehicle network, deceives an uncompromised ECU into thinking it is defective,
and eventually forces itself or even the whole network to shut down. This is an important
attack that must be thwarted, since the attack, once an ECU is compromised, is easy to be
mounted without reverse-engineering messages/checksums, while its prevention is very
difficult. We analyze its practicability and demonstrate the attack on a CAN bus prototype
and two real vehicles. Based on our analysis and experimental results, we propose a
defense mechanism to prevent the bus-off attack.
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1.4.2 CIDS: Fingerprinting ECUs for Vehicle Intrusion Detection
To overcome the limitations of state-of-the-art IDSs and defend against various vehicle
attacks, we propose a new anomaly-based IDS, called Clock-based IDS (CIDS). The need
of CIDS for vehicles is motivated through an analysis of three representative in-vehicle
network attacks — fabrication, suspension, and masquerade attacks. Our analysis shows
that state-of-the-art IDSs are insufficient, especially in detecting the masquerade attack
due to the absence of the transmitters information in messages. CIDS overcomes these
limitations of existing IDSs by fingerprinting in-vehicle ECUs. CIDSmonitors the intervals
of (commonly seen) periodic in-vehicle messages, and then exploits them to estimate
the clock skews of their transmitters which are then used to fingerprint the transmitters.
Based on the thus-obtained fingerprints, CIDS constructs a norm model of ECUs clock
behaviors using the Recursive Least Squares (RLS) algorithm and detects intrusions with a
Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) analysis. This enables CIDS to detect not only attacks that have
already been demonstrated or discussed in literature, but also those that are more acute and
cannot be detected by state-of-the-art IDSs. Our experimental evaluations on a CAN bus
prototype and 3 real vehicles show that CIDS detects various types of in-vehicle network
intrusions with a low false-positive rate of 0.055%.
1.4.3 Viden: Attacker Identification on In-Vehicle Networks
Although state-of-the-art defense schemes may detect the presence of an intrusion, they
fail to identify which ECU actually mounted the attack. To meet this need, we developed
a novel scheme, called Viden (Voltage-based attacker identification), which can identify
the attacker ECU by measuring and utilizing voltages on the in-vehicle network. The first
phase of Viden, called ACK learning, determines whether or not the measured voltage
signals really originate from the genuine message transmitter. Viden then exploits the
voltage measurements to construct and update the transmitter ECUs voltage profiles as their
fingerprints. It finally uses the voltage profiles to identify the attacker ECU. Since Viden
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adapts its profiles to changes inside/outside of the vehicle, it can pinpoint the attacker ECU
under various conditions. Moreover, its efficiency and design-compliance with modern
in-vehicle network implementations make Viden practical and easily deployable. Our
extensive experimental evaluations on both a CAN bus prototype and two real vehicles have
shown that Viden can accurately fingerprint ECUs based solely on voltage measurements
and thus identify the attacker ECU with a low false identification rate of 0.2%.
1.4.4 Who Killed My Parked Car?
We discover and apply two new practical and important cyber attacks — called
Battery-Drain (BD) and Denial-of-Body-control (DoB) — on real vehicles, invalidating
the conventional belief that vehicle cyber attacks are feasible and thus their defenses are
required only when the vehicle’s ignition is on. The former can drain the vehicle battery
while the latter can prevent the vehicle owner/driver from starting or even opening/entering
his car. These attacks will likely delude forensics since their symptoms are very similar
to typical mechanical/electronic failures, thus triggering unnecessary repairs, extending
service outage, or even blaming wrong parties (vehicle OEMs/suppliers) for the problem.
We first analyze how operation (e.g., normal, sleep, listen) modes of ECUs are
defined in various in-vehicle network standards and how they are implemented in real
vehicles. From this analysis, we discover that an adversary can exploit the wake-up
function of in-vehicle networks—which was originally designed for enhanced user
experience/convenience (e.g., remote diagnosis, remote temperature control)—as an attack
vector. Ironically, the key battery-saving feature in in-vehicle networks makes it easier for
an attacker to wake up ECUs and, therefore, mount BD and/or DoB attacks.
Via extensive experimental evaluations on various real vehicles, we show that by
mounting the BD attack, the adversary can increase the average battery consumption by
at least 12.57x, drain the car battery within a few hours in the worst case, and thereby
immobilize/cripple the vehicle. We also demonstrate the DoB attack on a real vehicle,
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showing that the attacker can disable communications between the vehicle and its key fob
by indefinitely shutting down an ECU, thus making the driver unable to start and/or even
enter the car.
1.4.5 Organization of Dissertation
This dissertation is organized as follows. The first chapter unveils the bus-off attack
vulnerability and details its countermeasure. The second and third chapter propose CIDS
and Viden, respectively. The fourth chapter unveils the two new attacks — BD and DoB
attack — which can be mounted while the car is parked with its ignition off. Finally,
we conclude the dissertation in the fifth chapter where we also discuss future research
directions.
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CHAPTER II
Error Handling of In-vehicle Networks Makes Them
Vulnerable
2.1 Introduction
To detect and prevent vehicle cyber attacks, various types of security solutions,
such as Message Authentication Code (MAC) and Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDSs) for in-vehicle networks — akin to those in the Internet security — have
been proposed [45,65,71,83]. These solutions provide a certain level of security, but there
still remain critical, uncovered vulnerabilities specific to the automotive domain.
In this chapter, we unveil a critical uncovered vulnerability called the bus-off attack.
Bus-off attack is a new type of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack which, ironically, exploits
the error-handling scheme of in-vehicle networks in shutting down a vehicle. That is,
their fault-confinement mechanism — which has been considered as one of their major
advantages in providing fault-tolerance and robustness — is used as an attack vector.
The attacker periodically injects attack messages to the in-vehicle network, deceives an
uncompromised ECU into thinking it is defective, and eventually forces itself or even the
whole network to shut down. In addition to its severe consequences, the following unique
characteristics of the proposed bus-off attack differentiate itself from previously known
attacks and make it a critical threat which must be countered.
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1. The bus-off attack is easy to mount since the attacker is not required to
reverse-engineer messages (i.e., figure out the meaning/purpose of messages)
or their checksum algorithms for launching it. Thus, the attacker can easily mount
the attack on various vehicles regardless of their manufacturer or model. This is
in sharp contrast to previously demonstrated attacks, which required painstaking
reverse-engineering procedures in order to take control of a vehicle [50, 56, 58].
2. As the symptoms of the bus-off attack resemble those of system errors such as
improper termination [17], bit flip [85], and bit drop [67], it deceives state-of-the-art
IDSs to think the network is erroneous, while it is actually under attack.
3. Although MACs for in-vehicle network messages may thwart most of the previously
known attacks, they cannot prevent the proposed bus-off attack since it nullifies their
functionalities. That is, not only contemporary insecure in-vehicle networks but also
prospective security-enhanced ones will still be vulnerable to the bus-off attack.
4. Since the attack relies solely on low-level safety features of in-vehicle networks, it is
independent of actual implementation subtleties of different ECUs.
In this chapter, we will primarily focus on what an adversary can do with a
compromised ECU, rather than how the ECU was compromised in the first place, which
has been covered well elsewhere [31, 41, 50, 56, 58].
This work makes the following main contributions:
• Discovery of a new Denial-of-Service threat — bus-off attack — on in-vehicle
networks which exploits their error-handling mechanism as an attack vector;
• Analysis and characterization of real CAN bus traffic, and the proof of the
practicability of the bus-off attack;
• Implementation and demonstration of the bus-off attack on a CAN bus prototype and
on two real vehicles; and
• Development and evaluation of a countermeasure that can detect and prevent the
bus-off attack.
12
?
?
?
??
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??? ???? ??? ???????
?
?
?
????
??? ???
??????????? ??????? ???? ??? ???
?????????????
????????????????????
?????? ????????? ??????? ???????????????
Figure 2.1: Format of a CAN data frame.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides the required
background on CAN, and Section 2.3 details the proposed bus-off attack. Section 2.4
discusses the feasibility of the attack and Section 2.5 evaluates the attack on a CAN
bus prototype and real vehicles. Section 2.6 discusses the limitations of state-of-the-art
solutions in preventing the bus-off attack, and Section 2.7 details a new defense mechanism
against it. Section 2.8 discusses further the severity of the bus-off attack as well as its
applicability to other in-vehicle networks. Finally, we conclude the chapter in Section 2.9.
2.2 Primer on CAN
For completeness, we first review the main features of CAN related to the proposed
attack; see the CAN specification [2] for the features that are not discussed here.
2.2.1 CAN Frames
CAN interconnects ECUs/nodes through a message broadcast bus. Each node
broadcasts periodic (and occasionally sporadic) data frames on the CAN bus to provide
retrieved data. The transmitted data is received by one or more nodes on the bus and then
utilized for maintaining data consistency and for vehicle control decisions.
Frame format. Each CAN frame is basically a sequence of dominant (0) and recessive
(1) bits, and belongs to one of four different types: data frame which is used for sending
retrieved data; remote frame for requesting transmission of a specified message; error frame
used to indicate detected errors via error flags; and overload frame to inject delay between
13
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Figure 2.2: Example of CAN arbitration phase.
frames. Fig. 2.1 shows the base format of a CAN data frame. A data frame can carry up
to 8 bytes of data, the length of which is specified in the 4-bit Data Length Code (DLC).
For most passenger cars, a 1-byte checksum of each message is contained in the last byte
of its data field [58]. Although the checksum is not part of the CAN specification, car
manufacturers implement it using their own algorithms to provide an additional layer of
protection to the CAN Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC). Consecutive transmissions of
CAN frames are separated by a 3-bit Inter-frame Space (IFS).
Message ID. Instead of containing the transmitter/receiver address, a CAN frame
contains a unique ID, which represents its priority and meaning. For example, a frame
containing wheel speed values might have ID=0x01 and frame containing battery
temperature values might have ID=0x20. Only one ECU is assigned to transmit a given ID
at a time, and the ID values are defined to be distinct from each other by the manufacturer.
The base frame format has an 11-bit ID, whereas an extended format has a 29-bit ID.
Since the use of base format is much more prevalent, we focus on the base format in this
dissertation. Note, however, that the attack model proposed in this chapter is not dependent
on the type of format.
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2.2.2 Arbitration
Once the CAN bus is detected idle, a node with data to transmit, starts its frame
transmission (Tx) by issuing a Start-of-Frame (SOF). SOF provides hard synchronization
between ECUs to make bitwise transmission and reception feasible. At that time, one or
more other nodes may also have buffered data to transmit, and may thus concurrently access
the bus. In such a case, the CAN protocol resolves the access contention via arbitration.
During transmission, each node sends its frame one bit at a time and monitors the
actual output on the CAN bus. In the arbitration phase, since frame IDs are unique and the
CAN bus logically behaves as a wired-AND gate (e.g., 0 & 1 = 0), some contending nodes
would see a dominant (0) bit even though it has transmitted a recessive (1) bit. In such a
case, they lose arbitration, withdraw from bus contention, and switch to receiver mode. In
the end, only one arbitration-winner node is allowed to continuously access the bus for data
transmission. This process enables higher-priority frames (i.e., lower IDs) to be transmitted
before lower-priority ones. Once the arbitration winner has completed transmission of its
frame ending with an End-of-Frame (EOF), after a 3-bit time of IFS, the bus becomes free
again for access, i.e., idle. At that time, nodes that have buffered data or had previously lost
arbitration, start another round of arbitration for access. For completeness, we illustrate in
Fig. 2.2 how arbitration is done in CAN.
2.2.3 Error Handling
Error handling is built in the CAN protocol and is important for its fault-tolerance. It
aims to detect errors in CAN frames and enables ECUs to take appropriate actions, such
as discarding a frame, retransmitting a frame, and raising error flags. The CAN protocol
defines no less than 5 different ways of detecting errors [2].
• Bit Error: Every transmitter compares its transmitted bit with the output bit on the
CAN bus. If the two are different, a bit error has occurred, except during arbitration.
15
??????
??????
??????
???????
???????
????????????????????????
???????????????????????????
?????????????????????????
Figure 2.3: State diagram of fault confinement in CAN.
• Stuff Error: After every five consecutive bits of the same polarity, an opposite polarity
bit is stuffed for maintaining soft synchronization. Violation of this incurs a stuff
error.
• CRC Error: If the calculated CRC is different from the received CRC, a CRC error
is raised.
• Form Error: If the fixed-form bit fields (e.g., CRC delimiter, ACK delimiter, EOF,
IFS) contain at least one illegal bit, a form error has incurred.
• ACK Error: When a node transmits a message, any node that has received it issues a
dominant bit in the ACK slot. If none replies, an ACK error is raised.
Error counters. For any detected errors, the perceived node transmits an error frame
on the bus and increases one of the two error counters it maintains: Transmit Error
Counter (TEC) and Receive Error Counter (REC). There are several rules governing the
increase/decrease of these counters, but in essence, a node that detects an error during
transmission increases TEC by 8, whereas if perceived during reception, REC is increased
by 1 [2]. Moreover, for any error-free transmission and reception, TEC and REC are
decreased by 1, respectively.
Fault confinement. To confine serious errors disrupting bus communications, each
ECU’s error mode is managed as in Fig. 2.3. All ECUs start in an Error-active mode
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and switch between different modes depending on their TEC and REC values. When
TEC or REC exceeds 127 due to consecutive errors, the node becomes Error-passive,
and only returns to its initial state when both go below 128. When TEC exceeds the
limit of 255, the corresponding ECU — which must have triggered many transmit errors
— enters the Bus-off mode. Upon entering this mode, to protect the CAN bus from
continuously being distracted, the error-causing ECU is forced to shut down and not
participate in sending/receiving data on the CAN bus at all. It can be restored back to its
original error-active mode, either automatically or manually. However, since bus-off is
usually an indication of serious network errors and may not be fixed by mere automatic
re-initialization of the CAN controller, a user-intervened recovery or even a controlled
shut-down of the entire system is recommended [75].
Bus-off recovery. The reasons for such different options are 1) the bus-off recovery
mechanism depends on the software stack being used, i.e., how the system is designed by
the manufacturer, and 2) ECUs have different ASILs (Automotive Safety Integrity Levels).
Since the bus-off is a serious problem, in most cases, vehicle systems are designed to first
enter a “limp home” mode (when it occurs) with all their parameters set to pre-set values,
and thus run with reduced functionality (e.g., limited engine RPM). In this mode, warning
lamps are lit up on the dashboard to alert the driver, and the vehicle runs only for some
time before it is properly serviced by an OEM-authorized service center. Depending on
the severity of the underlying issue, i.e., which ECU was shut down, a vehicle in the limp
home mode will later be totally disabled.
Error flags. When an error is detected, the perceived node indicates to others on the bus
via an error flag, which comes in two forms: active and passive. For any perceived errors,
nodes that are in error-active mode issue an active error flag which consists of 6 dominant
bits. So, the transmitted frame causes other nodes to violate the bit-stuffing rule, transmit
their own error frame caused by the stuff error, and terminate any on-going transmissions
or receptions.
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For nodes that are in error-passive mode, they operate in the same way as error-active
ones, except that they issue a passive error flag which consists of 6 recessive bits and have
an 11 (not 3) bit-time of IFS if they were the transmitter of the previous message [2]. An
error-passive node tries to signal its passive error flag until it actually observes 6 recessive
bits on the bus, i.e., an indication of the error flag being properly sent. Since recessive bits
are overwritten on the CAN bus by dominant bits, the thus-issued passive error flags may
persist until the end of a frame.
2.3 Attack Model
We first discuss the adversary model under consideration, and then uncover a new
vulnerability of in-vehicle networks.
2.3.1 Adversary Model
We consider an adversary whose objective is to shut down uncompromised (healthy)
in-vehicle ECUs with a minimal number of message injections. Such an objective
precludes other types of attacks (e.g., flooding) which, albeit their greater impact, require
a large number of message injections and are thus easier to be detected. In Section 2.8,
we will discuss more on such attacks, highlighting the severity of the bus-off attack.
As in previously discussed attacks [31, 50, 56, 58], we assume that the adversary can
physically/remotely compromise an in-vehicle ECU through numerous attack surfaces
and means, and thus gain its control. In contrast, we do not require the adversary under
consideration to reverse-engineer messages or checksums in order to achieve its goal of
shutting down an ECU. Since the messages and the implemented checksum algorithms are
different for different vehicle manufacturers and models, such reverse-engineering can be
very painstaking, when the adversary wants to mount attacks on different vehicles.
Once an ECU is compromised, we consider the adversary to be capable of performing
at least the following malicious actions. The adversary can inject any message with forged
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Figure 2.4: Example of a bus-off attack.
ID, DLC, and data on the bus as they are managed at user level. Also, since CAN is a
broadcast bus, the adversary can sniff messages on CAN. Restrictions of message filters
are detailed in Section 2.4.2. These are the basic capabilities of an adversary who has the
control of a compromised ECU. Practicability of such an adversary model has already been
proved and demonstrated in [31, 50, 56].
2.3.2 Bus-off Attack
We now introduce the bus-off attack which exploits the following feature of CAN:
CAN’s error handling automatically isolates defective or “misbehaving” ECUs — whose
TEC>255 — into bus-off mode. Specifically, by iteratively injecting attack messages,
the adversary coerces the TEC of an uncompromised/healthy victim ECU to continuously
increase — deceiving it to think it is defective — and in the end, triggers the CAN fault
confinement to force the victim or even the entire network to shut down.
Increasing the victim’s TEC. Suppose messageM is periodically sent by some victim
ECU V. Then, an adversary A can succeed in a bus-off attack by injecting an attack
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message, which satisfies the following conditions.
C1. ID – Same ID as messageM;
C2. Timing – Transmitted at the same time asM; and
C3. Contents – Having at least one bit position in which it is dominant (0), whereas it is
recessive (1) inM. All preceding bits should be the same asM.
To describe the general attack model, for now we assume that the adversary can transmit
a message that satisfies C1–C3. Details of how and why C1–C3 can be met will be
discussed in Section 2.4. As shown in Fig. 2.4, when the bus becomes idle, not only the
victim transmits message M but also the adversary transmits an attack message satisfying
C1–C3. So, not one but two transmitters — A and V sending messages with identical
IDs — win arbitration, and thus concurrently send their bit values of control, data, etc.,
on the bus. The two nodes’ bitwise transmissions are synchronized in virtue of hard and
soft synchronizations. Since the attack message meets C3, V sees an opposite polarity
on the bus to the one it transmitted (this happens after an arbitration). As a result, the
victim V experiences a bit error forced by A, thus increasing its TEC by 8. By repeating
this bus-off attack on the victim’s messages, the adversary can make the victim’s TEC to
continuously increase, and force the victim to enter bus-off mode and disconnect from the
bus. Although the victim is error-free in transmitting messages other than the targeted one,
since TEC increases by 8 upon detection of each error but decreases only by 1 for each
error-free transmission, an iterative bus-off attack rapidly increases the victim’s TEC. The
entire process of an iterative bus-off attack consists of the following two phases.
Phase 1 – Victim in error-active. Both adversary and victim nodes start in their default
mode, error-active. After observing messages on the CAN bus, the adversary targets one
of them for a bus-off attack. We refer to such a message as the target message and its
transmitter as the victim. As mentioned earlier, the adversary then injects its attack message
at the same time as the target message to increase the victim’s TEC. Thus, as shown in
Fig. 2.5a, the victim experiences bit error, transmits an active error flag, and increases its
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(a) Phase 1 – Victim in error-active mode.
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(b) Transition from Phase 1 to 2.
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(c) Phase 2 – Victim in error-passive mode.
Figure 2.5: Two phases of bus-off attack.
TEC by 8. Since an active error flag consists of 6 consecutive dominant bits (i.e., 000000),
either a stuff or bit error is triggered at the adversary node, and its TEC also increases by
8. After the error delimiter and IFS, the CAN controllers of the adversary and the victim
automatically retransmit the Tx-failed messages again at the same time. So, the exact same
bit error recurs until they both enter error-passive mode. What is significant about the attack
in Phase 1 is that the adversary can coerce the victim to become error-passive with just one
message injection.
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Phase 1 to 2. After 16 (re)transmissions, as shown in Fig. 2.5b, both the adversary
and the victim become error-passive when their TEC=128. Again, for the retransmitted
message, bit error occurs at the victim node. However, since the victim is now in
error-passive mode, it attempts to deliver a passive error flag which consists of 6 recessive
bits. At that time, since the adversary transmits its frame, the attempt to deliver the error
flag will persist until the adversary’s EOF. In contrast to Phase 1, the adversary node
experiences no error and thus succeeds in transmitting its frame, whereas the victim will
succeed later during its retransmission. In total, due to a bit error (+8) and a successful
retransmission (−1), the victim’s TEC changes 128→ 136→ 135, whereas the adversary’s
changes 128 → 127. Accordingly, the adversary returns to error-active, while the victim
remains error-passive. Up to this point, all but the first change in TEC are achieved via
automatic retransmissions by the CAN controller, i.e., the controller does it all for the
attacker!
Phase 2 – Victim in error-passive. Fig. 2.5c illustrates Phase 2 of the bus-off attack in
which only the victim is error-passive. Once the scheduled interval of the target message
has elapsed, the victim again transmits that message, and thus at the same time, the
adversary re-injects its attack message. Since the victim is still in error-passive mode, as
it was the case when transitioning from Phase 1 to 2, the adversary can decrease its TEC
further by 1. On the other hand, the victim’s TEC is again increased by 7 (=+8−1), thus
keeping the victim in error-passive mode. In Phase 2, the adversary iterates this process for
every periodically transmitted target message until the victim is eventually forced to bus
off, i.e., TEC>255. This implies that the periodicities of the attack and the target messages
are the same. As a result, the victim ECU becomes disconnected, and in the worst case,
the entire network shuts down [75].
Although CAN messages’ ID values do not contain information on their actual
transmitters, their values and intervals together imply the messages’ priority and
safety-criticality. That is, if the attacker targets a message sent with high priority (i.e., a
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low ID value) and small message intervals, then the attacker would most likely disconnect
a safety-critical ECU that sends important messages related to, for example, vehicle
acceleration or braking.
Alternative bus-off attacks. The adversary may attempt to iterate this process for not
only every periodic transmission but also every retransmission (as in Phase 1). However,
as shown in Fig. 2.5c, since error-passive nodes, which were the transmitter of the previous
message, have a longer IFS than error-active nodes, the adversary cannot synchronize its
injection timing with the victim’s retransmission, thus failing to mount the attack.
Yang [89] reported that an uncovered fatal error can sometimes occur due to a
misspecification of CAN; if a new frame is transmitted on the bus during the error
delimiter subsequent to a passive error flag issued by an error-passive node, a form error
incurs to that node, thus increasing its TEC. If the adversary were to exploit such an
inherent specification error in CAN to mount a bus-off attack, it may be simpler to coerce
the victim to bus off. However, the occurrence of that fatal error depends on what type of
new frame is transmitted at that time as well as how high the bus load is. Note that it would
be very difficult for an adversary to control such factors. That is, it is too restrictive for the
attacker to achieve the bus-off attack in that way. By contrast, we propose and discuss a
more general method for mounting the bus-off attack, i.e., succeeding the attack under any
bus condition.
2.4 Feasibility of Bus-off Attack
To mount the bus-off attack, the adversary has to inject an attack message that satisfies
conditions on ID, timing, and contents. We now discuss how and why each condition can
be met, in the ascending order of difficulty.
23
2.4.1 Different Contents
To trigger a bit error at the victim and increase its TEC, the attack message must first
satisfy C3: having at least one bit position in which its signal is dominant (0), whereas the
victim’s is recessive (1), and all preceding bits are identical. Since the bus-off attack also
requires the attack and target messages to have the same ID (i.e., C1 – identical arbitration
fields), the mismatch in C3 must occur in either the control or the data field. Note that
this is infeasible in other fields such as CRC and ACK, because they are determined by the
CAN controller, not by the user/adversary. Since CAN messages normally have DLC set
to at least 1 and non-zero data values, one simple but most definite way for the adversary
to cause a mismatch is to set the attack message’s DLC or data values to all 0s. Also, given
that DLC for each CAN ID is usually constant over time, the attacker can learn the value
and set its attack message’s DLC accordingly. This way, the adversary can satisfy C3.
2.4.2 Same ID
The next difficult task is to meet C1, which requires the attack message to have the
same ID as the target. That is, the adversary must know in advance the ID used by
the target message. The fact that favors the adversary is that CAN is a broadcast bus
system. However, each ECU cannot acquire the IDs of all received messages except those
passed through its message filter. We distinguish a received message from an accepted
message, depending on whether it passed through the filter and then arrived at a user-level
application. Since an adversary can read contents only from accepted messages, meeting
C1 depends on how the filter is set at the compromised ECU.
Empty message filter. Some ECUs in vehicles have almost, if not completely, empty
message filters so that they can receive, accept, and process almost all messages on the
bus, thus making it trivial to satisfy C1. A typical example of these ECUs is the telematic
unit, which has to operate in that way to provide a broad range of features, e.g., remote
diagnostics, anti-theft. Another interesting aspect of this ECU is that, from a security
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viewpoint, it is regarded as one of the most vulnerable ECUs due to its wide range of
external/remote attack surfaces. Note that several researchers have already shown the
practicability of compromising the telematic unit [31, 41, 50, 56]. So, this implies that an
adversary can compromise some empty filter ECUs more easily than those with non-empty
filters, thus satisfying C1.
Non-empty message filter. Although the message filter of a compromised ECU is
preset to accept messages with only a few different IDs, it does not restrict the adversary
in attacking them. Furthermore, by directly modifying the message filter, the adversary
can also mount the attack on messages that would usually have been filtered out. The
two most common CAN controllers — Microchip MCP2515 and NXP SJA1000 — both
allow modification and disabling of message filters through software commands, when the
ECU is in configuration mode [10, 15]. For ECUs with the Microchip MCP2515 CAN
controller, the configuration mode can be entered not only upon power-up or reset but
also via user instructions through the Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI). Through the SPI,
it is also possible for the user to read/write the CAN controller registers, including the
filter register [10]. Thus, such user-level features for configuring the CAN controller allow
attackers to easily enter configuration mode via software commands, and modify/disable
the message filters, thus satisfying C1.
2.4.3 Tx Synchronization
Even though the adversary knows the ID and contents to use for his attack message,
he should also know exactly when to send it. Unless the adversary is capable of sending
the attack message at the same time as the target message, not only once but iteratively, he
would fail to cause a bit error, or increase the victim’s TEC.
Difficulties in synchronizing the Tx timing. C2 requires the transmission of the attack
and the target messages to be synchronized with less than a bit resolution. If the attack
timing is wrong by even one bit, there won’t be two arbitration winners and the attack
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Figure 2.6: Example of preceded IDs.
would thus fail. For synchronizing the timing of its transmission, the adversary may utilize
the fact that CAN messages are usually sent at fixed intervals. For example, once the
adversary learns that the target message is sent every T ms, it can attempt to transmit
its attack message when T ms has elapsed since the target’s last transmission. However,
such an approach would be inaccurate due to jitters. Since jitters make the actual message
periodicities deviate from their preset values [46], albeit leveraging message periodicity
to fulfill C2, the attacker would have difficulties in synchronizing the transmission of its
attack message with the target’s.
Preceded ID. In order to overcome these difficulties, the adversary can exploit another
fact of CAN: nodes, which have either lost arbitration or had new messages buffered while
the bus was busy, attempt to transmit their messages as soon as the bus becomes idle.
We define a preceded ID of M as the ID of the message that has completed its
transmission right before the start of M’s. Consider an example where node A transmits
messages with ID=M1, M2, and node B transmits a message with ID=M3 which has the
lowest priority among them. As shown in Fig. 2.6, if these messages are arriving and
being queued at the depicted times, M1 and M2 would be the preceded IDs of M2 and
M3, respectively, with only a 3-bit IFS separating the corresponding message pairs. In
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Figure 2.7: Fabricated preceded ID.
other words, the transmissions ofM2 andM3 are forced to be buffered until their preceded
ID messages have been transmitted on the bus. Since message priorities and periodicities
do not change, such a feature implies that one particular CAN message may always be
followed by another specific message, i.e., there is a unique preceded ID for that specified
one. As an example, if the periodicities of their transmissions are either same or integer
multiples (e.g., 5ms forM1,M2, and 10ms forM3), thenM2 would always be the preceded
ID of M3, i.e., be the unique preceded ID. Hence, regardless of jitter, the exact timing of
message transmissions becomes rather predictable and even determinative: 3 bit-time after
the preceded ID’s completion.
Bus-off attack by exploiting preceded IDs. In the above example, to attack M3, the
adversary can monitor the CAN bus, learn its preceded ID of M2 or even M2’s preceded
ID of M1, and buffer an attack message with ID=M3 when receiving one of them. Then,
its CAN controller would always transmit the attack message afterM2’s transmission (i.e.,
concurrently with the target message), and the adversary will thus succeed in the bus-off
attack. Likewise, the adversary can targetM2 by buffering its attack message with ID=M2,
as soon as it receives its preceded ID ofM1. If the preceded ID is unique, then the bus-off
attack can be iterated for its every reception and thus consecutively increase the victim’s
TEC.
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Even though the target message does not have such a preceded ID, an adversary can
fabricate it in order to synchronize the timing and thus succeed in mounting the attack.
Consider an example shown in Fig. 2.7 where a victim node periodically transmits message
V, which has no preceded IDs. In such a case, just before the transmission of V, the
adversary can inject some message P and an attack message A, sequentially. Hence, V’s
transmission gets delayed until the completion of P, i.e., the adversary fabricates P as
the preceded ID of V, and thus the attack message is synchronized with its target. Our
evaluation results will later demonstrate the efficiency of bus-off attacks based on the above
approaches.
2.4.4 Preceded IDs in Actual CAN Traffic
The key point in meeting C2 and succeeding in the bus-off attack is leveraging the
preceded IDs of the target message. Depending on the configuration and scheduling of
messages, some target messages may (or may not) have a preceded ID. We first consider
the case in which the adversary is targeting messages with genuine (unfabricated) preceded
IDs. Hence, it is essential to verify their existence in actual CAN traffic as well as
usefulness in satisfying C2. That is, the following questions should be answered:
• Existence – Are there such preceded IDs in real in-vehicle network traffic?
• Uniqueness – If yes, how many distinct preceded IDs are there for a specified
message?
• Pattern – If more than one, are there any patterns in the preceded IDs which can be
utilized?
We answer these questions via an analysis of actual CAN traffic data. We use CAN data
that was recorded from a 2010 Toyota Camry by Ruth et al. [78]. During a 30-minute
drive, the data was logged by a Gryphon S3 and Hercules software [78]. According to the
logged data, there were 42 distinct messages transmitted on the CAN bus: 39 of them sent
periodically at intervals ranging from 10ms to 5 secs, and 3 of them sent sporadically.
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Figure 2.8: Distinct preceded IDs.
Existence and uniqueness. Of these, we first identify the ones of interest to us:
messages that are always sent right after another’s completion, i.e., have preceded IDs (e.g.,
M2 or M3 in Fig. 2.6). Of the 39 periodic messages seen on the bus, we were able to find
8 of such type. Fig. 2.8 shows the number of distinct preceded IDs of the ones labeled in
the x-axis. For example, message 0xB2 had a unique preceded ID 0xB0, i.e., 0xB2 always
followed 0xB0, where both were sent every 10ms. On the other hand, message 0x3B7 had
11 different kinds of those IDs. The result showing that 10% of the periodic messages
have a unique preceded ID answers the question of their existence as well as uniqueness in
actual CAN traffic, and thus implies that the bus-off attack exploiting genuine preceded IDs
is indeed feasible in actual vehicles. Since in-vehicle messages have fixed priorities, are
sent periodically, and some have to be sent consecutively by an ECU (e.g., two messages
containing front and rear wheel speed values), we believe preceded IDs are prevalent in all
other types of passenger cars as well.
Patterns in preceded IDs. Another interesting aspect of the CAN bus traffic, which
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Figure 2.9: Timing of preceded ID message injection.
caught our attention was that there were notable patterns in the preceded IDs. As shown in
Fig. 2.8, message 0x223 with periodicity 30ms had 3 distinct preceded IDs, meaning that
observing those IDs may not help determine the transmission timing of 0x223. However,
we were able to extract an interesting pattern in their transmission: the 6n-th transmission of
0x20 was the unique preceded ID of the 2n-th transmission of 0x223, where n is an integer.
That is, even though a unique preceded ID was not observable for every transmission, it
was for every n-fold transmission, i.e., there exists a pattern in preceded IDs. Therefore,
by observing the CAN bus traffic, acquiring knowledge of genuine preceded IDs, and thus
meeting not only C1, C3 but also C2, the adversary can succeed in mounting bus-off attack.
2.4.5 Fabrication of Preceded IDs
Even though the targeted messages do not have a preceded ID, as shown in Fig. 2.7,
the adversary can fabricate it to meet C2. Therefore, we will henceforth refer preceded ID
messages to ones which are fabricated by the adversary. The injection timing, quantity, and
the contents of the preceded ID message are important for the adversary to mount a bus-off
attack with preceded IDs.
Injection timing. To succeed in the bus-off attack via fabrication of preceded IDs,
it is essential for the adversary to inject that fabricated message right before the target
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message. In other words, the adversary is required to estimate when the target message
would be transmitted on the bus. Although most in-vehicle messages have fixed periodicity,
randomness incurred from jitters makes such estimation rather difficult. As shown in
Fig. 2.9, consider a target message V with periodicity of T , which is expected to be
transmitted at times torig, torig+T , and thereafter. Note that T is a predefined and constant
value for periodic messages. However, due to the jitters of Jn and Jn+1 — caused by
variations in the transmitter node’s clock drift, task scheduling, execution time, etc. [46]
— the victim’s messages are transmitted on the bus at times tvicn and t
vic
n+1, where n is the
sequence index. From the adversary’s perspective, due to an incurred delay of D from
transmission and reception, it receives message V at times tadvn and t
adv
n+1. Note that D
includes delays for message transmission, propagation, and processing. Since the number
of bits in a certain message is almost a constant and the bit timing of CAN already takes
into account of the signal propagation on the bus, without loss of generality, we assume D
to be constant for a given message V [2, 68].
Thus, the only remaining randomness in the timing of message transmission is jitter
(e.g., Jn). Jitter is known to follow a Gaussian distribution due to randomness in thermal
noise, which also follows a Gaussian, and the Central Limit Theorem, i.e., composite
effects of many uncorrelated noise sources approach a Gaussian distribution [46]. So, we
can consider Jn and Jn+1 as outcomes of a Gaussian random variable J ∼ N(0,σ2v ). Thus,
the times when the adversary receives V can be expressed as:
tadvn = t
vic
n +D= torig+ Jn+D
tadvn+1 = t
vic
n+1+D= torig+T + Jn+1+D,
(2.1)
where Jn < 0 and Jn+1 > 0 in Fig. 2.9. Then
tvicn+1 = t
adv
n +T −D+ Jn+1− Jn = tadvn +T −D+ J∗, (2.2)
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Before stuffing 000001111000011110000…
Stuffed bits
After stuffing 00000111110000011111000001…
Figure 2.10: Maximizing Tx duration via bit-stuffing.
where J∗ ∼ N(0,2σ2v ) since its outcomes are Jn+1 − Jn. Note that in Eq. (2.2), J∗ is the
only random variable whereas others are either constant or measurable by the adversary.
Such an equation shows that the adversary can indeed obtain an approximate estimation of
when the victim would transmit its message, i.e., the target message, at the next sequence.
As shown in Fig. 2.7, for the fabrication of preceded IDs to be effective, the adversary has
to 1) start transmission of its preceded ID message(s) before the target and 2,3) hold the
CAN bus, i.e., make the bus busy, until it becomes sure that the attack and target messages
would synchronize. That is, the adversary must meet the following three conditions:
1) tf ab <min(tvicn+1) = t
adv
n +T −D+min(J∗)
2) tf ab+H>max(tvicn+1) = t
adv
n +T −D+max(J∗)
3)H= κF>max(J∗)−min(J∗),
(2.3)
where t f ab denotes when the adversary starts to inject its fabricated preceded IDmessage(s).
Moreover,H denotes the duration of the adversary holding the bus, which is equivalent to κ
preceded IDmessages each sent for a duration of F. Since J∗ is a bounded Gaussian random
variable, the boundaries can be approximated as |max(J∗)|= |min(J∗)|  I√2σv, where σv
is measurable, and I an attack parameter. Since J∗ is Gaussian, setting I= 3 would provide
a 99.73% confidence and I= 4 a 99.99% confidence. In total, to fully exploit the fabricated
preceded IDs, the adversary has to start injecting them prior to tadvn +T −D− I
√
2σv. Note
that the adversary should not lower tf ab beyond max(tvicn+1)−H, which can be set once H is
determined.
Number of messages. Once satisfying 1) in Eq. (2.3), the adversary has to satisfy 3)
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— occupy the bus at least for the duration of max(J∗)−min(J∗) = 2√2Iσv, which can
be met via κ (≥ 1) injections of preceded ID messages. Since the adversary’s objective
is to mount the bus-off attack with a minimal number of injections, κ should be kept
to minimum by maximizing F. To maximize F, i.e., the duration of its preceded ID
message occupying the bus, the adversary can exploit the bit-stuffing rule of CAN: after
every 5 consecutive bits of the same polarity (e.g., 00000), an opposite polarity bit is
stuffed. By fabricating its preceded ID message with DLC=8 and the data field as shown
in Fig. 2.10, the adversary can maximize the number of stuffed bits and thus F to at least
F∗ = (8L+44+ 8L/4	)/Sbus = 124/Sbus, where 44 denotes the number of bits exterior
to the data field, L the DLC=8, and Sbus the bus speed. Note that at least 2L bits are added
to the fabricated message according to the CAN’s bit-stuffing rule. Hence, if we consider a
CAN bus with Sbus = 500Kbps, using a single injected preceded ID message, the adversary
can take control of the bus for at least 0.248ms. Such analyses suggest that for targeting a
message with a jitter deviation of σv, the adequate number of preceded ID messages can
be expressed as κ =
⌈
max(J∗)−min(J∗)
F∗
⌉
=
⌈
2
√
2IσvSbus
124
⌉
. For example, if σv = 0.025ms and
Sbus = 500Kbps, the adversary is only required to inject κ = 
0.8554 = 1 preceded ID
message with I = 3, i.e., 99.73% confidence. To ensure the effectiveness of the fabricated
preceded IDs with a near-perfect confidence, the adversary can set I = 4 and thus inject
κ = 
1.1405 = 2 messages at time tf ab. Our evaluation will later show that one injection
of fabricated ID messages (κ = 1) can be sufficient for a bus-off attack.
Contents of the preceded ID message. Other than the control and data fields, the
adversary also has to carefully decide which ID to use for fabricating the preceded ID
messages. If only one preceded ID message is to be used for the attack, the adversary
can exploit the next seemingly free ID. To be as elusive as possible, the ID value can be
changed for each attempt of attack and be chosen from those least frequently sent on the
bus. If two preceded ID messages are to be used, the adversary can similarly inject the first
one with any free ID but should inject the second one with an ID having higher priority
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Figure 2.11: CAN bus prototype.
(smaller value) than the target.
2.5 Evaluation
We now evaluate the feasibility of the proposed bus-off attack on a CAN bus prototype
and two real vehicles. For in-depth analyses of the bus-off attack, we first evaluate the
attack on the CAN bus prototype, and then extend the evaluation to real vehicles.
2.5.1 Bus-off Attack
As shown in Fig. 2.11, we configured a CAN prototype in which all 3 nodes were
connected to each other via a 2-wire bus. Each node consists of an Arduino UNO board
and a SeeedStudio CAN bus shield, which is composed of a Microchip MCP2515 CAN
controller with SPI interface, MCP2551 CAN transceiver, and a 120Ω terminal resistor to
provide CAN bus communication capabilities.
Evaluation setup. The CAN bus prototype was set up to operate at 500Kbps as in
typical in-vehicle CAN buses. Three interconnected nodes were each programmed to
replicate the scenario shown in Fig. 2.6, which is also commonly seen in actual CAN
bus traffic: every 10ms, node A was programmed to send two consecutive messages with
ID=0x07 and 0x09, and B to send one message with a lower priority of ID=0x11. Node
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Figure 2.12: TECs during a bus-off attack.
B buffered its message when a message with ID=0x07 was received. Note that 0x07 and
0x09 become the genuine preceded IDs of 0x09 and 0x11, respectively. We will later
extend this evaluation of the bus-off attack to the case without assuming the availability of
genuine preceded IDs. Last, but not least, the third node was programmed as an attacker
which learns any preceded IDs on the bus and repetitively launches the bus-off attack. In
our evaluation, message 0x11 from B was set as the attacker’s target message. Hence,
the attack message was set up to have the same ID=0x11 but with a different DLC (=0).
Since the targeted message had a period of 10ms, the bus-off attack was repeated at the
same time interval. For every message transmission/reception, the Transmit Error Count
(TEC) of each node was read from its CAN controller register. The entire procedure of
an iterative bus-off attack was re-initiated once a node entered the bus-off mode, and was
examined 1,000 times.
Changes in TEC during a bus-off attack. Fig. 2.12 shows how the TECs of the
victim and the adversary change during an iterative bus-off attack. All 1,000 examinations
showed near identical changes as shown in Fig. 2.12. In the initial stage of the attack,
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Figure 2.13: Victim’s TEC during Phase 1 and 2.
there was a steep rise in the TEC of both nodes. This is because in Phase 1, with just
one attack message, bit errors incurred for not only the initial transmission but also all
subsequent retransmissions as depicted in Fig. 2.5a. Once the victim became error-passive,
i.e., TEC>127, the attack entered its second phase. Here, with successful message
transmissions, the adversary was able to recover back to, and remain as error-active. On
the other hand, the victim experienced iterative bit errors during its transmissions, and
eventually entered the bus-off mode when its TEC exceeded 255.
Properties of attack Phase 2. Fig. 2.13 shows a magnified plot of the changes in the
victim’s TEC during the attack. In Phase 1, TEC monotonically increased due to the errors
in all (re)transmissions. On the other hand, once the attack entered Phase 2, the difference
in error mode lets the victim succeed in its transmission only after experiencing a bit error.
Thus, whenever an attack message was injected into the bus by the attacker, the victim’s
TEC was first increased by 8 and then immediately decreased by 1. The net TEC increase
of 7 each time eventually forced the victim to be disconnected from the bus. These results
confirm the properties of Phase 2 discussed in Section 2.3.2.
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Figure 2.14: Delays of bus-off attack under different bus speeds.
2.5.2 Attack Under Different Bus Conditions
The bit-rate of the CAN bus can vary from 125Kbps to 1Mbps, depending on
its purpose, and its bus load can also vary with time. Thus, in order to examine the
practicability of a bus-off attack under different bus conditions, we conducted the same
experiment in Section 2.5.1 1,000 times, while varying the speed and load of the bus. Each
time we measured the average delays of the bus-off attack that forces a victim to enter
error-passive and bus-off modes, as they represent the following metrics: (1) the required
number of attack messages, and (2) the probability of the attack’s success. If there was at
least one attempt in which the attack failed, then the maximum deviation in delays would
be at least the inter-attack interval.
Different bus speeds. Fig. 2.14 shows box plots of the average delays of the bus-off
attack in coercing the victim to become error-passive and bus-off. The bus speed was varied
from 250Kbps to its maximum of 1Mbps. As shown in Fig. 2.14 (top), for all bus speeds,
it took much less than 10ms for the adversary to coerce the victim to become error-passive.
37
100 200 300 400 500
#messages per second on the bus
188
189
190
191
192
193
D
el
ay
 o
f s
uc
ce
ed
in
g 
bu
s-
of
f a
tta
ck
 [m
s]
Figure 2.15: Delays of bus-off attack under different bus loads.
Since the attack message was injected every 10ms, this implies that only a single injection
of the attack message was required. Also, observing that the maximum deviation was less
than 10ms, all attempted bus-off attacks succeeded, irrespective of the bus speed. The
attacker was able to make the victim enter error-passive mode faster with the increase of
bus speed, because a higher bus speed enabled frame (re)transmissions to complete more
quickly. Fig. 2.14 (bottom) shows the total delay of the victim eventually becoming bus-off
at different bus speeds. For all settings, the maximum deviation was less than 10ms, again
implying a 100% success probability of the attack.
Different bus loads. Not only the speed but also the load of the bus was varied
in evaluating the attack. To generate different bus loads, the node that was neither the
adversary nor the victim injected 100∼500 messages per second. Their IDs were randomly
chosen among the set of unused ID values, and their DLCs were set randomly between 1
and 8. Fig. 2.15 shows the average total delay of coercing the victim node to eventually
bus off under the given bus loads. As the bus load increases, the overall delay is shown to
rise, because some of the randomly injected messages won arbitration over the target and
attack messages and thus delayed their transmission. Note, however, that since they both
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Figure 2.16: Changes in TECs when the preceded ID is fabricated.
had the same IDs, they both won/lost the arbitration. Therefore, in all 1000 examinations
with different bus loads, all trials of bus-off attack succeeded regardless of the bus load.
2.5.3 Periodicity vs. Preceded ID
Tomount a bus-off attack, the attack message has to satisfy conditions C1–C3. Of these,
C2 is the most difficult to meet, but can be satisfied by exploiting either of the following
three scenarios:
• Periodicity – measure the Tx interval of the target message and exploit it for
synchronizing the transmission timing.
• Genuine ID – assuming genuine preceded IDs are available, exploit them for the
bus-off attack.
• Fabricated ID – fabricating and thus exploiting the preceded ID of a target message.
We evaluated all of these in order to verify their accuracies and efficiencies. For the first
scenario, the adversary and the victim were programmed to send messages every 10ms
with the same ID but different DLC values. The first transmissions from both nodes were
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initiated by a reference message sent by the non-victim node. For the second scenario of
exploiting genuine preceded IDs, the nodes were programmed equivalently as discussed in
Section 2.5.1. Finally, for the third scenario, we programmed the adversary to fabricate
one preceded ID message per attack as shown in Fig 2.7. For each attack scenario, we
examined 50,000 bus-off attack trials.
When periodicity was exploited to synchronize the Tx timing for a bus-off attack,
due to jitters, only 58 out of 50,000 trials (0.12%) were able to trigger a bit error at the
victim, thus eventually not triggering a bus-off. On the other hand, when genuine preceded
IDs were assumed to be present and thus were exploited, all 50,000 trials succeeded in
increasing the victim’s TEC. Even without assuming that there is a genuine preceded ID
for the target message, the adversary increased the victim’s TEC 45,127 times (out of
50,000 trials) by fabricating it, i.e., a 0.9025 success probability. Note that in achieving
such a high probability, one fabricated preceded ID was sufficient since the jitter deviation
σv = 0.023ms. Although some attempts failed, due to the high success rate and the nature
of change in TEC (i.e.,+8 in TEC in case of error and−1 in the absence of error), iterative
bus-off attacks eventually forced the victim to bus off as shown in Fig. 2.16. One can
see that the change in TEC is slightly different from the one in Fig. 2.12 due to some
failed attempts. These results show that a preceded ID — regardless of whether genuine
or fabricated — is a good indicator for determining the exact timing of a specific message,
and is indeed useful for mounting a bus-off attack.
2.5.4 Bus-off Attack on Real Vehicles
To evaluate the feasibility of bus-off attack further, we also conducted experiments on
two real vehicles, 2013 Honda Accord and 2016 Hyundai Sonata shown in Figs. 2.17a and
2.17b. During our experiments, the vehicles were immobilized for safety in an isolated and
controlled environment. As shown in Fig. 2.17, through the On-Board Diagnostic (OBD-II)
port, we were able to connect our CAN bus prototype to their in-vehicle CAN buses, both
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(a) Communication with ECUs in a 2013 Honda Accord.
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(b) Communication with ECUs in a 2016 Hyundai Sonata.
Figure 2.17: Bus-off attack experiments on (a) Honda Accord 2013 and (b) Hyundai Sonata
2016.
of which run at 500Kbps. Thus, the 3 prototype nodes were able to read all 40 distinct
broadcast messages from the Honda Accord’s CAN bus and 58 distinct messages from the
Hyundai Sonata’s CAN bus. Moreover, the nodes were capable of injecting and delivering
arbitrary messages to the in-vehicle ECUs.
Increasing the TEC of a real in-vehicle ECU. We first experimentally show that an
attacker can synchronize its Tx timing with a real ECU, increase its TEC, and thus succeed
in launching a bus-off attack. For the evaluation on the Honda Accord, one prototype node
was programmed as the attacker mounting a bus-off attack on one of its ECUs, which sent
message 0x295 every 40ms. The attacker node made 15 attempts of the bus-off attack on
that ECU by fabricating the preceded ID of 0x295. For the evaluation on the Hyundai
Sonata, the node was programmed to mount the attack on an ECU which sent message
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(b) 2016 Hyundai Sonata.
Figure 2.18: Transmit error counts of ECUs in the two real vehicles are increased via
bus-off attack.
0x164 every 10ms. Similarly, 15 attempts of the bus-off attack via fabrication of preceded
ID were made.
Due to restrictions in accessing the error counters of real in-vehicle ECUs, we validate
the attack on real ECUs by exploiting the fact that in Phase 1 of the bus-off attack, the
attacker’s and the victim’s TECs increase equivalently and both eventually exceed 127
within a very short period. So, Fig. 2.18 shows (i) how the attacker’s TEC changed during
Phase 1 of 15 bus-off attack attempts under both settings, and (ii) how the TEC of the
in-vehicle victim ECU changed. In contrast, during Phase 2, the attacker’s TEC does not
reflect the victim’s TEC. Since the results from only Phase 1 are valid, once the attacker’s
TEC exceeds 127, the node is reset to initialize its error counters. For the real ECU’s
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Figure 2.19: Iterative bus-off attack in a Honda Accord and a Hyundai Sonata.
TEC to be re-initialized so as to iterate Phase 1, the adversary mounted the attack every 5
secs, thus allowing the real ECU to decrease its TEC back to 0 as a result of its error-free
transmissions during this period.
One can see from Fig. 2.18a that in 13 out of 15 attempts, the attacker’s and hence
the Honda Accord ECU’s (victim’s) TEC rose steeply, thus making both ECUs enter
error-passive mode. As the attack was mounted via one fabricated preceded ID, 2 out of
15 attempts failed. The steep rises of TEC were again due to automatic retransmissions
by the attacker node’s and the in-vehicle ECU’s CAN controllers. Similarly, Fig. 2.18b
shows that, except for one attempt, the Hyundai Sonata ECU’s TEC always increased
when the bus-off attack was mounted. Although we could only show the result from Phase
1, it implies that the attacker can synchronize the Tx timing with a real ECU, and iterate
such a process to continuously increase its TEC, eventually forcing it to disconnect from
the in-vehicle network. Moreover, it shows that the attack can succeed regardless of the
vehicle model/year, and corroborates an important fact of the bus-off attack: there is no
need to reverse-engineer messages or checksums for mounting the bus-off attack, thus
making it easier for the adversary to launch the bus-off attack.
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Forcing an in-vehicle ECU to bus off. To further demonstrate the feasibility of
the bus-off attack on real vehicles, we also evaluated a scenario in which one of the
CAN prototype nodes was made to be the victim. The period of the target message sent
by the victim was set to 50ms. Since the three CAN prototype nodes were capable of
exchanging messages with real ECUs in both vehicles, they were successfully added to
their in-vehicle CAN networks, and hence operate/act as if they were real ECUs. As a
result, an attack on one of them would be equivalent to an attack on a real ECU. Unlike
the prototype setting, however, their bus loads were significantly higher — due to traffic
generated by real in-vehicle ECUs — during the attack, i.e., the attack was evaluated in
highly complex CAN bus traffic. Fig. 2.19 shows the changes in TECs of the victim node
being attacked on the 2013 Honda Accord and the 2016 Hyundai Sonata. Under both
settings, through iterative bus-off attacks, the victim became error-passive within 2.4ms
and eventually entered bus-off mode. Compared to the prototype setting, since the target
message was set to have a larger interval and the bus loads were much higher, the overall
delays of the victim entering error-passive and bus-off were larger.
These results on the two real vehicles confirm that the bus-off attack is indeed a severe,
real problem.
2.6 Related Work
As a countermeasure against attacks on in-vehicle networks, message authentication
and intrusion detection systems (IDSs) have been the two main lines of defense.
As we had discussed in Chapter I, providing message authentication for CAN
is difficult due to the limited space available for appending a MAC in its data field.
Moreover, the requirement of real-time communication and processing makes the
provision of authentication a non-trivial problem. Although, several schemes have been
proposed to overcome these difficulties, in the proposed bus-off attack, the adversary
causes a bit error at the victim during message reception. Thus, even though a MAC is
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appended to the message, its functionalities will be nullified. Similarly, the functionalities
of message checksums are also nullified.
Other than authentication methods, IDSs have also been proposed as countermeasures.
The essence of state-of-the-art IDSs is to monitor the periodicity and contents of messages,
and verify whether there are any significant changes to them. Although such IDSs
are capable of detecting attacks to some extent, they overlooked the fact that message
periodicity can change even in a normal or uncompromised environment. For example,
if an error had occurred due to hardware/software fault, then that message would
automatically be retransmitted by the CAN controller, thus changing its transmission
interval [77]. As a result, since an abnormal periodicity may be due to a system error as
well as an attack, it is unreasonable to directly map such a symptom to an attack. For
example, 16 consecutive error frames can occur due to not only a bus-off attack but also
improper CAN termination [17]. This implies that for the proposed bus-off attack, the IDS
may not tell if the error was due to an attack or a system error.
2.7 Countermeasures
The proposed bus-off attack is an important vulnerability, especially in view of its
capability of nullifying MACs and checksums, and also deceiving IDSs to think there is
a system error although the network is actually under attack. We propose a new defense
mechanism which leverages the following features of the bus-off attack for its prevention.
In Phase 1, due to CAN’s automatic retransmission,
F1. at least two consecutive errors occur during the transmission of frames. Thus, we
watch for consecutive error frames with an active error flag.
In Phase 2, due to the difference in error modes,
F2. at the time when the (error-passive) victim’s TEC increases, a message with the same
ID will be successfully transmitted by some ECU on the bus.
F1 indicates a bus-off attack. We first simulated the probability of F1 under an
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Figure 2.20: Probability of two consecutive errors.
uncompromised condition. We leveraged the same error model in [77] where bit error
occurrences follow a Bernoulli distribution. In our simulation, for a given DLC and Bit
Error Rate (BER), we randomly generated 100,000 different CAN messages and measured
how many of them satisfy F1. The simulation result, plotted in Fig. 2.20, shows that
even under an unusually high BER of 10−3 (usually 10−5 ∼ 10−7 [77]), the maximum
probability of F1 was only 0.11%. So, under a normal condition, the probability of F1
occurring 16 times in a bursty manner can be considered 0, whereas it was 1.0 during a
bus-off attack. Considering this large discrepancy, we can consider F1 to indicate a bus-off
attack. However, since F1 can also occur due to severe system errors such as improper bus
termination [17], bit flip [85], and bit drop/insertion [67], F1 alone cannot be a definitive
evidence of a bus-off attack.
F2 is the evidence. After occurrence of F1, once an error-passive ECU experiences a
bit error again when transmitting a message with ID=M, it can further monitor the CAN
bus and check if there was any successful transmission of another message with the same
ID=M, i.e., occurrence of F2. This can only occur when two or more ECUs are sending
the same message at the same time, which is not allowed on CAN and thus infeasible even
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Figure 2.21: Efficiency of the proposed countermeasure.
in a severely erroneous network, while it is possible under a bus-off attack. From both F1
and F2, we can thus verify the occurrence of a bus-off attack, i.e., the observed symptoms
are not caused by a system error. Following this reasoning, we propose the following
defense mechanism: an ECU or its error counters are reset whenever F2 is observed after
N consecutive error frames. We use N = 16 to reset the victim ECU upon occurrence of
both F1 and F2.
Efficiency of the proposed countermeasure. We evaluated the bus-off attack on our
CAN bus prototype with the proposed countermeasure. According to the proposed defense,
the nodes were programmed to reset when F2 was observed after 16 consecutive and bursty
error frames. During an iterative bus-off attack, Fig. 2.21 shows how the victim’s TEC
changed with and without the proposed defense. By observing the presence of bursty error
frames on the CAN bus, the victim’s error mode mostly stayed as error-active, which is in
sharp contrast to the case without any countermeasure, and also successfully transmitted
its messages, efficiently preventing the bus-off attack.
Alternative countermeasures. In our proposed countermeasure, we looked for
consecutive error frames (i.e., F1) to prevent the bus-off attack. We may also consider a
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countermeasure which verifies if consecutive errors incur at the same bit position, instead
of frames. As this is, in fact, the strongest evidence of the bus-off attack, we may use it as
the condition of triggering an ECU reset. It may also be considered as a new rule in CAN
for not increasing the error counters. Then, as the detection of a bus-off attack can be made
much faster with the stronger evidence, unwanted retransmissions, which were at least 16
in our proposed countermeasure, can be reduced further. Note that these retransmissions
may affect other messages in meeting their hard/soft deadlines. Albeit effective, such a
countermeasure accompanies numerous challenges and limitations: 1) detecting individual
bit errors would require changes in hardware, thus incurring expensive development cost
and 2) detecting which bit has currently changed and comparing it with the previously
changed one would require additional memory in the CAN transceiver chip.
The proposed bus-off attack exploits the periodic feature of in-vehicle network
messages for synchronizing its transmission time with the victim’s. It is thus limited
to only periodic messages but it is very effective since most in-vehicle messages are
periodic. Therefore, an alternative countermeasure can be to transmit periodic messages
with some random factors added to their Tx times (e.g., adding random jitters), making
them somewhat aperiodic. However, adding random factors to Tx times can create serious
unexpected problems such as priority inversion, message sequence inversion, and deadline
violation [37]. As this incurs detrimental effects on the message scheduling mechanism,
we did not consider it as a possible countermeasure against the bus-off attack.
2.8 Discussion
Severity of the bus-off attack. Since contemporary in-vehicle networks are not
equipped with security mechanisms, an adversary can mount not only the bus-off attack
but also other types of (previously covered) attacks on in-vehicle networks. For example,
the attacker can simply inject arbitrary messages on the CAN bus or monopolize the
network by continuously sending the highest-priority frames. However, the following facts
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make the bus-off attack a more severe problem and an attack that an adversary might favor
over other attacks. Previously demonstrated/covered attacks either show obvious misuse
of message IDs or significantly increase the message frequency, which can easily be
detected and then removed by existing IDSs [45, 56, 65]. In contrast, the proposed bus-off
attack can be mounted without misusing IDs and requires only a small increase in message
frequency — up to a frequency that renders the bus-off attack feasible even during a system
error (e.g., bit drop/insertion). This may cause the existing IDSs to be confused whether
the symptom is due to an attack or a system error. More importantly, unlike previously
demonstrated attacks, the adversary can mount a bus-off attack without any knowledge
on the meanings or purposes of messages, making their reverse-engineering unnecessary.
Also, the attacker succeeds before the victim verifies a message’s checksum, and hence
can use an arbitrary checksum in the attack message, i.e., no need to reverse-engineer
the implemented checksum algorithm. Even if MACs were used for in-vehicle network
messages, their functionalities could likewise be nullified. Requiring far less painstaking
(than reverse engineering) efforts — especially when the adversary wants to mount attacks
on various types of vehicles — differentiates the bus-off attack from previously known
vehicle attacks and can also be a strong motivation for the adversary to prefer the bus-off
attack to others.
Limitations of the bus-off attack. In order to succeed in the bus-off attack, the attacker
must synchronize its transmission timing with the victim’s. To achieve this, the proposed
bus-off attack leverages the CAN protocol’s buffering strategy via a genuine/fabricated
preceded ID message. As mentioned before, however, its exploitation is only feasible when
the target message (from the victim) is sent periodically. In other words, the attacker cannot
force a victim to bus off when he is sending messages aperiodically. Meanwhile, since most
messages in CAN are sent periodically, the attacker can succeed in mounting the bus-off
attack on most ECUs in the in-vehicle network.
Vulnerability of other in-vehicle networks. Although most modern vehicles are
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equipped with CAN, some may deploy other protocols, such as CAN-FD, TTCAN, and
FlexRay for more complex operations. Note that CAN-FD is an enhanced version of
CAN, providing flexible and higher data rates as well as a larger data field [67]. Since
CAN-FD’s basic components, arbitration, and error handling all conform to those in CAN,
it is also vulnerable to the proposed bus-off attack. What makes CAN-FD more interesting
is that an attacker can monitor the newly introduced Extended Data Length (EDL) and Bit
Rate Switch (BRS) fields, recognize which messages are sent with high bit rates or large
payloads — safety-critical messages — and target them for a bus-off attack.
TTCAN is a session-layer protocol in which its message transmissions are based on
a static schedule, time-triggered paradigm to provide Tx determinism [51]. As a result,
all ECUs transmit their messages only at their assigned time slots and are periodically
synchronized through a broadcast reference message. Since the allocated time slots are
predefined in a schedule matrix and are stored in each node, the attacker — having control
of a vehicle running TTCAN — is provided with the knowledge of what messages are sent
and when, thus making the bus-off attack easier.
In FlexRay, which is designed to be more reliable than CAN as in CAN-FD, the
error modes are divided into 3 different modes: normal-active, normal-passive, and halt.
Normal-active mode is essentially equivalent to the error-active mode of CAN, whereas
normal-passive mode differs from the CAN’s error-passive mode, as it does not allow
the nodes to transmit in that mode. Accordingly, FlexRay becomes invulnerable to the
proposed bus-off attack.
2.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, we discovered a new vulnerability, called the bus-off attack, of in-vehicle
networks. The attack exploits their error-handling scheme to disconnect an uncompromised
ECU and/or even shut down the entire in-vehicle network. We analyzed its practicability
and demonstrated the attack on a CAN bus prototype and two real vehicles. Based on our
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analysis and experimental results, we proposed a defense mechanism to prevent the bus-off
attack. Even though the proposed attack has not yet been seen in the wild, it is easy to
mount and also directly related to drivers/passengers’ safety, and should thus be countered
with high priority. Moreover, the facts that the proposed attack can nullify state-of-the-art
solutions and is easy to launch, make it even more important to design and deploy its
countermeasures. Thus, we recommend concerted efforts from both academia and industry
to account for this vulnerability in the design of in-vehicle networks.
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CHAPTER III
Fingerprinting Electronic Control Units for Vehicle
Intrusion Detection
3.1 Introduction
Many researchers have been able to demonstrate various types of vehicle attacks,
some forcing mass recalls from car OEMs. As a countermeasure against such attacks,
defense schemes in the forms of message authentication or intrusion detection have been
proposed. Although these provide a certain level of security, there still remain critical
attacks which existing schemes can neither detect nor prevent, for two main reasons: 1)
in-vehicle messages do not carry information on their transmitters, and thus one cannot
tell whether they originate from genuine transmitters; and 2) lack of the transmitters’
information makes it very difficult or impossible for state-of-the-art IDSs to identify which
ECU has mounted an attack.
To overcome these limitations and defend against various vehicle attacks, we propose
a new anomaly-based IDS, called Clock-based IDS (CIDS). The need of CIDS for vehicles
is motivated through an analysis of three representative in-vehicle network attacks —
fabrication, suspension, and masquerade attacks. Our analysis shows that state-of-the-art
IDSs are insufficient, especially in detecting the masquerade attack due to the absence of
the transmitters’ information in messages. CIDS overcomes these limitations of existing
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IDSs by fingerprinting in-vehicle ECUs. Researchers have proposed various schemes for
fingerprinting network devices by estimating their clock skews through the timestamps
carried in their control packet headers [47, 49, 73, 90]. However, since such embedded
timestamps are not available for in-vehicle networks making them inapplicable, CIDS
fingerprints in-vehicle ECUs in a very different way.
CIDS monitors the intervals of (commonly seen) periodic in-vehicle messages, and
then exploits them to estimate the clock skews of their transmitters which are then used
to fingerprint the transmitters. That is, instead of assuming or requiring timestamps
to be carried in messages for fingerprinting, CIDS exploits the periodic feature (seen
at receivers) of in-vehicle network messages for fingerprinting transmitter ECUs. This
makes CIDS invulnerable to attackers who use faked timestamps and thus clock skews
— a problem that timestamp-based fingerprinting schemes cannot handle. Based on the
thus-obtained fingerprints, CIDS constructs a norm model of ECUs’ clock behaviors using
the Recursive Least Squares (RLS) algorithm and detects intrusions with a Cumulative
Sum (CUSUM) analysis. This enables CIDS to detect not only attacks that have already
been demonstrated or discussed in literature, but also those that are more acute and cannot
be detected by state-of-the-art IDSs. Our experimental evaluations show that CIDS detects
various types of in-vehicle network intrusions with a low false-positive rate of 0.055%.
Unlike state-of-the-art IDSs, if an intrusion is detected in CIDS, its fingerprinting capability
facilitates identification of the (compromised) ECU that mounted the attack. We validate
these capabilities of CIDS through experimental evaluations on a CAN bus prototype and
on real vehicles.
Although CIDS’s focus is on securing CAN, its applicability is not limited to it; we also
discuss its applicability to other in-vehicle network protocols in Section 3.6. Considering
the ubiquity of CAN and its direct relationship with the drivers/passengers’ safety, it is
critically important to build as capable a CAN bus IDS as possible.
This work makes the following contributions:
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• Development of a novel scheme of fingerprinting ECUs by exploiting message
periodicity;
• Proposal of CIDS, which models the norm behavior of in-vehicle ECUs’ clocks based
on fingerprints and then detects in-vehicle network intrusions;
• Implementation and validation of CIDS on a CAN bus prototype as well as on 3 real
vehicles.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides the necessary
background of CAN and IDS-related work, and Section 3.3 details the attack model we
consider. Section 3.4 details the design of CIDS, which is evaluated in Section 3.5 on a
CAN bus prototype as well as on three real vehicles. Section 3.6 discusses CIDS further,
such as its overhead and extension to emerging in-vehicle networks. Finally, we conclude
the chapter in Section 3.7.
3.2 Background
For completeness, we first provide the necessary background on the CAN protocol that
is yet unexplained but relevant to CIDS. Then, we discuss the related work on security
solutions for in-vehicle networks.
3.2.1 Synchronization in CAN
Each ECU broadcasts periodic (or occasionally sporadic) frames on the CAN bus to
deliver retrieved sensor data. For proper bitwise message transmission and reception, hard
and soft bit synchronizations are achieved, respectively, by using the Start-of-Frame (SOF)
signal and bit stuffing in CAN frames [2]. Although these provide alignment of bit edges
for message exchange, they do not synchronize the clocks of ECUs, i.e., CAN lacks clock
synchronization. Thus, since time instants for ECUs are provided by their own quartz
crystal clocks, these clocks, in reality, run at different frequencies, resulting in random
drifting of clocks: a drift of 2400ms over a period of 24 hours is possible [61].
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3.2.2 Deficiency of State-of-the-art Defense Schemes
In the area of Internet security, cryptographic message authentication provides strong
protection against forgery. Thus, researchers have attempted to borrow such approaches
from the domain of Internet security to address in-vehicle network security problems.
Although such preventive measures provide some degree of security, they alone cannot
guarantee complete security due to their inability to handle certain critical attacks,
e.g., Denial-of-Service (DoS). Moreover, their operations not only require a significant
amount of processing power but also increase message latencies and bus utilization.
Since in-vehicle networks must operate in real time and ECUs are resource-limited for
cost reasons, unlike in the Internet, these “costs” of preventive measures hinder their
adoption [65]. More importantly, when an adversary has full access to any data stored in
RAM and/or FLASH, including data used for implementing security mechanisms (e.g.,
shared secret keys), some cryptographic solutions become incapable [57].
To overcome such limitations of preventive measures, different IDSs have been
proposed. Although existing IDSs are capable of detecting most attacks, they fail to cover
some critical attacks which are more acute, and thus are not sufficient to provide security.
We will elaborate on such shortcomings of state-of-the-art IDSs while analyzing the attack
scenarios under consideration in Section 3.3.3.
3.3 Attack Model
We first discuss the adversary model under consideration, and then the three
representative attack scenarios.
3.3.1 Adversary Model
Adversaries can physically/remotely compromise more than one in-vehicle ECU
via numerous attack surfaces and means [31]. We consider an adversary who wants
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to manipulate or impair in-vehicle functions. The adversary can achieve this by either
injecting arbitrary messages with a spoofed ID into the in-vehicle network, which we
refer to as attack messages, or by stopping/suspending message transmissions of the
compromised ECU.
Strong and weak attackers. Depending on their hardware, software, and attack
surfaces, ECUs of different vehicles have different degrees of vulnerabilities, thus
providing attackers different capabilities. So, we consider two different types of
compromised ECUs: fully and weakly compromised ECUs.
Through aweakly compromised ECU, the attacker is assumed to be able to stop/suspend
the ECU from transmitting certain messages or keep the ECU in listen-only mode, but
cannot inject any fabricated messages. We call such an attacker with limited capabilities a
weak attacker, and will use this term interchangeably with “weakly compromised ECU”.
In contrast, with a fully compromised ECU, the attacker is assumed to have full
control of it and access to memory data. Thus, in addition to what a weak attacker can
do, the attacker controlling a fully compromised ECU can mount attacks by injecting
arbitrary attack messages. We call such an attacker with more attack capabilities a strong
attacker, and will use this term interchangeably with a “fully compromised ECU”. Even
when preventive security mechanisms (e.g., MAC) are built into the ECUs, since the
strong attacker has full access to any data stored in their memory, including data used for
implementing security mechanisms (e.g., shared secret keys), it can disable them [57].
On the other hand, a weak attacker can only stop, or listen to message transmissions, but
cannot start a new one.
Foster et al. [41] have recently proved the possible existence of these two types of
attackers in in-vehicle networks. They have shown that the firmware versions of telematics
units can affect/limit the attacker’s capabilities in injecting and monitoring in-vehicle
network messages. Specifically, for a certain firmware version of the telematics unit,
an attacker having control of that ECU was shown to be able to receive CAN messages
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Figure 3.1: Three representative attack scenarios on in-vehicle networks.
but unable to send the messages. On the other hand, for some other firmware versions,
the attacker was capable of both sending and receiving CAN messages to and from the
in-vehicle network. In other words, the firmware version of an ECU determines which
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type of an attacker — strong or weak — it can become, if compromised.
To further comprehend how and why these two different types of attackers can exist,
let’s consider one of the most common CAN controllers, Microchip MCP2515 [10]. For
ECUs with such a controller, various operation modes like configuration, normal, and
listen-only can be selected by user instructions through the Serial Peripheral Interface
(SPI). Thus, user-level features for configuring the CAN controller allow attackers to easily
enter different modes (e.g., listen-only mode for a weak attacker). In contrast, there are
no such features allowing attackers to easily inject forged messages. In other words, the
specification of the ECU hardware/software, if compromised, can restrict the adversary to
become a weak attacker only. Note that the required functionalities of a strong attacker
subsume those of a weak attacker. It is thus easier for an adversary to become a weak
attacker than a strong attacker, let alone researchers have already demonstrated how to
create such a strong attacker [31, 50, 56, 57].
3.3.2 Attack Scenarios
Based on the adversary model discussed so far, we consider the following attack
scenarios that can severely impair in-vehicle functions: fabrication, suspension, and
masquerade.1
Fabrication attack. Through an in-vehicle ECU compromised to be a strong attacker,
the adversary fabricates and injects messages with forged ID, DLC, and data. The objective
of this attack is to override any periodic messages sent by a legitimate safety-critical ECU
so that their receiver ECUs get distracted or become inoperable. For example, as shown
in Fig. 3.1a, the strong attacker A injects several attack messages with ID=0xB0, which
is usually sent by a legitimate ECU B, at a high frequency. Thus, other nodes which
normally receive message 0xB0 are forced to receive the fabricated attack messages more
often than the legitimate ones. We refer to such a case as A mounting a fabrication attack
1In this dissertation, we focus on only these three attack scenarios and do not consider others as they may
be less feasible or harmful, or be detectable by existing IDSs.
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on message 0xB0 or its genuine transmitter B. Demonstrated attacks such as controlling
vehicle maneuver [50] and monopolizing the CAN bus with highest priority messages [45]
exemplify a fabrication attack.
Suspension attack. Tomount a suspension attack, the adversary needs only one weakly
compromised ECU, i.e., become a weak attacker. As one type of Denial-of-Service (DoS)
attack, the objective of this attack is to stop/suspend the weakly compromised ECU’s
message transmissions, thus preventing the delivery/propagation of information it acquired,
to other ECUs. For some ECUs, they must receive certain information from other ECUs
to function properly. Therefore, the suspension attack can harm not only the (weakly)
compromised ECU itself but also other receiver ECUs. An example of this attack is shown
in Fig. 3.1b where the weak attacker having control of the Electric Power Steering ECU
B stops transmitting its measured steering wheel angle value. So, the Electronic Stability
Control (ESC) ECU A, which requires the steering wheel angle value from B for detecting
and reducing the loss of traction, no longer receives its updates and thus malfunctions.
Masquerade attack. To mount a masquerade attack, the adversary needs to
compromise two ECUs, one as a strong attacker and the other as a weak attacker. The
objective of this attack is to manipulate an ECU, while shielding the fact that an ECU is
compromised. Fig. 3.1c shows an example where the adversary controls a strong attacker
A and a weak attacker B. Until time Tmasq, the adversary monitors and learns which
messages are sent at what frequency by its weaker attacker, e.g., B sends message 0xB0
every 20ms. Since most in-vehicle network messages are periodic and broadcast over
CAN, it is easy to learn their IDs and intervals. Once it has learned the ID and frequency
of a message, at time Tmasq, the adversary stops the transmission of its weak attacker
and utilizes its strong attacker A to fabricate and inject attack messages with ID=0xB0.
Stopping B’s transmission and exploiting A for transmission of attack messages are to
overcome the weak attacker’s inability of injecting messages. After Tmasq, the original
transmitter of 0xB0, B, does not send that message any longer, whereas A sends it instead
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at its original frequency. So, when the CAN bus traffic is observed, the frequency of
message 0xB0 remains the same, whereas its transmitter has changed. We refer to such a
case as A mounting a masquerade attack on message 0xB0 or its original transmitter B.
In fact, in order to attack and remotely stop a Jeep Cherokee running on a highway,
Miller et al. [58] had to control its ABS collision prevention system by mounting
a masquerade (not fabrication) attack. In contrast to other vehicles which they had
previously examined (e.g., Toyota Prius), the Jeep Cherokee’s brake was not controllable
via the fabrication attack as its ABS collision prevention system, which was the attack
vector for engaging brakes, was switched off when the fabrication attack was mounted. On
the other hand, when mounting the masquerade attack, the system was not switched off,
thus allowing them to control the Jeep Cherokee’s braking maneuver.
Using masquerade attacks, the adversary can not only inject attack messages from
the compromised/impersonating ECU but also cause other severe problems, significantly
degrading the in-vehicle network performance. The impersonating ECU sending a message
instead of another ECU implies that it would generate more messages to periodically
transmit than before, making its transmit buffer more likely overloaded. This may, in turn,
lead to severe consequences, such as non-abortable transmission requests [37], deadline
violation [48], and significant priority inversion [68]. Moreover, the original sequence
of messages may also change, thus failing to meet the requirement of some in-vehicle
messages to be sent sequentially in a correct order for proper vehicle operations. These
network problems from a masquerade attack occur while not deviating much from the norm
network behavior (e.g., message frequency remains the same). This is in sharp contrast to
the cases of mounting a fabrication attack or a suspension attack, which may also incur
similar problems. Such problems have been identified to be critical since they degrade the
real-time performance of CAN significantly, and thus undermine vehicle safety [37,48,68].
The masquerade attack can thus cause more problems to the in-vehicle network than just
injecting attack messages.
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3.3.3 Defense Against the Attacks
When the fabrication or suspension attack is mounted, the frequency of certain
messages significantly and abnormally increases or decreases, respectively. Thus, if
state-of-the-art IDSs [45, 56, 65, 66], which monitor the message frequencies, were to be
used, the attacks can be detected.
When mounting the masquerade attack, however, the adversary does not change
the original frequency of messages. Thus, the adversary may use this attack to evade
state-of-the-art IDSs. Moreover, if the adversary does not change the content of messages
as well, it can behave like a legitimate ECU. However, the adversary may later mount
other types of attacks (e.g., a fabrication attack) through the impersonating ECU. Hence,
defending against the masquerade attack implies not only detecting the attack reactively,
but also preventing other attacks proactively.
3.4 Clock-Based Detection
Although state-of-the-art IDSs are capable of detecting some basic attacks such as
fabrication attack and suspension attack, they fail to detect more sophisticated ones such as
the masquerade attack for the following reasons.
• No authenticity—CANmessages lack information on their transmitters. So, existing
IDSs do not know whether or not the messages on the CAN bus were sent by the
genuine transmitter, and hence cannot detect any changes of the message transmitter.
• Inability of identifying a compromised ECU — Lack of the transmitter’s information
makes it very difficult or impossible for state-of-the-art IDSs to identify which of
compromised ECUs mounted an attack.
If CAN frames do not carry any information on their transmitters, how could an IDS
identify them and detect intrusions such as the masquerade attacks? Which behavior of
CAN should the IDS model for detection of such intrusions? We answer these questions
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by developing a novel IDS, CIDS, which exploits message frequency to fingerprint the
transmitter ECUs, and models a norm behavior based on their fingerprints for intrusion
detection. We focus on detecting intrusions in periodic messages as most in-vehicle
messages are sent periodically [68, 78].
3.4.1 Fingerprinting ECUs
For each in-vehicle ECU in CAN, the time instants of periodic message transmissions
are determined by its quartz crystal clock [61]. We follow the nomenclature of clocks of
the NTP specification [59] and Paxson [74]. Let Ctrue be a “true” clock which reports the
true time at any moment and Ci be some other non-true clock. We define the terms “clock
offset, frequency, and skew” as follows.
• offset: difference in the time reported by clockCi and the true clockCtrue. We define
relative offset as the offset between two non-true clocks.
• frequency: the rate at which clock Ci advances. Thus, the frequency at time t is
C′i(t)≡ dCi(t)/dt.
• skew: difference between the frequencies of clock Ci and the true clock Ctrue. We
define relative skew as the difference in skews of two non-true clocks.
If two clocks have relative offset and skew of 0, then they are said to be synchronized.
Otherwise, we consider they are unsynchronized. Since CAN lacks clock synchronization,
it is considered to be unsynchronized.
Clock skew as a fingerprint. The clock offsets and skews of unsynchronized nodes
depend solely on their local clocks, thus being distinct from others. As others have also
concluded [47, 49, 90], clock skews and offsets can therefore be considered as fingerprints
of nodes. Various studies have exploited this fact to fingerprint physical devices [47, 49,
73, 90]. However, they are not applicable to our problem as they exclusively rely on the
timestamps carried in the packet headers, which are, as discussed before, not available in
in-vehicle networks. Kohno et al. [49] considered an alternative to embedded timestamps:
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Figure 3.2: Timing analysis of message arrivals.
using Fourier Transform for clock skew estimation. However, as their approach relies on
the unique characteristics of the Internet (e.g., multi-hop delays, large network topology),
it cannot be directly applied to in-vehicle networks.
To build an effective IDS, which can detect various types of attack including the
masquerade attack, it should be capable of verifying the transmitter of each message.
However, since such information is not present in CAN messages, we must fingerprint
ECUs with other “leaked” information. Unlike the existing approaches that exploit
embedded timestamps, we exploit message periodicity to extract and estimate the
transmitters’ clock skews, which are then used to fingerprint the transmitter ECUs.
Clock skew estimation. Consider an ECU A which broadcasts a message every T ms
and an ECU R which periodically receives that message. From the perspective of R, since
only its timestamp is available, we consider its clock as the true clock. As shown in Fig. 3.2,
due to the clock skew, periodic messages are sent at times with small offsets from the ideal
values (e.g., T , 2T , 3T , · · · ). Let t = 0 be the time when the first message was sent from
A, and Oi be the clock offset of A when it sends the i-th message since t = 0. Then, after
a network delay of di, ECU R would receive that message and put an arrival timestamp of
iT +Oi+di+ni, where ni denotes the noise in R’s timestamp quantization [90]. Thus, the
intervals between each arrival timestamp, Trx,i = T +ΔOi+Δdi+Δni, where ΔXi denotes
the difference of X between step i and i−1, and O0 = 0. Since the change in Oi within one
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time step is negligible and ni is a zero-mean Gaussian noise term [11], the expected value
of the timestamp intervals, μTrx = E[Trx,i], can be expressed as:
μTrx = E[T +ΔOi+Δdi+Δni]
= T +E[ΔOi+Δdi+Δni]
≈ T,
(3.1)
where the second equality holds since T is a pre-determined constant. Since the data
lengths of CAN periodic messages, i.e., DLCs, are constant over time, for now, we consider
E[Δdi] = 0. Later in Section 3.4.4, we will discuss the case when di is not constant, and
how it may affect the performance of CIDS.
Based on the arrival timestamp of the first message, d0 + n0, and the average of
timestamp intervals, μTrx , we extrapolate and determine the estimated arrival time of the
i-th message as iμTrx +d0+n0, whereas the actualmeasured arrival time is iT+Oi+di+ni.
As we are estimating subsequent arrival times, μTrx is determined by past measurements.
Since T is constant over time and thus again μTrx ≈ T , the average difference between the
estimated and measured times is:
E[D] = E[i(T −μTrx)+Oi+Δd+Δn]≈ E[Oi]. (3.2)
That is, from message periodicity, we can estimate the average clock offset, E[Oi], which
will indeed be distinct for different transmitters. Since clock offset is slowly varying and
non-zero [47, 90], E[Oi] = 0, whereas E[ΔOi] = 0.
If ECU R were to determine the average clock offset for every N received messages,
since it is derived in reference to the first message (of N messages), it represents only
the average of newly incurred offsets. Thus, to obtain the total amount of incurred offset,
which we call the accumulated clock offset, the absolute values of the average clock offsets
have to be summed up. By definition, the slope of the accumulated clock offset would
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Algorithm 1 Clock skew estimation with RLS
1: Initialize: S[0] = 0, P[0] = δ I
2: function SKEWUPDATE(t,e)  RLS algorithm
3: G[k]← λ−1P[k−1]t[k]1+λ−1t2[k]P[k−1]
4: P[k]← λ−1(P[k−1]−G[k]t[k]P[k−1])
5: return S[k]← S[k−1]+G[k]e[k]
6: end function
7: for kth step do
8: a0 ← arrival timestamp of most recently rxed message
9: n← 1
10: while n≤ N do
11: if current time  an−1 then
12: /* No longer receives the message */
13: an, · · · ,aN ← significantly high values
14: Tn, · · · ,TN ← significantly high values
15: break
16: else
17: an ← arrival timestamp of nth message
18: Tn ← an−an−1  Timestamp interval
19: n← n+1
20: end if
21: end while
22: μT [k]← 1N ∑Ni=1Ti  Avg. timestamp interval
23: O[k]← 1N−1 ∑Ni=2 ai− (a1+(i−1)μT [k−1])
24: Oacc[k]← Oacc[k−1]+ |O[k]|  Accumulated offset
25: e[k]← Oacc[k]−S[k−1]t[k]  Identification error
26: S[k]← SKEWUPDATE(t,e)  Clock skew
27: end for
thus represent the clock skew, which is constant as we will show and as others have also
concluded [49, 63, 74, 87]. This enables CIDS to estimate the clock skew from arrival
timestamps and thus fingerprint the message transmitter for intrusion detection. We will
later show, via experimental evaluations on a CAN bus prototype and on 3 real vehicles,
that the thus-derived clock skew is indeed a fingerprint of an in-vehicle ECU.
3.4.2 CIDS — Per-message Detection
By determining the clock skew from observation of message intervals, transmitter
ECUs can be fingerprinted. We exploit this in designing CIDS, a clock-based IDS for
in-vehicle networks which detects intrusions in two different ways: per-message detection
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and message-pairwise detection, where the latter supplements the former in reducing false
positive/negative results. Next, we first discuss per-message detection and then pairwise
detection.
Modeling. For a given message ID, CIDS derives the accumulated clock offset inherent
in the arrival timestamps. Since clock skew is constant, the accumulated clock offset is
linear in time, and hence CIDS describes it as a linear regression model. A linear parameter
identification problem is thus formulated as:
Oacc[k] = S[k] · t[k]+ e[k], (3.3)
where at step k, Oacc[k] is the accumulated clock offset, S[k] the regression parameter, t[k]
the elapsed time, and e[k] the identification error. The regression parameter S represents
the slope of the linear model and thus the estimated clock skew. The identification error, e,
represents the residual which is not explained by the model. In CIDS, Oacc, S, t, and e are
updated every N messages, i.e., kN messages are examined up to step k.
To determine the unknown parameter S, we use the Recursive Least Squares (RLS)
algorithm [43], which uses the residual as an objective function to minimize the sum of
squares of the modeling errors. Hence, in RLS, the identification error skews towards 0,
i.e., has 0 mean. We will discuss the computational overhead of RLS as well as other
possible solutions in Section 3.6.
Algorithm 1 describes how the clock skew is estimated using RLS. First, CIDSmeasures
the arrival times and their intervals of N messages for a given ID. If the intended message
has not been received for a long time — possibly due to suspension attack — as in line
13–14, CIDS sets the remaining timestamp and interval values significantly higher. Once
N values are measured, CIDS determines the accumulated clock offset and accordingly, the
identification error. Based on the thus-derived value, the gain, G, and the covariance, P,
are updated with RLS for identifying the regression parameter S, i.e., estimate clock skew.
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This procedure of clock skew estimation continues iteratively during the operation of CIDS
and, if uncompromised, outputs an identification error skewed towards 0 and a constant
clock skew. This way, the norm clock behavior of the transmitter can be described as a
linear model with the clock skew being the slope. In RLS, a forgetting factor, λ , is used to
give exponentially less weights to older samples and thus provide freshness. In CIDS, we
set λ=0.9995.
Detection. For a given message ID, CIDS runs RLS for clock skew estimation,
constructs a norm model on clock behavior, and verifies whether there are any abnormal
measurements deviating from it, i.e., intrusions.
Consider a fabrication attack in which the adversary injects an attack message with
ID=0x01, which is originally sent every 10ms by some ECU. The fabrication attack
significantly increases the absolute average difference between the estimated and measured
arrival times of 0x01. As a result, due to a sudden increase in the rate at which the
accumulated clock offset changes, a high identification error results. Similarly, when the
suspension attack is mounted, the absolute average difference also increases and thus a
high error is also incurred. When a masquerade attack is mounted, since the adversary
sends the message through a different ECU than its original one, the increase rate of
accumulated clock offset, i.e., clock skew, suddenly changes and also results in a high
identification error. In summary, unlike when the mean of identification error should
usually skew towards 0, which is the norm clock behavior, its mean suddenly shifts towards
a high non-zero value when there is an intrusion.
CIDS exploits the Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) method, which derives the cumulative
sums of the deviations from a target value to detect sudden shifts. Since it is cumulative,
even minor drifting from the target value leads to steadily increasing or decreasing
cumulative values. It is therefore optimal in detecting small persistent changes and is
widely used for change-point detection [28]. CIDS detects intrusions via CUSUM as
follows. At each step of clock skew estimation, CIDS updates the mean and variance of
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the identification errors (e), μe and σ2e , respectively. In CIDS, these values represent the
CUSUM target values of e (i.e., norm clock behavior), and thus require proper tracking.
Hence, as a precaution of abnormal values incurring from an attack to be reflected into the
target values, μe and σ2e are updated only if | e−μeσe | < 3. Then, per derived identification
error e, the upper and lower control limits of CUSUM, L+ and L− are updated as [88]:
L+ ←max[0,L++(e−μe)/σe−κ
]
L− ←max[0,L−− (e−μe)/σe−κ
] (3.4)
where κ is a parameter reflecting the number of standard deviations CIDS intends to detect.
Note that κ can be learned offline, or by monitoring normal in-vehicle traffic. If either of
the control limits, L+ or L−, exceeds a threshold ΓL, a sudden positive or negative shift
in value has been detected, respectively, and thus CIDS declares it as an intrusion. As the
general rule of thumb for CUSUM is to have a threshold of 4 or 5 [62], we set ΓL = 5.
3.4.3 CIDS — Message-pairwise Detection
In addition to per-message detection, CIDS also alarms intrusions via message-pairwise
detection, which examines the correlation between the average clock offsets in two periodic
messages. Consider two messages M1 and M2 periodically sent by an ECU A. Since these
messages originate from the same transmitter, their instantaneous average clock offsets are
likely equivalent. Thus, the correlation coefficient, ρ , between their average clock offsets
(derived per step) would show a high value close to 1, i.e., correlated. On the other hand, if
the two messages were sent by different ECUs, ρ  0, i.e., uncorrelated.
Modeling and detection. If clock offsets in two messages are highly correlated
(ρ > 0.8), their relationship can be linear. So, CIDS describes them as a linear regression
model: OM2 [k] = αOM1 [k] + ecorr[k], where OMi denotes the average clock offset of
message Mi at step k, α the regression parameter, and ecorr[k] the identification error.
As per-message detection, message-pairwise detection is also based on a linear model.
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Thus, we apply the same detection method, CUSUM. Since message-pairwise detection
seeks intrusions from a different perspective than per-message detection, it reduces
false positive/negative results. Note, however, that message-pairwise detection is only
applicable when two messages’ clock offsets are highly correlated, whereas per-message
detection is applicable to any periodic message. Moreover, albeit effective, it requires
pairwise computations. Therefore, we use message-pairwise detection as an optional
feature of CIDS. We will later show via experimental evaluations how message-pairwise
detection further improves the performance of CIDS.
3.4.4 Verification
To reduce possible false positives/negatives, CIDS also performs a verification process.
Suppose that a possible intrusion was alarmed due to a high identification error when
verifying message Vi, the i-th message of V . Although such a high error can be due to
an intrusion, it can also be due to an incorrect computation of average clock offset. In
Section 3.4.1, we considered E[Δdi] = 0 and could thus extract and determine the average
clock offset. Although this is true in most cases, occasionally E[Δdi] = 0, which affects the
accuracy of deriving the true clock offset and thus the detection result. In CAN, E[Δdi] = 0
only occurs if the transmission ofVi was delayed due to the bus being busy or its transmitter
losing arbitration when attempting to send Vi. Note that the latter also results in the bus
being busy before the transmission/reception ofVi. Thus, CIDS also checks if the possibility
of E[Δdi] = 0 is the main cause of a (possibly false) alarm of intrusion by verifying whether
the CAN bus was busy right before receiving Vi. This way, CIDS enhances its detection
accuracy. However, as discussed before, usually E[Δdi] = 0 in an actual CAN bus due to its
high speed, its messages having short lengths, and low bus load. In other words, the nature
of CAN bus communication helps CIDS reduce false positives/negatives.
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3.4.5 Attacker Identification
When an intrusion is detected for some message ID, CIDS can also identify which
compromised ECU mounted the attack. It can extract the clock skew for that attacked
message ID, compare it with other clock skew values extracted from other message IDs,
and exploit the comparison result in determining whether they originated from the same
transmitter. This way, CIDS can at least reduce the scope of ECUs which may (or may not)
have mounted the attack, thus facilitating attacker identification
3.5 Evaluation
We now validate that clock skews can be used as fingerprints of transmitter ECUs, and
evaluate the performance of CIDS on a CAN bus prototype and real vehicles.
CAN bus prototype: Similarly to the set up we had in Chapter 2.5, the CAN bus
prototype was configured to operate at a 500Kbps bus speed, interconnecting three CAN
nodes. The main differences were how the nodes were programmed. The first node A was
programmed to send messages 0x11 and 0x13 every 50ms, and the second node B to send
message 0x55 at the same frequency. The third node R was programmed to run CIDS.
Real vehicle: The 2013 Honda Accord (Fig. 2.17a (left)) that we had used for the
bus-off attack evaluation is also used for our experiments of CIDS in an isolated and
controlled (for safety) environment. Again, via the On-Board Diagnostic (OBD-II) system
port [13], we connected our CAN bus prototype nodes — which function as an adversary
or CIDS — to the in-vehicle network. Through the OBD-II port, the three nodes were able
to communicate with real ECUs.
CAN log data: To further validate that CIDS’s fingerprinting is applicable to other
vehicles, we also refer to CAN traffic data logged from a Toyota Camry 2010 by Ruth et
al. [78] and data logged from a Dodge Ram Pickup 2010 by Daily [36]. Both data were
logged through a Gryphon S3 and Hercules software. In the Toyota Camry 2010, there
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were 42 distinct messages transmitted on the CAN bus: 39 of them sent periodically at
intervals ranging from 10ms to 5 seconds, and 3 of them sent sporadically. In the Dodge
Ram Pickup 2010, there were 55 distinct messages which were all sent periodically on the
CAN bus.
In order to identify which messages originate from the same real ECU and thus exploit
it as a ground truth, we used the naive method discussed in [68]. The messages, which
originate from the same ECU and have the same preset message interval, were shown to
have the same number of transmissions on the bus, when traced for at least a few minutes.
Such a method can be an alternative to fingerprinting, but it requires pairwise comparisons
and cannot be completed in real time as required in the design of CIDS, which is essential
for intrusion detection in real in-vehicle networks.
While running CIDS, we determined offsets and skews for every 20 received samples,
i.e., N = 20, and set κ = 5.
3.5.1 Clock Skew as a Fingerprint
We first evaluate the validity of CIDS’s fingerprinting of the transmitter ECUs based on
the estimated clock skews. We evaluate skew estimates in microseconds per second (μs/s)
or parts per million (ppm).
CAN bus prototype. Fig. 3.3a plots our evaluation results of CIDS’s fingerprinting
on the CAN bus prototype: accumulated clock offsets of messages 0x11, 0x13, and 0x55.
Note that the slopes in this figure represent the estimated clock skews. All the derived
accumulated clock offsets were found to be linear in time, i.e., constant estimated skews.
Messages 0x11 and 0x13, both of which were sent from node A, exhibited the same
constant clock skew of 13.4ppm. On the other hand, the message 0x55 sent from a different
node B showed a different clock skew of 27.2ppm. Thus, the clock skews derived by CIDS
can be used to differentiate ECUs.
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Figure 3.3: Accumulated clock offsets derived by CIDS in different evaluation settings.
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Honda Accord 2013. For CIDS’s evaluation on a real vehicle, the CAN prototype nodes
logged the in-vehicle CAN traffic of the Honda Accord 2013, and ran CIDS on messages
0x1B0, 0x1D0, 0x1A6, 0x294, 0x295, and 0x309. The approach in [68] was adopted to
verify that messages {0x1B0, 0x1D0} were sent from the same ECU, {0x294, 0x295}
both sent from another ECU, whereas others were sent from different ECUs. Utilizing
these facts, one can conclude from Fig. 3.3b that the clock offsets and the skews derived in
CIDS are equivalent only for those messages sent from the same ECU; 0x1B0 and 0x1D0
showed a skew of 78.4ppm, 0x294 and 0x295 showed a skew of 199.8ppm, while messages
0x1A6 and 0x309 showed very different skews of 265.7ppm and 95.78ppm, respectively.
This result again shows that clock skews between different ECUs are distinct and can thus
be used as the fingerprints of the corresponding ECUs.
Toyota Camry 2010. To show that the applicability of CIDS’s fingerprinting is not
limited to the specific vehicle model used, we also conducted experiments on a different
vehicle: running CIDS’s fingerprinting on the Toyota Camry logged data. Similarly to the
real vehicle evaluation in Section 3.5.1, the approach in [68] was used as the ground truth. It
was verified that messages {0x20, 0xB2} within the CAN log data were all sent from some
ECU A. Also, {0x223, 0x224} were both sent from some ECU B, whereas 0x2C1, 0x2C4,
0x3A0, 0x4C3, and 0x620 were each sent from a different ECU. As shown in Fig. 3.3c,
messages 0x20 and 0xB2 both showed a clock skew of approximately 345.3ppm, whereas
0x223 and 0x224 showed a different clock skew of 276.5ppm. 0x2C4, 0x3A0, 0x4C3, and
0x620 showed very different clock skews of 460.1ppm, 142.5ppm, 26.1ppm and 58.7 ppm,
respectively.
We made an interesting observation on message 0x2C1, showing a clock skew of
334.1ppm, which was different from the skews of messages {0x20, 0xB2} only by 3%,
despite the fact that it was sent by a different ECU. This may confuse CIDS in determining
whether they were sent by the same ECU or not. However, in such a case, CIDS can
further examine the correlation between clock offsets and can thus fingerprint with a higher
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accuracy, which we will discuss and evaluate further in Section 3.5.4.
Dodge Ram Pickup 2010. We also ran CIDS’s fingerprinting on the CAN log data
of a Dodge Ram Pickup 2010. For this vehicle, it was verified that message 0x200 was
sent from some ECU A, {0x215, 0x300} sent from B, {0x6F9, 0x3E6, 0x6FD, 0x700}
sent from C, and {0x101, 0x6FE} sent from D. Fig. 3.3d shows that CIDS determined that
0x200 has a clock skew of 351.7ppm, {0x215, 0x300} to have approximately 295.3ppm,
{0x6F9, 0x3E6, 0x6FD, 0x700} to have 24.5ppm, and {0x101, 0x6FE} to have 110.3ppm,
thus correctly fingerprinting their transmitters.
These results of a Toyota Camry and a Dodge Ram Pickup CAN log data again affirm
the fact that the clock skews derived by CIDS are diverse and can indeed be used as
fingerprints of in-vehicle ECUs. Moreover, they show that CIDS’s fingerprinting is not
limited to a specific vehicle model, and can thus be applied to other vehicle models.
3.5.2 Defending Against Fabrication and Suspension Attacks
On both the CAN bus prototype and the real vehicle setting (Honda Accord 2013),
we launch the fabrication and suspension attacks, and evaluate CIDS’s effectiveness in
detecting them.2 To this end, we consider CIDS to only perform per-message detection,
and will later evaluate CIDS with message-pairwise detection.
CAN bus prototype. For evaluation of CIDS defending against fabrication attack on
the CAN bus prototype, B was programmed to inject a fabricated message at t = 400 secs
with ID=0x11, which is a periodic message usually sent by A, i.e., B launches a fabrication
attack on A. ECU R was running CIDS on message 0x11 and derived accumulated clock
offset (Oacc), identification error (e), and control limits (L+, L−). For the suspension attack,
A was instead programmed to stop transmitting 0x11 at t = 400 secs.
Fig. 3.4a shows how such values changed for message 0x11 in the presence and
absence of a fabrication attack. As soon as B mounted a fabrication attack, as discussed
2As the attacks cannot be emulated using the CAN log data, we do not consider their use for evaluating
CIDS against the attacks.
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(b) Suspension attack.
Figure 3.4: CIDS defending fabrication attack (left) and suspension attack (right) in a CAN
bus prototype.
in Section 3.4.2, there was a sudden positive shift in the accumulated clock offset, thus
yielding a high identification error. Due to such a shift, the upper control limit, L+, of
CUSUM suddenly increased and exceeded its threshold ΓL =5, i.e., detecting an intrusion.
Similarly, Fig. 3.4b shows that since the suspension attack also shifted the accumulated
clock offset significantly, CIDS was able to detect the attack.
Real vehicle. To evaluate CIDS against the fabrication attack under the real vehicle
setting, one CAN prototype node R was programmed to run CIDS, and another node A
as an adversary mounting the attack on a real ECU. The attack was mounted by injecting
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Figure 3.5: CIDS defending fabrication attack (left) and suspension attack (right) in a Honda
Accord 2013.
a fabricated attack message with ID=0x1B0, which was sent every 20ms by some real
in-vehicle ECU, i.e., A mounted the fabrication attack on a Honda Accord ECU sending
0x1B0. For the suspension attack, the message filter of R was reset at t = 420 secs so as to
no longer receive 0x1B0, thus emulating the suspension attack.
Fig. 3.5a shows how accumulated clock offsets (Oacc), identification errors (e), and
upper control limits (L+) changed for both cases of with and without a fabrication attack.
Again, the attack message injected at around t = 420 secs caused a sudden increase in Oacc
and e, thus increasing L+ to exceed ΓL =5. As a result, CIDS declares the detection of an
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Figure 3.6: Masquerade attack — Probability mass function of message intervals (left),
changes in accumulated clock offsets (middle), and control limits (right) derived in CIDS.
attack. After the attack, since 0x1B0 was still periodically sent by the real in-vehicle ECU,
the clock skew — i.e., the slope of Oacc graph — remains unchanged. Similarly, as shown
in Fig. 3.5b, the suspension attack increases the offset values, thus causing L+ to exceed
the threshold, i.e., the suspension attack was detected by CIDS.
3.5.3 Defending Against Masquerade Attack
We now evaluate the performance of CIDS in detecting a masquerade attack.
CAN bus prototype. To evaluate CIDS’s defense against the masquerade attack in the
CAN bus prototype, nodes A and B were considered to have been compromised as strong
and weak attackers as in Fig. 3.1c, respectively. Awas programmed to mount a masquerade
attack on B, i.e., stop B transmitting message 0x55 and instead send it through A onwards,
once Tmasq = 250 secs had elapsed. As usual, messages 0x11 and 0x13 were periodically
sent by A, and CIDS was run by R.
Fig. 3.6a (left) shows the Probability Mass Function (PMF) of the intervals of message
0x55: before and after the attack was mounted. In contrast to the fabrication attack,
since the attacker sent the attack message at its original frequency after masquerading,
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the distribution did not deviate much from that before the attack. However, at Tmasq, since
there was some delay when the transmitter was switched from one node to another, the first
masquerade attack message was sent 51.04ms after its previous transmission, whereas it
should have been approximately 50ms which is the preset message interval of 0x55. Due
to such a slightly mistimed masquerade attack, the PMF graph shows a message interval
with an abnormal deviation from the mean. We will later evaluate the perfectly timed
masquerade attack — a much more severe case than a mistimed attack — on a real vehicle,
and show the efficacy of CIDS in detecting it.
The resulting changes in Oacc, L+, and L− at R are also shown in Fig. 3.6a (middle
and right). The change in the ECU transmitting message 0x55 caused the slope (i.e., clock
skew) in Oacc graph to change after the attack was mounted. Since the measurements
of Oacc after Tmasq significantly deviated from their expected values, which is determined
by the estimated clock skew of t < Tmasq, the CUSUM lower control limit, L−, in CIDS
exceeded the threshold, thus declaring detection of an intrusion. Since the transmitter of
0x55 was changed (to ECU A), its clock skew after t = Tmasq was equivalent to the clock
skew in 0x11. Accordingly, via its attacker identification, CIDS identifies the compromised
ECU to be ECU A. Unlike the previous results, since the change in slope was negative,
persistent identification error with high negative values caused L− to exceed the threshold.
Real vehicle. To evaluate CIDS’s defense against the masquerade attack in a real
vehicle, we consider a scenario in which real in-vehicle ECUs V1 and V2 transmitting
0x1A6 and 0x1B0 are compromised as a strong and a weak attacker, respectively. Of the
three CAN prototype nodes (A, B, and R), which were connected to the real in-vehicle
network via OBD-II, we programmed node R to run CIDS on in-vehicle message 0x1B0
and another node B to simply log the CAN traffic. To generate a scenario of real ECU
V1 mounting a masquerade attack on real ECU V2, R was programmed further to receive
message 0x1A6 instead of 0x1B0, but still record the received messages’ ID to be 0x1B0,
once Tmasq = 1100 seconds had elapsed. That is, we let R interpret 0x1A6 as 0x1B0
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for t > Tmasq, i.e., the transmitter of 0x1B0 changes from V2 to V1. Such a change in
interpretation was achieved by programming R to modify its message acceptance filter
from only accepting 0x1B0 to only accepting 0x1A6. Since 0x1B0 and 0x1A6 were
observed to be always transmitted nearly at the same time, such a setting replicates the
timed masquerade attack. During such a process, B continuously logged 0x1B0 so that we
can obtain a reference for circumstances when no attacks are mounted.
Fig. 3.6b (left) shows the PMF of the message intervals of 0x1B0 before and after the
attack. Since the message periodicity remained the same, the distribution of the messages
intervals did not change. Moreover, since we considered a timed masquerade attack, in
contrast to the result in Fig. 3.6a, there were no such abnormal message intervals. Such a
result indicates that state-of-the-art IDSs, which try to find abnormal message frequencies,
cannot detect such an attack. Although the distribution of message intervals remained
unchanged, due to the change in ECU transmitting 0x1B0 (V2 → V1), the accumulated
clock offset suddenly exhibited a different trend in its change, i.e., a different clock skew
after the attack. Here, the original trend in offset changes was determined by the data
obtained from B. So, as shown in Fig. 3.6b (right), CIDS was able to detect a sudden shift
in its identification error and thus outputted a high level of CUSUM upper control limit, i.e.,
an intrusion detection. CIDS’s capability of detecting various types of masquerade attack is
evaluated further in Section 3.5.5.
In conclusion, through its modeling and detection processes, CIDS can detect not only
the fabrication attack but also the masquerade attack, i.e., is capable of doing not only what
existing solutions can do, but also more.
3.5.4 Message-pairwise Detection
We evaluate the feasibility and efficiency of message-pairwise detection in CIDS. To
validate its practicability in the real-world, we first examine whether there exists pairs of
messages inside real vehicles with correlated clock offsets — the condition for CIDS to run
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Figure 3.7: Correlated and uncorrelated clock offsets.
message-pairwise detection.
Fig. 3.7a shows two cases of correlated and uncorrelated clock offsets of in-vehicle
messages collected from the Honda Accord 2013. Fig. 3.7a (left) shows that the average
clock offsets of messages 0x1B0 and 0x1D0, which were determined to have been sent from
the same ECU, showed a high correlation of 0.9213, i.e., linear relationship. In contrast,
as shown in Fig. 3.7a (right), average clock offsets of messages 0x1B0 and 0x1A6, which
were sent every 20ms from different ECUs, showed a near 0 correlation.
By the Birthday paradox, some ECUs in the vehicle may probably have near-equivalent
clock skews — as it was for messages 0x20 and 0x2C1 in the examined Toyota Camry
2010 (see Fig. 3.3c). Although clock skews may be near-equivalent, instantaneous clock
offsets of two different ECUs cannot be near-equivalent and are thus uncorrelated as they
run different processes. The results in Fig. 3.7b corroborate such a fact by showing that
clock offsets of messages 0x20 and 0xB2, which were sent by the same ECU, had a high
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Figure 3.8: Defense against the worst-case masquerade attack via message-pairwise
detection.
correlation of 0.9860, whereas offsets of messages 0x20 and 0x2C1 — sent by different
ECUs with similar clock skews — had a low correlation of 0.0331. Thus, for messages
with near-equivalent clock skews, CIDS can further examine the correlation between their
clock offsets, and correctly determine their transmitters.3 These facts and observations
indicate the feasibility and efficiency of message-pairwise detection in CIDS.
To show that message-pairwise detection can support per-message detection in
decreasing false positives/negatives by examining offset correlations, we consider a
scenario in which an attacker V1 has mounted a masquerade attack on a Honda Accord
ECUV2 at tmasq = 800 secs. We refer toV2 as the ECU which originally transmits message
0x1B0. To consider the worst case in detecting the masquerade attack, we assume that the
clock skews of V1 and V2 are nearly equivalent, similarly to messages 0x20 and 0x2C1
in the Toyota Camry. We replicated such a worst-case scenario by randomly permuting
the acquired offset values of 0x1B0 for t > tmasq, and considering the permuted values to
be output from V1. As shown in Fig. 3.8a, this leads to a situation where the clock skew
does not change even though the message transmitter has been changed from one ECU to
another. Although the clock skew remained equivalent at t = tmasq, the correlation between
offsets of 0x1B0 and 0x1D0 suddenly dropped from 0.9533 to 0.1201, i.e., a linear to
3If the two ECUs’ clock behaviors are still not distinguishable, CIDS can be set up to exclude them for
examination so that the risk of false positives significantly decreases. However, this may impact CIDS’s
capability of detecting attacks mounted through those ECUs.
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non-linear relationship. As a result, as shown in Fig. 3.8b, the control limits in CIDS’s
message-pairwise detection exceeded the threshold ΓL = 5. On the other hand, since the
clock skews before and after the attack were equivalent, per-message detection was not
able to detect the intrusion.
3.5.5 False Alarm Rate
We also examined the false alarm rate of CIDS under the real vehicle setting. The results
obtained from the CAN bus prototype are omitted due to their insignificance, i.e., not many
false alarms occurred due to its less complex bus traffic. Based on data recorded for 30
minutes from the Honda Accord 2013— approximately 2.25 million messages on the CAN
bus — four attack datasets were constructed to each contain 300 different intrusions. The
intrusions either had different injection timings, suspension timings, or changes in clock
skews: each in the form of fabrication attack, suspension attack, mistimed masquerade
attack, and timed masquerade attack. For each dataset, we varied the κ parameter of CIDS
to acquire one false positive rate (false-alarm rate) and one false negative rate (1−detection
rate).
Fig. 3.9a shows the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve of CIDS, which
represents its trade-off between false alarm and detection, executing only per-message
detection on the attack datasets. Clearly, CIDS is shown to be able to detect fabrication,
suspension, and masquerade attacks with a high probability. Since the timed masquerade
attack is the most difficult to detect, it showed the highest false positive rate among
all the attack scenarios considered: a false positive rate of 0.055% while not missing
any anomalies (100% true positives). Even for false positives < 0.055%, 97% of the
anomalies were detected by CIDS. However, these false positives can be of great concern
for in-vehicle networks. Therefore, to eliminate such false positives, CIDS can additionally
run message-pairwise detection. Fig. 3.9b shows the ROC curve of CIDS executing not
only per-message detection but also message-pairwise detection for further verification.
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Figure 3.9: ROC curves of CIDS in the real vehicle.
Accordingly, CIDS was able to detect all types of attacks considered without having any
false positives, which is in contrast to CIDS with only per-message detection, i.e., all false
positives were eliminated via message-pairwise detection.
3.6 Discussion
Discussed below are the overhead, deployment, limitations, and applications of CIDS.
Identification algorithm. To estimate clock skew, one can also use other algorithms
than RLS, such as Total Least Squares (TLS) and Damped Least Squares (DLS), which
perform orthogonal linear and non-linear regression, respectively. Although they might
identify the clock skew with a higher accuracy than RLS, their gains are offset by the
accompanying high complexity. TLS requires Singular Value Decomposition (SVD),
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which is computationally expensive, and DLS requires a large number of iterations for
curve fitting. RLS is known to have a computation complexity of O(N2) per iteration,
where N is the size of the data matrix. However, in CIDS, only a scalar clock offset is
exploited for identification, and thus the computational complexity is relatively low.
Defeating CIDS. There may be several ways the adversary may attempt to defeat CIDS.
First, the adversary may try to compromise the ECU running CIDS and disable it. However,
if cross-validation for CIDS was to be exploited, such an attempt can be nullified. For the
detection of intrusions, CIDS only requires an ECU to record the timestamps of message
arrivals. Such a low overhead makes it feasible for CIDS to be installed distributively across
several in-vehicle ECUs for cross-validation. Suppose using CIDS, ECUAmonitors attacks
on messages {M1, M2}, ECU Bmonitors {M2, M3}, and ECUCmonitors {M1, M3}. Since
CIDS regards the receiver’s time clock as the true clock, cross-validation provides multiple
perspectives of clock behaviors for each message ID, e.g., two different perspectives of M2
from A and B. Thus, even when an ECU running CIDS gets compromised, cross-validation
via CIDS can handle such a problem.
Another way the adversary may try to defeat CIDS is to adapt to how its algorithm
is running and thus deceive it. The adversary may figure out the clock skew of the target
ECU and then heat up or cool down the compromised ECU so that its clock skew changes to
match that of the target. In such a case, the clock skew can be matched and thus may bypass
CIDS’s per-message detection. However, as discussed in Section 3.5.4, unless the adversary
also matches the instantaneous clock offset, which is affected by the ECU’s momentary
workload and temperature, CIDS can detect the intrusion via message-pairwise detection.
Upon intrusion detection. False alarms for intrusion detection systems, especially
in in-vehicle networks, are critical. Thus, CIDS should also deal with them as accurately
as possible. To meet this requirement, if an intrusion has been determined, even after
going through the verification process, CIDS can follow the following steps for further
examination:
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1. If an intrusion was detected while using only per-message detection, examine it
further via message-pairwise detection.
2. If still alarmed as an intrusion and the attacked ECU is a safety-critical ECU, go
straight to step 4.
3. If not, communicate with other ECUs for cross-validation as they would provide
different perspectives of the clock skew results. If communicating with other ECUs
incurs too much overhead (in terms of bus load, processing overhead, etc.), send
traffic data for a remote diagnosis.
4. Request re-patching of firmware and advise the driver to stop the vehicle.
Limitation of CIDS. CIDS is shown to be effective in detecting various types of
in-vehicle network intrusions. One limitation of CIDS might be that since it can only
extract clock skews from periodic messages, it would be difficult to fingerprint ECUs which
are sending aperiodic messages. That is, if the attacker injects messages aperiodically,
although CIDS can still detect the intrusion, it would not be able to pinpoint where the
attack message came from, i.e., finding the source of the attacks launched with or on
aperiodic messages. Recall that CIDS can achieve this only for periodic messages. In
future, we would like to find new features other than clock skew, which can fingerprint
ECUs, regardless of whether they send messages periodically or aperiodically.
Applicability to other in-vehicle networks. Although most modern in-vehicle
networks are based on CAN, some may be equipped with other protocols, such as
CAN-FD, TTCAN and FlexRay, for more complex operations. CAN-FD is an enhanced
version of CAN, providing flexible and higher data rates [3]. Since its basic components
conform to CAN and thus also lacks synchronization, CIDS can be applied to CAN-FD.
For protocols such as TTCAN [51] and FlexRay [55], nodes are periodically synchronized
for determinative timing of message exchanges. The interval between two consecutive
synchronizations depends on how each protocol is deployed [68]. For TTCAN, it can be
up to 216 = 65536 bits long, i.e., 131ms in a 500Kbps bus [79]. This lets some messages be
sent multiple times between consecutive synchronizations. So, if the time interval is long,
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CIDS would still be able to extract clock skews from messages which are sent multiple
times, whereas, if the period is short, CIDS may not be feasible. However, the fact that
TTCAN and FlexRay have high implementation cost, whereas for CAN-FD it is minimal,
makes CAN-FD a favorite candidate for next-generation in-vehicle networks [24,84]. This
means that CIDS can be applicable to not only current but also future in-vehicle networks.
3.7 Conclusion
New security breaches in vehicles have made vehicle security one of the most critical
issues. To defend against vehicle attacks, several security mechanisms have been proposed
in the literature. They can cope with some attacks but cannot cover other safety-critical
attacks, such as the masquerade attack. To remedy this problem, we have proposed a
new IDS called CIDS, which extracts clock skews from message intervals, fingerprints
the transmitter ECUs, and models their clock behaviors using RLS. Then, based on the
thus-constructed model, CIDS detects intrusions via CUSUM analysis. Based on our
experiments on a CAN bus prototype and on real vehicles, CIDS is shown to be capable of
detecting various types of in-vehicle network intrusions. CIDS can address all attacks that
existing IDSs can and cannot handle as well as facilitates attacker identification. Thus, it
has potential for significantly enhancing vehicle security and safety.
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CHAPTER IV
Viden: Attacker Identification on In-Vehicle Networks
4.1 Introduction
Numerous defense schemes have been proposed to detect and/or prevent various
vehicle cyber attacks [33, 45, 65, 66, 71, 83, 86]. Although these countermeasures have
reinforced cyber security of vehicles somewhat, they all fail to meet one important need:
attacker identification. That is, although state-of-the-art countermeasures are capable of
determining whether or not there is an intrusion in the in-vehicle network, they cannot
determine which ECU is actually mounting the attack. In Chapter III, despite its main
objective being intrusion detection, we mentioned that CIDS can also achieve attacker
identification, but only in a very restricted scenario: when attack messages are injected
periodically. An accurate attacker identification is imperative as it provides a swift
pathway for forensic, isolation, security patch, etc. No matter how well an IDS detects the
presence of an intrusion in a vehicle, if we still do not know which ECU is mounting the
attack and hence which ECU to isolate/patch, the vehicle remains insecure and unsafe. It is
much better and more economical to isolate/patch the attacker ECU, than blindly treating
all ECUs as (possible) attackers.
To meet this essential need for attacker identification — that existing solutions
have not yet been able to satisfactorily meet — we propose a novel scheme, called
Viden (Voltage-based attacker identification), which fingerprints message transmitter
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ECUs on CAN via voltage measurements and thus facilitates attacker identification.
The rationale behind using voltage for fingerprinting ECUs is the existence of small
inherent discrepancies in different ECUs’ voltage outputs when they inject messages.
To capture this and then use it to fingerprint the transmitter ECUs, Viden first monitors
the output voltages from the two dedicated wires on the CAN bus: CAN-High (CANH)
and CAN-Low (CANL). All ECUs’ transceivers are connected to, and use these for their
message transmissions and receptions. Through the acquired voltage measurements for
each message ID, Viden first learns the ACK threshold, the key information Viden uses to
discard the measurements of voltages outputted by ECUs while acknowledging the receipt
of, but not transmitting, the message. Viden utilizes the thus-derived ACK threshold to
learn the voltage output behavior of each in-vehicle ECU by constructing new features
called voltage instances. Then, it transforms those instances to the transmitter ECU’s
voltage profile (i.e., fingerprint) via Recursive Least Square (RLS) algorithm, an adaptive
signal processing technique. As a result, Viden utilizes the derived voltage profiles for
an accurate attacker identification. Through experimental evaluations on a CAN bus
prototype and on two real vehicles, we show that the constructed voltage profiles are
distinct for different ECUs, thus validating Viden’s capability of identifying the attacker
ECU.
While there have been proposals to fingerprint ECUs with timing [33] or voltage (like
Viden) measurements [35, 64], their practicality and efficiency in identifying the attacker
ECU remain limited to only certain attack scenarios, mainly because they were designed
for intrusion detection, not attacker identification. In other words, there are many scenarios
in which existence of an attack is detected but the attacker cannot be identified correctly.
Thus, we design, implement, and evaluate Viden by focusing on attacker identification via
a distinct way of fingerprinting ECUs from the existing schemes. As a result, Viden is
efficient and easy to deploy on any ECU, thanks to its adaptability and practicality.
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Adaptability. Existing voltage-based fingerprinting uses supervised batch learning that
generates a norm model by learning from a pre-defined training data set [35, 64]. So,
until the training data set and hence models/fingerprints are updated again, the norm
models remain unchanged. Such an approach, however, cannot adapt the norm models
to unexpected changes (e.g., changes in temperature) inside/outside the vehicle. More
importantly, adversaries who intentionally generate changes can evade these existing
fingerprinting schemes. Viden takes a very different approach from them in that it models
and updates the voltage-based fingerprints by applying adaptive signal processing (i.e.,
online (not batch) learning) to its new set of features: voltage instances. This enables
Viden to correctly modify the fingerprints and hence adapt to inevitable but unpredictable
changes in vehicles that can either occur naturally (due to the mother nature) or be
intentionally triggered by an intelligent adversary. Such adaptability is essential for vehicle
security.
Practicality. Unlike the existing voltage-based fingerprinting schemes, the unique
approach taken by Viden eliminates the requirement/assumption of using a specific CAN
message type or CAN bus speed, thus facilitating its deployment. Moreover, it does
not require any knowledge of which message fields the voltages are measured on, i.e.,
message-field-agnostic. This enables Viden to achieve its goal even with a low voltage
sampling rate, thus lowering cost. Furthermore, even though it is message-field-agnostic,
since Viden filters out undesired samples using its derived ACK thresholds, there is no
need to impose restrictions on which fields of the message should be sampled to run
Viden. All of these salient features enable Viden to run without re-designing current CAN
controllers and make Viden very practical and cost-efficient, which is very important for
the cost-conscious automotive industry.
We have implemented and evaluated Viden on a CAN bus prototype and on two real
vehicles. Our evaluation results show that Viden can identify the attacker ECU with a low
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false identification rate of 0.2%, thanks to its unique fingerprinting that makes it adaptive
to handle various attack scenarios.
This work makes the following main contributions:
1. Proposal of a new scheme which retains only the voltage measurements output by
the transmitter ECU (Section 4.3.4);
2. Design of Viden which constructs voltage profiles, i.e., fingerprints, by modeling
the norm voltage output behaviors of in-vehicle ECUs and exploits them for accurate
identification of the attacker ECU (Sections 4.3.5–4.3.8);
3. Implementation and demonstration of Viden on a CAN bus prototype and on two
real vehicles (Section 4.4).
4.2 Background
4.2.1 CAN Message Transmission
In-vehicle ECUs broadcast their retrieved sensor data via a CAN frame/message.
Instead of carrying the address of the transmitter/receiver, as shown in Fig. 2.1, it contains
a unique identifier (ID), which represents its priority. Starting from a 0-bit followed by a
sequence of dominant (0) or recessive (1) bits, all fields within the CAN frame are sent on
the bus by the “transmitter ECU” except for the Acknowledgment (ACK) slot. The ACK
slot is, in fact, used by all ECUs at the same time — except for the transmitter ECU —
that have correctly received the preceded fields of the ACK slot, regardless of whether they
are interested in their content or not. If correctly received, those ECUs send a 0-bit in the
ACK slot. Thus, multiple ECUs acknowledge the message simultaneously, even before the
transmitter finishes sending its message on the bus.
To send either a 0- or 1-bit, CAN transceivers (are agreed to) output certain voltage
levels on the two dedicated CAN wires: CANH and CANL. As shown in Fig. 4.1, to issue
a 0-bit on the CAN bus, CAN transceivers (are agreed to) output approximately 3.5V on
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Figure 4.1: CAN output voltages when sending a message.
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Figure 4.2: Output schematics of a CAN transceiver.
CANH and 1.5V on CANL so that the differential voltage becomes approximately 2V.
On the other hand, when sending a 1-bit, the transceivers output approximately 2.5V on
both CANH and CANL, yielding a differential voltage of approximately 0V [8, 9]. So, by
measuring the differential voltage of CANH and CANL, receiver ECUs read the streams
of 0 and 1 bits, and thus receive the message. From this perspective, CAN is a differential
bus.
CAN transceivers output the intended voltages by simultaneously switching on/off
their transistors. Fig. 4.2a shows an equivalent schematic of a CAN transceiver [16, 18].
Note that CAN transceivers of multiple ECUs are connected to the CAN bus in parallel,
thus sharing the same load resistance RL, which is normally set to 60Ω [20]. The high-
and low-side output circuits consist of a series diode and a P- and N-channel transistor,
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respectively.
For the transceiver to send a 1-bit, both the high and low side transistors are switched
off and are thus in a high impedance state. This results in negligible current flowing from
VCC to ground, yielding negligible differential voltage on CANH and CANL. On the other
hand, when sending a 0-bit, both transistors are turned on and are thus in a low impedance
state. When the transistors are on, they can be equivalently described as resistors with
drain-to-source on-state resistance RDSON as shown in Fig. 4.2b, where current flows from
VCC to ground through RL and thus creates a differential voltage of (approximately) 2V
between CANH and CANL. This way, the CAN transceivers are capable of outputting
either 0 or 2V of differential voltage on the two CAN wires.
4.2.2 Related Work
Researchers have attempted to fingerprint ECUs in various ways, mostly for the purpose
of intrusion detection.
In Chapter III, we proposed CIDS which detects intrusions by fingerprinting ECUs
on CAN. While its main objective was to detect intrusions, we also mentioned that the
thus-derived fingerprints may also be used for attacker identification, but only when attack
messages are injected periodically. In other words, if the attacker transmits messages
aperiodically, then CIDS cannot identify the attacker ECU, i.e., the adversary can evade
CIDS as far as attacker identification is concerned. Viden takes an entirely different
approach: looking at attack messages from the perspective of ECUs’ output voltages on
CAN. This allows Viden to accurately identify the attacker ECU irrespective of how and
when the attacker injects its messages, which is crucial for attacker identification.
Instead of fingerprinting ECUs based on message timings, as in Viden, some
researchers also proposed to fingerprint them via voltage measurements. The authors
of [64] used the Mean Squared Error (MSE) of voltage measurements as fingerprints of
ECUs. However, they were shown to be valid only for the voltages measured during the
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transmission of CAN message IDs, and more importantly when voltages were measured
on a low-speed (10Kbps) CAN bus; this is far from contemporary vehicles that usually
operate on a 500Kbps CAN bus.
To overcome these difficulties, researchers proposed to extract other time and frequency
domain features of voltage measurements (e.g., RMS amplitude) and use them as inputs for
classification; more specifically, supervised (batch) learning algorithms (e.g., SVM) [35].
This way, they were able to fingerprint ECUs with enhanced accuracy and was successful
on high-speed CAN buses. However, this solution was neither practical nor attractive for
attacker identification for the following reasons. First, it required not only a high sampling
rate (2.5 GSamples/sec), but also the use of the extended CAN frame format with 29-bit
IDs, which is seldom used (due to its bandwidth waste) in contemporary vehicles; most
vehicles use the standard format with 11-bit IDs. Moreover, since the modeling was done
via batch learning, unpredictable changes in the CAN bus (e.g., temperature, battery level)
and adversary’s behaviors can lead to false identifications. These will be detailed later
when we discuss the details of Viden.
In contrast, Viden fingerprints ECUs very differently and hence achieves effective
attacker identification (1) through online update of fingerprints via adaptive signal
processing to provide adaptability; (2) at a low sampling rate (50 KSamples/sec); and more
importantly, (3) without imposing restrictions on the type of CAN message or the speed of
CAN bus to be used. As a result, the deployment of Viden in legacy and new vehicles will
be much easier.
4.3 Viden
Attacker identification is essential for expedited forensic, isolation, and security
patches, all of which are the key requirements for vehicle safety. To meet this need, we
propose a novel fingerprinting scheme, Viden, that exploits small inherent discrepancies
in different ECUs’ voltage outputs. Before delving into the inner workings of Viden, we
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first describe the system and threat models.
4.3.1 System and Threat Models
4.3.1.1 System Model
The vehicle’s CAN bus under consideration is assumed to have been equipped with
an IDS as well as a timing- (e.g., CIDS) and voltage-based (e.g., schemes in [35, 64] or
Viden) fingerprinting device; the latter complements the former via attacker identification.
We discern a fingerprinting device from an IDS based on the fact that the IDS detects
the presence of an attack whereas the fingerprinting device identifies the source of the
(detected) attack. An attack can be mounted by the adversary who has control of a
physically/remotely compromised ECU. In our system model, however, we consider such
an ECU to have been remotely compromised and thus controlled by the adversary as
in [31,58]. We do not consider a compromised device which was attached to the in-vehicle
network (e.g., device plugged in the OBD-II port), as it requires physical access and
its identification has been addressed elsewhere [35, 72]. So, the compromised ECU we
consider is one of those originally installed on the vehicle’s CAN bus.
4.3.1.2 Threat Model
By injecting fabricated attack messages through his compromised ECU, the attacker can
control the vehicle maneuver. We consider the attacker to be smarter than this: beyond just
controlling the vehicle, the attacker’s goal is to also hide the identity of the ECU injecting
the attack messages. That is, while the deployed IDS may detect the presence of an attack,
the adversary tries to evade the fingerprinting device, i.e., prevent it from determining the
source of the attack. For evasion, the adversary can perform two different impersonations
when injecting his attack messages:
• Arbitrary impersonation: The attacker misleads the fingerprinting device to think
that some arbitrary ECU other than himself is the attacker.
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• Targeted impersonation: The attacker acts smarter by impersonating a targeted ECU
for evasion, i.e., make the fingerprinting device believe that the targeted ECU is the
attacker.
Depending on the adversary’s capabilities and knowledge of different defense schemes
(available in the market or in literature) as well as their operation, his approach to evading
a fingerprinting device would be different. Specifically, based on whether the adversary
is aware of the fact that an in-vehicle ECU can be fingerprinted via timing and/or voltage
measurements, his best effort in achieving his goal would be different. Thus, we consider
three different types of adversaries: naive, timing-aware, and timing-voltage-aware
adversaries.
While all attackers are capable of injecting and sniffing messages on the CAN bus, a
naive adversary does not have any knowledge of how ECUs can be fingerprinted (either
via timing or voltage), due possibly to lack of his technical expertise or curiosity. Thus,
the naive adversary injects his attack messages imprudently at arbitrary times with forged
message IDs (for impersonation).
An intelligent adversary, however, might know how ECUs can be fingerprinted via
timing analysis. Thus, the adversary uses his knowledge to evade any (possibly-installed)
fingerprinting scheme as much as possible as follows. The adversary logs CAN traffic,
learns the timing behavior of other ECUs, and exploits the learned information in injecting
attack messages at the appropriate (learned) times so as to imitate other ECUs’ timing
behavior. This way, the adversary can perform arbitrary/targeted impersonation and thus
attempt to evade the fingerprinting device. We refer to this adversary as a timing-aware
adversary.
The adversary might also have knowledge of how ECUs can be fingerprinted
via voltage and timing measurements. Hence, when injecting attack messages, such
an adversary may try to exploit his knowledge in impersonating other ECU(s) and
thus evade any fingerprinting device as much as possible. We call this adversary a
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Figure 4.3: An overview of Viden.
timing-voltage-aware adversary. We consider such an adversary to be capable of changing
his voltage outputs via running battery draining processes, changing the supply voltage
level, or by heating up or cooling down the ECU. Although he can change them to a
certain level, we consider him to be incapable of precisely controlling their instantaneous
values. This is reasonable as precise control of voltages would require, for example,
control of even the ambient temperature. By changing his ECU’s voltage outputs to a
certain level in which the targeted ECU is outputting, a timing-voltage-aware adversary
can perform a targeted impersonation. Similarly, he can arbitrarily change the output levels
for arbitrary impersonation. Since changing his voltage levels (either before or during
message injections) does not necessarily imply that he is attacking the CAN bus, in this
chapter, we differentiate “impersonation” from an actual attack of message injections. In
addition, the adversary might even know when the voltage-based fingerprints are updated
(if not updated in real time) and thus use that as a reference in determining when to
perform arbitrary/targeted impersonation. Note, however, that he must ”play” within the
setting boundaries of the given CAN bus. For example, the attacker cannot control/tune
the values of resistors within the CAN bus in order to control the voltage levels, as this
requires physical access.
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4.3.2 High-Level Overview of Viden
As shown in Fig. 5.1, Viden fingerprints ECUs via voltage measurements and achieves
attacker identification in four phases.
Phase 1: Videnmeasures the CANH&CANL voltages and maps the recently acquired
values to the ID of the message it has just received through the ECU’s receive buffer. Then,
for that message ID, Viden learns its ACK threshold. This threshold helps Viden determine
whether or not the measured voltage originates from the actual message transmitter. Phase
1 is run in the initialization step of Viden and when an update is necessary.
Phase 2: Exploiting the learned ACK threshold, Viden selects voltages that are
outputted solely by the message transmitter. Then, Viden uses them to derive a voltage
instance, which is a set of features that reflect the transmitter ECU’s voltage output
behavior. Phase 2 and onwards are run iteratively.
Phase 3: Viden uses every newly derived voltage instance to update the voltage profile
of the message transmitter. When an attack is detected by the IDS, Viden constructs a
voltage profile for the attack messages and maps that profile to one of those Viden has,
thus identifying the attacker ECU.
Phase 4: The results from Phase 3 are verified further via multi-class classification,
only when necessary.
For a given message ID, only one ECU is assigned for its transmission in most cases.
Thus, for now we consider the relationship between the numbers of ECUs, IDs, and voltage
profiles to be 1, N(≥ 1), and 1, respectively. We will discuss further in Section 4.5 on how
Viden deals with cases where the relationship between the numbers of ECUs and IDs might
be N and 1, respectively.
4.3.3 CANH and CANL Voltage Outputs
Before presenting the details of Viden, we first discuss which voltage characteristics of
ECUs it exploits for attacker identification.
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Figure 4.4: CAN typical application schematic.
Variations in supply and ground voltages. Fig. 4.4 shows a typical ECU connection
to CAN [16, 18]. In order to output the desired voltage levels on CANH and CANL,
transceivers are powered with the nominal supply voltage (VCC) of 5V, which is provided
and maintained by a voltage regulator. The input of the regulator, VIN , comes from a
power supply, i.e., a 12V/24V battery powering all the ECUs [52]. Not only the voltage
regulator but also the connected bypass capacitors help stabilize the VCC level. However,
the output voltage of an ECU’s regulator varies independently and differently from other
ECUs’ regulators, as their supply characteristics are different (e.g., different regulators’
common-mode rejection ratios). Thus, there are inherent, small but non-negligible
differences in ECUs’ VCC. There exist variations in not only VCC but also in the ground
voltage since there does not exist a perfect ground [20].
For these reasons, CAN transceivers are built to operate over a range of voltages (e.g.,
TI TCAN10xx devices are designed to handle 10% supply variations [18]). This guarantees
transceivers with different VCC and/or ground to communicate messages correctly.
Variations in on-state resistance. When transceivers send a 0-bit, their two transistors
are turned on so that the flowing current generates the required differential voltage between
CANH and CANL. In such a case, transistors in the transceivers are considered as resistors
RDSON,P/N (see Fig. 4.2b). Although transceivers are designed to have the same RDSON,P/N
values, process/manufacturing variations/imperfections cause transistors’ RDSON,P/N
values to be slightly different from each other [60].
Fig. 4.5 shows a typical circuit diagram of a CAN transceiver. Transistors’ RDSON
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Figure 4.5: Transistors’ gate voltages are fed by the driver.
values are inversely related to their gate voltages, which are supplied by a driver, i.e., a fully
differential amplifier [14,80]. Interestingly, since the driver input is affected byVCC, which
also varies with ECU, the transistors’ gate voltages are also affected by VCC. Therefore,
variations in VCC lead to variations in transistors’ actual RDSON values. In summary,
V1. There exist differences/variations in CAN transceivers’ nominal supply voltage,
ground voltage, and RDSON,P/N values, especially during the transmission of a 0-bit.
When transmitting a 1-bit, the two transistors are simply turned off and thus there
is little voltage variation between nodes. Hence, we do not consider any voltage
measurements when the transmitter was sending a 1-bit. Instead, we only consider those
measured when it was sending a 0-bit, and refer to those as dominant voltages.
Variations in dominant voltages. From Fig. 4.2b, when transceiver i is transmitting
a 0-bit, the current, I(i) flowing from its VCC(i) to its ground can be derived as I(i) =
VCC(i)−VG(i)−2VD
RDSON,P(i)+RDSON,N(i)+RL
, where VG(i) denotes its ground voltage, and VD the diodes’ forward
bias (assuming they are equivalent). To simplify the analysis, we omit other factors such as
leakage current or variations in diodes. We can thus derive the CANH and CANL dominant
voltages, VCANH(i) and VCANL(i), from transceiver i as:
VCANH(i) =VCC(i)−VD− I(i)RDSON,P(i),
VCANL(i) =VG(i) +VD+ I(i)RDSON,N(i).
(4.1)
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From Eq. (4.1), one can see that
V2. Variations in VCC, ground, and RDSON,P/N result in different ECUs with different
CANH and CANL dominant voltages.
For this reason, the ISO11898-2 specifies that a compliant transceiver must accommodate
dominant voltages of CANH=2.75∼4.5V and CANL=0.5∼2.25V [8]. Hence, we refer to
any voltage values meeting this requirement as dominant voltages.
Transient changes in on-state resistances. In Fig. 4.5, when VOUT+ of the driver
increases, VOUT− concurrently decreases as they are differential outputs. So, for both
transistors, the absolute differences between their gate and source voltages simultaneously
decrease. This results in both RDSON,P and RDSON,N to increase, i.e., change in the same
direction [14,80]. Even when a change in the ECU temperature affects RDSON,P & RDSON,N ,
they change in the same direction. So, for a given VCC and ground voltage, the opposite
signs of I(i)RDSON,P/N(i) in (4.1) indicate that
V3. Transient changes in the ECU temperature and driver’s input/output affect
RDSON,P/N, and thus make VCANH and VCANL temporarily deviate in the “opposite”
direction.
Since regulated VCC and ground voltage remain constant, and are not affected by
transient changes in RDSON,P/N ,
V4. Transient changes in VCC and ground are significantly smaller than those in VCANH
and VCANL, i.e., their values remain relatively constant.
V1–V4 indicate that CANH and CANL dominant voltages of each ECU are different
from each other. Viden exploits this fact in constructing different voltage profiles for
(fingerprinting) ECUs.
4.3.4 Phase 1: ACK Threshold Learning
Viden is designed to run with a low voltage sampling rate so that it can be easily
installed as a low-cost software application, which requires no changes in the CAN
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Figure 4.6: Viden measuring CANH voltages.
protocol; the high rate of voltage sampling would only be required for the CAN protocol to
receive messages as it is designed to be. Such a feature, however, renders Viden incapable
of determining at which slot the voltage values were measured; all it knows is the value.
Thus, Viden goes through a phase of learning the ACK threshold, which determines
whether or not the measured voltage was outputted by the message transmitter.
Measuring dominant voltages. Viden’s measurement is triggered whenever a CANH
voltage exceeds 2.75V after a certain idle period. This is because the first measured voltage
exceeding 2.75V represents the case of some transmitter transmitting a 0-bit on the bus [8].
Since Viden is only interested in dominant voltages, it discards any measurements that are
lower than 2.75V on CANH and higher than 2.25V on CANL. The measurement continues
until some message is shown to have been received into Viden’s receive message buffer,
i.e., an indication that the transmitter has finished sending a message. By reading the ID
value of that received message, Viden knows which message ID the acquired dominant
voltages correspond to.
Non-ACK voltages. Viden continues collection of more dominant voltages for the
acquired ID (whenever the message is received) until it learns its CANH and CANL ACK
thresholds. When collecting and exploiting voltage measurements, one needs to be cautious
of the fact “During the ACK slot of a transmitted message, if received, all other nodes but its
transmitter output a 0-bit on the CAN bus” [2]. Thus, even though Viden samples at least
a few dominant voltages while receiving a certain message, not all represent the outputs
from the actual message transmitter. Fig. 4.6 shows an example of Viden’s five voltage
measurements of {3.4V, 2.6V, 2.5V, 3.3V, 3.8V} from the CANH line during the reception
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of a message, where 3.8V was measured during the ACK slot. Of them, Viden discards
measurements {2.6V, 2.5V} as they do not meet the criteria of dominant voltages. If
Viden had considered the remaining 3 measurements as if they were output by the message
transmitter, it would have been incorrect since 3.8V was from all ECUs but the message
transmitter in the ACK slot. Therefore, to accurately fingerprint the transmitter ECU,
Viden derives the ACK threshold which distinguishes a non-ACK voltage measurement
from an ACK voltage measurement. We refer to non-ACK voltages as dominant voltages
measured from slots other than the ACK slot, and ACK voltages as those measured from
the ACK slot. The threshold is derived by exploiting the following two facts of the ACK
voltage.
K1. Low probability: Since ACK is only 1 bit long, when measuring dominant voltages
during a message reception, most of them would be outputted from the message
transmitter.
K2. Different voltage level for ACK: During an ACK slot, all ECUs but the transmitter
acknowledge their message reception. Since those responders are connected in
parallel and turned on concurrently, when receiving the ACK, the measured voltages
are much higher on CANH and much lower on CANL than those when receiving
non-ACK bits.
Viden exploits these facts to collect M dominant voltages from both CANH and CANL for
N rounds for a given message ID. So, based on K1, the most frequently measured voltage
value (of the M values) will most likely represent the non-ACK voltage. During the N
rounds, we refer to the set of N most frequently measured values as the most frequent set,
S f req. On the other hand, if we were to determine the maximum and the minimum of the
M values from CANH and CANL, respectively, then they would represent ACK as well as
non-ACK voltages. This is because even a single dominant voltage value collected (without
awareness) from the ACK slot would become the maximum/minimum of the M values due
to K2. Here, the set of N maximum/minimum values measured from CANH/CANL is
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Figure 4.7: ACK threshold in a CAN bus prototype.
defined as the maximum/minimum set, denoted as Smax/min. For each message ID, Viden
exploits sets S f req and Smax/min to derive the ACK threshold that differentiates a non-ACK
voltage from an ACK voltage.
Derivation of ACK threshold. Fig. 4.7 shows the kernel density plots of the most
frequent and the maximum sets of the measured dominant voltages from the CANH line.
The measurements were made while running Viden on our CAN bus prototype, which
will be detailed in Section 4.4. One can see that only for the maximum set, there exists
a side lobe, whereas the most frequent set resembles a Gaussian distribution. Note that
during the N rounds of M measurements each, the most frequent and the maximum values
can be different. Thus, from the maximum set, Viden first discards values lower than
max(S f req) +BσS f req , where σS f req is the standard deviation of set S f req, and B a design
parameter determining how aggressive one wants to be in discarding ACK voltages. Note
that such a value also represents the rightmost end-point of the most frequent set’s kernel
density (e.g., dotted vertical line in Fig. 4.7). Then, the usual side lobe of the maximum
set (Smax) becomes the main lobe of a refined maximum set, S′max. From S′max, Viden
determines Γ1 = median(S′max)− 3MAD(S′max) and Γ2 = μS′max − 3σS′max , where MAD(x)
denotes the median absolute deviation of x, and μx its mean. The CANH ACK threshold
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of the given message ID (or its transmitter), ΓHACK , is then derived to be max(Γ1,Γ2). We
take the maximum of the two to be conservative in discarding any non-ACK voltages.
Moreover, not only the lower 3σ limit but also the lower 3-MAD limit is used since the
refined maximum set S′max may still contain its own (new) side lobe as shown in Fig. 4.7,
i.e., an outlier for S′max. Using these processes, the ACK threshold of the example in Fig. 4.7
is determined to be ΓHACK = 3.499V — a point where the two lobes in the maximum set are
separated. Depending on the transmitter ECU, the ACK threshold can be different as the
set of responders is different. Thus, the ACK learning is performed for all message IDs of
interest.
When deriving the CANL ACK threshold, ΓLACK , the minimum (instead of the
maximum) and the upper (instead of the lower) limits are used. Later through evaluation,
we show that the proposed scheme can correctly determine the ACK thresholds even in
real vehicles.
4.3.5 Phase 2: Deriving a Voltage Instance
Once ACK thresholds, ΓHACK and Γ
L
ACK , of the given message ID are learned, from
that point and on, Viden continuously collects dominant voltages, but discards those from
CANH that are lower than 2.75V or higher than ΓHACK , and those from CANL that are higher
than 2.25V or lower than ΓLACK . This way, Viden selects and processes only non-ACK
voltages. Whenever Viden obtains κ new measurements of CANH and CANL non-ACK
voltages, Viden derives a new voltage instance which is defined as the set of 6 tracking
points, F1–F6.
F1–F2: Most frequent values. Similarly to Phase 1, Viden determines the most
frequently measured CANH and CANL voltages (from κ values), which are denoted as
F1 and F2, respectively. Since Viden knows the ACK thresholds, the main differences from
Phase 1 are that only non-ACK voltages as well as κ (< M) of them are used in deriving
the most frequent values. This way, Viden keeps track of the median of the transmitter’s
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Algorithm 2 Dispersion Update
1: function UPDATEDISPERSION(V,Λ,P∗)
2: return Λ← Λ+α(P∗ − #(V<Λ)#V )3  Adjust tracking position
3: end function
4: if #measured CANH and CANL voltages both ≥ κ then
5: VH ,VL ←{past κR CANH, CANL measurements}
6: F3 ← UPDATEDISPERSION(VH ,F3,0.75)
7: F4 ← UPDATEDISPERSION(VL,F4,0.25)
8: F5 ← UPDATEDISPERSION(VH ,F5,0.9)
9: F6 ← UPDATEDISPERSION(VL,F6,0.1)
10: end if
dominant voltages.
F3–F6: Dispersions. Viden also keeps track of the dispersions of CANH and CANL
dominant voltages. As the transmitter’s voltage output behavior can change over time,
Viden continuously updates 4 different tracking points, F3–F6, which reflect (1) F3: 75th,
(2) F5: 90th percentile of the transmitter’s CANH outputs, (3) F4: 25th, and (4) F6: 10th
percentile of CANL outputs. By tracking the transmitter’s voltage distribution, Viden
understands itsmomentary voltage output behavior. Thus, voltage instances represent those
momentary behaviors. Since even a single ACK voltage can significantly distort Viden’s
understanding of transmitters’ behaviors, it is important to learn the ACK threshold. The
reasons for Viden’s tracking of different percentiles of CANH and CANL are that the low
percentiles of CANH would contain voltages measured when the transmitter switches from
sending a 1-bit to sending a 0-bit, and vice versa. The same applies for the high percentiles
of CANL measurements. Although other percentiles can be tracked as well, to minimize
Viden’s overhead, we only track F3–F6.
Algorithm 2 describes how the tracked dispersions are updated whenever Viden
acquires κ dominant voltages from each of CANH and CANL. Using the past κR
measurements, as in line 2, Viden roughly estimates what percentile the current tracking
point, Λ, represents. In Viden, we set R= 10. Then, to correct and thus move the tracking
point Λ to the desired position — where it represents the P∗ percentile — an adjustment is
made as in line 2, where α is a design parameter determining the sensitivity to changes.
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With the adjustment function proportional to (P∗ − #(V<Λ)#V )3, the tracking points move
faster if they are far away from their desired positions. As a result, the four tracking points
move if the transmitter’s voltage distribution (i.e., output behavior) shows changes, thus
adapting to any changes on the CAN bus. Instead of tracking, it is also possible to directly
derive the percentiles from the κR values. Viden, however, does not follow this since it is
too sensitive to transient changes, especially when κR is small, i.e., insufficient samples in
deriving the percentiles. Thus, in order to make Viden work under various circumstances,
we track them instead.
4.3.6 Phase 3: Attacker Identification
A voltage instance (F1–F6) represents the momentary voltage output behavior of
the message transmitter. So, to log its usual behavior, Viden exploits every newly
derived voltage instance to construct/update the voltage profile of the message transmitter.
Although the voltage instances are derived ”per message ID”, if messages originate from
the same transmitter/ECU, their instances are near-equivalent, thus leading to construction
of the same voltage profile. We will later show through evaluations that there exists
only one voltage profile for a given transmitter/ECU, thus enabling its fingerprinting. By
exploiting a newly derived voltage instance, Viden first updates the cumulative voltage
deviations (CVDs) of features F1–F6. We define a CVD to represent how much the
transmitter’s dominant voltages deviated cumulatively from their ideal values. Thus, for
feature Fx, the CVD at step n,CVDx[n], is updated as:
CVDx[n] =CVDx[n−1]+Δ[n] (1−νx[n]/ν∗x ) , (4.2)
where Δ[n] is the elapsed time since step n−1, νx[n] the value of feature Fx at step n, and ν∗x
the desired value of νx. Ideally, the most frequently measured as well as any percentiles of
the CANH and CANL dominant voltages should be equal to 3.5V and 1.5V, respectively,
106
i.e., no variations in their output voltages. Therefore, for features {F1, F3, F5}, which
represent CANH values, we set ν∗{1,3,5} = 3.5V and similarly we set ν
∗
{2,4,6} = 1.5V .
Suppressing transient changes. As ECUs have different VCC, ground, and RDSON
values, they output different CANH and CANL dominant voltages. Their momentary
voltage instances would, therefore, be different, and hence the trends in their CVD
changes would also be different from each other. So, for every obtained CVD of features
F1–F6, Viden derives Ψ[n] = ∑6x=1CVDx[n]. The reason for Viden’s summing of all the
CVDs is to exploit V3. Recall from Section 4.3.3 that V3 gives us transient deviations in
CANH and CANL output voltages are opposite in direction. So, via CVD summation,
Viden suppresses any transient deviations that have occurred (due to changes in driver,
temperature, etc.) when constructing and/or updating the voltage profiles. Note that since
CAN is a differential bus, F2, F4, F6 suppress F1, F3, F5, respectively.
Voltage profile. Suppression of transient changes yields a value, Ψ, that (mostly)
represents the consistent factors in the voltage instances: VCC, ground voltages, and
the usual voltage drops across the transistors. As stated in V4, since these values are
rather constant, the accumulated sum of Ψ, Ψaccum[n] = ∑nk=1Ψ[k] becomes linear in
time. Moreover, from V1–V2, as Ψ values are distinct for different ECUs, the trends
in how Ψaccum changes also become different, i.e., the slopes in a Ψaccum–time graph
are different. Therefore, Viden formulates a linear parameter identification problem as
Ψaccum[n] = ϒ[n]t[n] + e[n], where at step n, ϒ[n] is the regression parameter, t[n] the
elapsed time, and e[n] the identification error. As the regression parameter ϒ represents
the slope of the linear model and varies with the transmitter, we define this as the voltage
profile. This way of formulating the problem and constructing the profiles facilitates
Viden’s online update of fingerprints, which is key to Viden’s adaptability. To determine
the voltage profile ϒ, i.e., fingerprint ECUs, we use an adaptive signal processing
technique, the Recursive Least Squares (RLS) [43], which is an online approach in
learning the regression parameter. Note, however, that the choice of algorithm does not
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affect Viden’s performance. In RLS, we use kiloseconds (=103 secs) as the unit for t. Due
to space limitation, we omit details of RLS, and refer the readers to [43] for its details. We
will later show, via experimental evaluations, that the thus-derived profile ϒ is constant
over time and also distinct for different ECUs, thus allowing Viden to correctly fingerprint
them.
Identifying the attacker. When an adversary mounts an attack, the underlying IDS
can determine whether the message is malicious or not, so Viden can filter out the voltage
outputs obtained only from the (detected) attack messages and build a voltage profile from
only those. We refer to such a voltage profile as an intrusion voltage profile. Viden then
looks up the voltage profiles it had built until the detection of the attack and searches for the
one that is similar to the intrusion voltage profile.1 This way, Viden identifies the attacker
ECU.
The performance of Viden will, of course, depend on how well the IDS detects the
intrusion; this dependency needs to be investigated when an IDS and Viden are integrated
as a whole system. Note, however, that the mostly periodic nature of in-vehicle messages
makes correct detection of intrusions not as difficult as pinpointing the attacker ECU.
Researchers and car-makers are now well aware of how to detect intrusions, but not how to
accurately identify the attacker ECU.
The only case where the identified ECU would have an unknown/unlearned profile
is when it was physically attached to the vehicle by an adversary. However, since this
requires physical access and its identification has been addressed elsewhere [35,72], we do
not discuss its detection any further in this chapter.
4.3.7 Phase 4: Verification
By the birthday paradox, two different ECUs may naturally have near-equivalent
voltage profiles, i.e., voltage profile collision, thus confusing Viden in identifying
1The initial set of “ground truth” voltage profiles can be verified via timing-based fingerprinting
schemes [33, 68].
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the attacker ECU. Note, however, that Viden has at least narrowed its search scope
significantly. An adversary may also attempt to mimic some other ECU’s voltage output
behavior, i.e., targeted impersonation. In such a case where further verification besides
the voltage profiles is required, in Phase 4 of Viden, machine classifiers are run with the
(momentary) voltage instances as their inputs, i.e., F1–F6 as their features. This way, an
analysis of attacks from a different vantage point — not only its trend (Phase 3) but also its
momentary behavior — is performed, thus resolving ambiguities in attacker identification.
We, however, stress that while the adaptability achieved from Phase 3 is an essential
attribute for an accurate attacker identification, Phase 4 cannot totally replace it, i.e.,
only complements Phase 3. We will later show through evaluations that by using voltage
instances as machine classifiers’ input, Viden can resolve issues such as voltage profile
collision and an adversary’s targeted impersonation.
4.3.8 Voltage Profile Adjustment
For attacker identification, it is important to not only have the correct fingerprint of
an ECU but also that fingerprint to be still valid when examining a voltage measurement
obtained during the (detected) attack. If it was updated much earlier than when the attack
was detected, any changes occurred between those two time instants would not be reflected
in the latest model, thus leading to false identifications. We refer to this as a model-exam
discrepancy. Since Viden continuously updates the voltage profiles in real time, such a
model-exam discrepancy is minimized/nullified. Since attacker identification is performed
upon detection of an intrusion, as long as Viden keeps the fingerprints up-to-date until an
intrusion is detected (by an IDS), Viden can locate the source of the attack. Even when
there are abrupt changes in the temperature of an ECU, Viden suppresses those transient
changes, and adapts its model accordingly for an accurate attacker identification.
One corner case in which the performance of Viden might suffer from the model-exam
discrepancy would be when the vehicle has not been turned on for a long time. During
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that period, various features (e.g., power supply level, ambient temperature) which affect
the output voltages might have changed. In such a case, since the old voltage profiles
may not correctly reflect the current status, Viden may have to reconstruct (instead of
update) them. In fact, a timing-voltage-aware adversary may attempt to exploit such a
fact and attack the CAN bus as soon as the vehicle is turned on, making Viden incapable
of handling the attacks. However, even in such a case, as ECUs use the same power
source, i.e., battery, and thus all voltage profiles change in the same direction and with
the same magnitude, Viden re-adjusts and reuses the old ones as a starting point for
voltage profile update rather than reconstructing it from scratch when the vehicle is
turned on. Specifically, Viden first determines how much of common changes occurred in
ECUs’ VCC by deriving the differences between the previous and current mean values of
(F3+F4+F5+F6)/2 — an estimated value of VCC based on Eq. (4.1). Viden then adds the
thus-derived differences to ν∗ (in Eq. (4.2)) based on the fact that if common changes in
VCC incur, CANH and CANL output values increase simultaneously [16, 18]. This way,
Viden correctly adjusts/updates its voltage profile(s) and thus identifies such a type of
timing-voltage-aware adversary; we will later evaluate this via real vehicle experiments.
Note, however, that if voltage-based fingerprinting was done solely via batch learning (as
in [35,64]), it cannot make such an adjustment, suffer from high model-exam discrepancy,
thus allowing a timing-voltage-aware adversary to evade it.
4.3.9 Security of Viden
Once an intrusion is detected, via voltage measurements, Viden can identify the
attacker ECU.
A naive adversary would be capable of controlling the vehicle via continuous message
injections. However, since he has no knowledge of how ECUs might be fingerprinted, he
would inject them imprudently. In such a case, he cannot evade Viden.
A timing-aware adversary who knows that ECUs can be fingerprinted via timing
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analysis, will attempt to exploit this knowledge in not only controlling the vehicle but
also evading the fingerprinting device. For example, the adversary may know that CIDS
(Chapter III) can identify the attacker ECU only if the attack messages were injected
periodically. Hence, he may perform an arbitrary impersonation by injecting messages
aperiodically, thus fooling CIDS. Note, however, that CIDS would still detect the presence
of the attack. In addition, based on his knowledge that CIDS’s fingerprints are basically
clock skews, he may attempt to imitate the targeted ECU’s clock behavior, i.e., targeted
impersonation. However, with Viden also installed in the vehicle, since it identifies
the attacker ECU via voltage measurements, i.e., irrespective of message timings, a
timing-aware adversary can evade CIDS, but not Viden.
A timing-voltage-aware adversary may also try to evade Viden using his knowledge
of how voltage-based fingerprinting devices run. In order to achieve this, when or before
the adversary injects the attack messages, he may attempt to change the voltage output
levels by changing the supply voltage (e.g., run processes which drain battery) or by
heating up or cooling down the ECUs so that the transistors’ internal resistance values
change. He could even attempt to start attacking the CAN bus only when the vehicle is
turned on after staying off for a long time as discussed in Section 4.3.8. However, since
Viden performs an online update of voltage-based fingerprints and also adjusts them if
necessary, thus minimizing/nullifying model-exam discrepancy, it would be difficult for
the timing-voltage-aware adversary to evade Viden. Moreover, since Viden analyzes
voltage outputs from two different perspectives — momentary behavior (Phase 4) and its
trend (Phase 3) — a timing-voltage-aware adversary incapable of precisely controlling the
instantaneous voltage outputs cannot evade Viden.
4.4 Evaluation
We now evaluate the practicability and efficiency of Viden in achieving an effective
and accurate attacker identification on a CAN bus prototype and two real vehicles. When
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(a) CAN bus prototype.
ADC pins
CANH/CANL
(b) Prototype node.
(c) 2015 Chevrolet Trax. (d) Connection to the vehicle.
Figure 4.8: Experiments were conducted on a CAN bus prototype and on two real vehicles.
running Viden for both evaluation settings, in Phase 1, M = 30 dominant voltages were
obtained for each message ID for N = 50 rounds. From Phase 2, voltage instances were
outputted whenever κ = 15 non-ACK voltages from both CANH and CANLwere acquired.
4.4.1 Evaluation Setups
CAN bus prototype. Different from previous CAN bus prototype settings (in Chapter
II and Chapter III), as shown in Fig. 4.8a, this time, we configured the CAN prototype
to have four nodes. Three prototype nodes A, B, and C were programmed to inject
messages 0x01, 0x07, and 0x15 at random message intervals within [20ms, 200ms].
The fourth node V was programmed to run Viden and construct voltage profiles for
messages 0x01, 0x07, and 0x15 (i.e., transmitters A, B, and C), respectively. The reason
for injecting the messages aperiodically is to show that even in such cases, Viden is
capable of fingerprinting the transmitters. For node V that runs Viden, as shown in
Fig. 4.8b, its CANH and CANL lines were not only connected to the bus but also to the
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Figure 4.9: Deriving the ACK thresholds for message 0x091 in the 2013 Honda Accord.
microcontroller’s Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC), which had 10-bit resolution and
was configured to sample voltages at its maximum rate of 50 KSamples/sec. This way, V
acquired measurements of dominant voltages on the bus when nodes A–C were sending
their messages. The CAN bus prototype was set up to operate at 500Kbps, which is typical
for in-vehicle high-speed CAN buses. In such settings, Viden required only 2–3 messages
to output a voltage instance and update the profiles.
Real vehicles. Two cars, the 2013 Honda Accord (Fig. 2.17a) and a 2015 Chevrolet
Trax (Fig. 4.8c), were also used for our experimental evaluation of Viden. Through the
OBD-II port, the Viden node (V) was connected to the in-vehicle CAN bus, both running
at 500Kbps. From a laptop and through the Viden node, as shown in Fig. 4.8d, we were
able to read messages from the 2013 Honda Accord’s and the 2015 Chevrolet Trax’s CAN
buses. While Viden was receiving messages from the two vehicles, it sampled their CANH
and CANL voltages and then derived their ECUs’ voltage instances and profiles.
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4.4.2 ACK Threshold Learning In a Real Vehicle
Viden first learns the thresholds which determine whether the measured voltages are
from the ACK slot or not, before outputting voltage instances and profiles. This was
achieved by determining most frequent and maximum/minimum sets, and exploiting the
side lobe which only exists in the latter. In other words, the existence of such a side
lobe (as shown in Fig. 4.7 in a CAN prototype), which represents the distribution of ACK
voltages, is critical in learning the ACK threshold. Thus, to show that the proposed ACK
learning is feasible even in real vehicles, through Viden, we obtained both most frequent
and maximum/minimum sets for message ID=0x091, which was sent every 10ms by some
ECU in the 2013 Honda Accord.
Fig. 4.9 (upper) shows the kernel density plots of the most frequent and maximum sets
of the CANH dominant voltages while receiving ID=0x091, and Fig. 4.9 (lower) the kernel
density of those obtained from the CANL line. One can see that as in the CAN prototype
result (Fig. 4.7), side lobes exist in both the CANH and CANL lines. Thus, the proposed
ACK learning mechanism in Viden derived the refined maximum and minimum sets, S′max
and S′min, correctly and thus derived the ACK thresholds of message 0x091 to be 3.844V
for CANH outputs and 1.114V for CANL outputs.
One interesting observation is how high and low CANH and CANL ACK voltage
levels are. In our evaluation of Viden on the CAN prototype, since we had only 3 nodes
acknowledging to the message, the median of the CANH ACK voltages was 3.514V as
shown in Fig. 4.7. On the other hand, in our experiment on the 2013 Honda Accord, the
median of the CANH ACK voltage showed a high voltage level, 4.049V — much higher
than the one obtained from the CAN prototype. For the CANL ACK voltage, the median
was 0.953V. Such a result is due to the fact that there were much more ECUs (compared to
3 in the prototype) inside the vehicle which ACKed message 0x091.
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Figure 4.10: Voltage profiles obtained from the CAN bus prototype and the two real
vehicles.
115
4.4.3 Voltage Profiles as Fingerprints
We first evaluate the accuracy and validity of using voltage profiles to fingerprint the
transmitter ECUs.
CAN bus prototype. Fig. 4.10a shows the voltage profiles of all the three messages
sent on the prototype bus. Although the three CAN prototypes nodes were built with the
same hardware, the corresponding message IDs showed different trends in how theirΨaccum
changed over time, since the three ECUs differ in their supply and transistor characteristics.
Based on the RLS implemented in Viden, we were able to find that nodes A, B, and C had
different voltage profiles (ϒ) being equal to 10.1, -154.3, and -4.9, respectively. In other
words, voltage profiles of 0x01, 0x07, and 0x15 were shown to be different from each other
as they were sent by different ECUs, thus verifying the feasibility and accuracy of Viden.
Real vehicles. In the CAN prototype, we knew which ECU is sending which
message(s), but it is difficult to know this in a real vehicle. In order to obtain the ground
truth on the message source(s), we exploit the schemes in [33, 68], which analyzed timing
patterns in CAN for fingerprinting the ECUs. Note, however, that these are used only for
obtaining the ground truth, since those cannot identify the attacker ECU if messages are
injected at random times.
Through the connected Viden node, we not only logged the CAN traffic of the
2013 Honda Accord but also measured the dominant voltages from its CAN bus. The
measurements were made on a stationary vehicle, but while continuously changing their
operations (e.g., pressing brake pedal, turning the steering wheel) to generate some
transient changes. We later show that outputs in Viden is not affected by whether the
car is being driven or stationary. By logging the CAN traffic and exploiting the schemes
in [33, 68], we were able to verify that messages {0x091, 0x1A6} were sent from some
ECU A, {0x309} from B, {0x191, 0x1ED} from C, {0x1EA, 0x1D0} from D, {0x1AA}
from E, and {0x1A4} from F. Fig. 4.10b shows the messages’ voltage profiles. The
profiles (ϒ) derived by Viden are shown to be equivalent only for those messages sent from
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the same ECU; ECU A sending {0x091, 0x1A6} had ϒA = 102.6, B sending {0x309}
had ϒB = 85.0, C sending {0x191, 0x1ED} had ϒC = 137.0, D sending {0x1EA, 0x1D0}
had ϒD = −39.2, E sending {0x1AA} had ϒE = 67.5, while F sending {0x1A4} had
ϒF = 120.8. This result again shows that voltage profiles for different ECUs are different
and can thus be used as their fingerprints.
To further verify that Viden’s capability of fingerprinting is not restricted to a specific
vehicle model, Viden was also run on a 2015 Chevrolet Trax. Again, by exploiting the
schemes in [33, 68], we obtained the ground truths of messages {0x1FC, 0x362} sent
from some ECU A, {0x19D, 0x199} from B, {0x348} from C, {0x1E9} from D, and
{0x2F9} from E. Fig. 4.10c shows the result of Viden determining that {0x1FC, 0x362}
have a voltage profile of ϒA = −14.7, {0x19D, 0x199} have ϒB = −2.8, {0x348} has
ϒC = 5.9, {0x1E9} has ϒD = 1.8, and {0x2F9} has ϒE = −4.4. Thus, using voltage
measurements, Viden correctly fingerprinted their transmitters. This again confirms the
diversity of voltage profiles (of different ECUs), thus facilitating Viden’s fingerprinting of
in-vehicle ECUs. Moreover, these results show that Viden’s fingerprinting is not limited to
a specific vehicle model, and can thus be applied to other vehicle models.
4.4.4 Voltage profiles while driving
We further validate that Viden’s derived voltage profiles do not depend on whether and
how the vehicle is driven. We first obtained the voltage instances of 0x191 from the 2013
Honda Accord’s CAN bus. At this time of measurement, the vehicle was stationary. Later
on that day, instances of 0x191 was once again obtained, but this time while driving the
vehicle for approximately 10 mins; the same data which we used in Section 4.4.7.1.
Fig. 4.11 shows the voltage profiles of 0x191 obtained while the vehicle was stationary
and driven. One can see that the two voltage profiles are equivalent, even though they were
measured under a different condition. These are due to the fact that the voltage outputs
are much more dependent on hardware components’ characteristics than their momentary
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Figure 4.11: Voltage profiles of message 0x191 when the vehicle was stationary and driven.
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Figure 4.12: Features F1 and F2 of Viden in the two real vehicles.
conditions. Moreover, transient deviations incurred from changes in momentary conditions
would have been suppressed thanks to how Viden derives its voltage profiles; summing
CVDs of CANH and CANL.
4.4.5 Voltage Outputs in Real Vehicles
We provided 4 characteristics, V1–V4, which were imperative for Viden in
fingerprinting ECUs. We evaluate whether V1–V3 actually hold in real vehicles. Note that
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Figure 4.13: Changes of message 0x1D0 in the Honda Accord.
Fig. 4.10 verifies V4, corroborating that the voltage profiles of ECUs were constant over
time, i.e., linear.
Different outputs. According to V1–V2, ECUs output different dominant voltages.
Fig. 4.12a plots features F1–F2 (i.e., the most frequently measured CANH and CANL
values) outputted by Viden for messages 0x309 (sent by B), 0x191 (sent by C), and
0x1D0 (sent by D) in the Honda Accord. Although the transceivers of all those messages
are to output the agreed-on CANH=3.5V and CANL=1.5V when sending a 0-bit, they
outputted values deviating from them. More importantly, their output levels were clearly
discriminable. Even though ECU B, which sent 0x309, was shown to output similar CANH
dominant voltages to ECU D, it outputted totally different voltages on CANL. Similarly,
Fig. 4.12b plots F1–F2 values of 0x1FC (sent from A), 0x199 (sent from B), and 0x1E9
(sent from D) outputted by Viden in the 2015 Chevrolet Trax. Again, we can see that the
transmitters of those messages did not output the desired levels, but outputted discernible
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Figure 4.14: Viden identifying a timing-aware adversary.
levels. These results confirm that V1–V2 hold even in real vehicles, thus facilitating
Viden’s fingerprinting.
Transient changes. V3 states that transient changes in CANH and CANL voltages
are opposite in direction. Fig. 4.13 shows the 4 tracked percentiles, F3–F6, of message
0x1D0 in the 2013 Honda Accord. F3–F6 values are shown to temporarily deviate from and
later return to their usual values. Since F3 and F5 are inverses of F4 and F6, respectively,
vertically reversed shapes of the former resemble those of the latter. Thus, summing them
suppressed their transient deviations when deriving the voltage profiles. Note, however,
that since the tracked values in Viden depend on the time of sampling and its accuracy, the
summation did not completely remove the deviations, but it sufficed for fingerprinting.
4.4.6 Against a Timing-Aware Adversary
We evaluated Viden’s performance of attacker identification in the CAN bus prototype
and in a real vehicle against a timing-aware adversary. We did not evaluate its performance
against a naive adversary since the timing-aware adversary subsumes his capabilities.
CAN bus prototype. In the CAN bus prototype, we further programmed node C to
be the timing-aware adversary who injects not only 0x15 but also attack messages with
ID=0x01 at a random interval of 10–20ms; injecting messages aperiodically to perform
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arbitrary impersonation and thus evade timing-based fingerprinting devices. Note that 0x01
is also being sent from the legitimate node A at a random interval of 20–200ms. Fig. 4.14a
shows the determined voltage profiles for all three messages during the mounted attack.
Even though the voltage profile for 0x01 now reflects both the voltage outputs from A and
C, since the injection frequency from the attacker C was much higher, the voltage profile
for 0x01 changed to a profile equivalent to the one shown in 0x15 (sent by C). As a result,
Viden determined that the transmitters of 0x01 and 0x15 are the same, thus identifying the
source of the attack to be ECU C. Note that even when the injection frequency is lower,
the attacker ECU can be identified by observing the intrusion voltage profile.
Real vehicle. We also evaluated Viden’s performance against a timing-aware adversary
in a real vehicle setting. We focus on the results obtained from the 2013 Honda Accord for
the purpose of more in-depth discussion. We consider a scenario in which a timing-aware
adversary controlling the Honda Accord ECUD attacks ECUB and also impersonates ECU
A, i.e., targeted impersonation. Thus, from the vehicle, Viden acquired voltage instances
and profiles of the monitored messages: 0x091 sent from A, 0x309 from B, and {0x1EA,
0x1D0} from D. To generate the scenario of D impersonating A (while attacking B), V
was further programmed to record only every 4-th message of 0x091 (sent by A every
15ms), and every 3rd message of 0x1D0 (sent by D every 20ms) as its ID to be 0x309.
This was to emulate a scenario where the attacker D injects its attack messages with forged
ID=0x309 at a similar frequency to A, thus attempting to imitate its timing behavior for
impersonation.
Fig. 4.14b plots the voltage profiles of {0x091, 0x1EA, 0x1D0} and the intrusion
voltage profile of 0x309. Although the adversary attempted to impersonate ECU A, one
can see that since Viden fingerprints the transmitter regardless of message timings, the
intrusion voltage profile of 0x309 matched the profiles of {0x1EA, 0x1D0}. As a result,
Viden concluded the attacker to be D.
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4.4.7 Against a Timing-Voltage-Aware Adversary
Based on his knowledge of voltage-based fingerprinting devices, a timing-voltage-aware
adversary could attempt to evade Viden in two ways. First, the adversary might perform
arbitrary impersonation by attacking the vehicle only when voltage-based fingerprints have
not been updated for a long period of time, i.e., a high model-exam discrepancy. Next, the
adversary might also perform targeted impersonation by changing its voltage output levels
so as to imitate some specific ECUs’ voltage output behavior.
4.4.7.1 Arbitrary impersonation
In most cases of a timing-voltage-aware adversary performing arbitrary impersonation,
Viden accordingly/adaptively updates the voltage profiles and can thus correctly identify
the attacker. One corner case, however, in detecting the adversary would be when he
performs arbitrary impersonation by attacking the vehicle only after a long idle period.
To verify Viden’s reaction to such an adversary, we evaluated the following scenario. We
first obtained the voltage profiles of 0x091 and 0x191 from the 2013 Honda Accord while
driving the vehicle for approximately 10 mins. After 8 and 10 days had elapsed, we again
obtained their profiles; the average temperatures during the three days were 14.4°C, 7.7°C,
and 12.2°C, respectively. In between the three update dates, the vehicle was driven 700
miles and 40 miles to generate (on purpose) the considered scenario where the voltage
profiles might be outdated, thus becoming a chance for the timing-voltage-aware adversary
to perform arbitrary impersonation.
Fig. 4.15a shows the acquired voltage profiles corresponding to messages 0x091 and
0x191 on the three different dates. The initial profiles obtained were found different from
those obtained on the 8-th and 10-th elapsed days, whereas the latter two were equivalent.
One interesting observation, however, was that the voltage profiles of both message IDs
were decreased by the same amount. The changes we observed were due to a slight shift
in all ECUs’ VCC — most probably due to the change in the battery state after the long 700
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Figure 4.15: Adjusting voltage profiles of {0x091, 0x191}.
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Figure 4.16: Efficacy of Viden’s Phase 4 execution.
miles driving. In such a case, as we discussed in Section 4.3.8, Viden adjusts its voltage
profiles. Once such an adjustment was made, we obtained the results shown in Fig. 4.15b,
where all voltage profiles were properly aligned. This result shows that Viden is capable of
handling cases where a timing-voltage-aware adversary performs arbitrary impersonation
right after a vehicle’s long idle period.
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4.4.7.2 Targeted impersonation
Under scenarios where a timing-aware adversary performs arbitrary/targeted
impersonation or where a timing-voltage-aware adversary performs an arbitrary
impersonation, Viden can correctly identify him solely based on voltage profiles,
i.e., within Phase 3. It could be much more challenging for Viden (requiring to run
Phase 4) when a timing-voltage-aware adversary performs a targeted impersonation, i.e.,
trying to imitate some specific ECU’s voltage outputs. Since the adversary creates a
situation of at least two ECUs having similar voltage profiles (i.e., not unique), targeted
impersonation would be more difficult for Viden to handle than arbitrary impersonation.
We evaluated how Viden performs against such an adversary via (1) vehicle experiments
and (2) simulations based on vehicle data.
Experiment-based evaluation. In the real vehicle setting, to generate a case
which reflects a timing-voltage-aware adversary performing targeted impersonation, we
considered the following scenario in the Honda Accord: adversary’s ECU C, which
usually sends 0x191, injects attack messages with ID=0x309, thus attacking its original
sender B and at the same time imitating A’s voltage output behavior. In generating such a
scenario, evaluation settings were similar to the previous ones, except that Viden recorded
every 10n-th message of 0x191 as its ID to be 0x309. This was to generate the voltage
profile of 0x309 to be similar to A’s as in Fig. 4.16a; C impersonates A. To introduce
ambiguity in the decision, we do not use the intrusion voltage profile in this evaluation. In
such a case, if only voltage profiles are exploited, Viden might consider ECU A to be the
attacker. However, Viden deals with this in Phase 4 by using voltage instances as machine
classifier’s input. In this evaluation, we used a 200-tree Random Forest classifier with 50%
of the acquired data until detecting the intrusion as its training set.
Fig. 4.16b shows the number of misclassified voltage instances by the Random Forest
classifier. It shows that Viden misclassified a large number of 0x309’s voltage instances as
those of 0x191. That is, even when the voltage profiles of 0x091 and 0x309 were similar,
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since Viden observed the measurements in a momentary manner and the adversary was
incapable of precisely matching them, the attack source was correctly identified as C, i.e.,
transmitter of 0x191, not A. This validates that by using voltage instances as machine
classifiers’ inputs, Viden can prevent targeted impersonation by a timing-voltage-aware
adversary.
By the Birthday paradox, at least two ECUs may naturally have similar voltage profiles.
However, since Viden was feasible to distinguish them via machine classifiers, profile
collision can be mitigated.
Simulation-based evaluation. In addition to the scenario shown in Fig. 4.16a, which
we evaluated via real vehicle experiments, there could be different ways in which a
timing-voltage-aware adversary might perform targeted impersonation. For example,
the adversary might heat up or cool down his ECU to match some other ECUs’ voltage
profiles, even before he starts injecting attack messages. Thus, we conducted a more
in-depth evaluation as follows. Based on the 35-min data of voltage instances output
by the Honda Accord’s 6 ECUs and those output by the Chevrolet Trax’s 5 ECUs, two
attack datasets were constructed to each contain 1000 different “targeted impersonation”
attempts by a timing-voltage-aware adversary. We refer to Honda Accord’s ECUs as A–F
and Chevrolet Trax’s ECUs as G–K. The first dataset was based on only voltage instances
of A–F whereas the second was based on data from both vehicles, assuming that A–K
lie in the same vehicle. Such an assumption was made to evaluate how Viden performs
when the number of ECUs increases. Each impersonation attempt was constructed by (1)
randomly choosing one ECU to be the adversary and another to be the victim, then (2)
randomly choosing the times when the adversary starts to change his voltage outputs and
(later) when to start attacking the victim, and finally (3) steadily shifting the adversary’s
voltage instance values (when it starts impersonation) so that his voltage profile matches
the victim’s, i.e., profile collision, before mounting an attack. Note, however, that such
a shift does not make their instantaneous instances to be equivalent. As we discussed
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A B C D E F
A 100 0 0 0 0 0
B 0 99.3 0 0 0.7 0
C 0 0 100 0 0 0
D 0 0 0 100 0 0
E 0 0 0 0 100 0
F 0 0 0 0 0 100
(a) ”Honda Accord” attack dataset.
A B C D E F G H I J K
A 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B 1.5 98.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
C 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
D 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
E 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0
F 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0
G 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0
H 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0
I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0
J 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0
K 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.2 0 96.8
(b) ”Honda Accord + Chevrolet Trax” attack dataset.
Table 4.1: Confusion matrix of Viden [Unit: %].
in Section 4.3.1, although an adversary may match the target’s profile, it would be very
difficult for him to precisely follow the target’s instantaneous behaviors (e.g., transient
changes due to temperature). This way, we were able to emulate a scenario where the
adversary first imitates some specific ECU’s voltage output behavior and then injects
attack messages.
Table 4.1a shows the confusion matrix of Viden when identifying the attacker of
the 1000 targeted impersonation attempts in the first attack dataset. For identification,
Viden not only used voltage profiles but also a 200-tree Random Forest with voltage
instances as its input. Again, half of the data until an attack was detected was used as the
training set. Thanks to Viden’s analysis of the adversary’s impersonation attempts from
two different viewpoints — ECU’s usual voltage output behavior via voltage profiles and
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its momentary behavior via voltage instances — Viden was able to identify the attacker
with only a 0.2% false identification rate. Even when Viden was evaluated based on our
second attack dataset, which had 11 ECUs, Viden identified the attacker with a 0.3%
false identification rate where the confusion matrix is shown in Table 4.1b. Albeit the
increased number of ECUs, Viden’s false identification rate increased only by 0.1%,
thus corroborating its effectiveness. Note that such false rates reflect Viden’s capability
and robustness against the most skillful adversary who is aware of timing and voltage,
i.e., the timing-voltage-aware adversary. Thus, Viden’s false rate against all types of the
considered adversaries — including the naive and timing-aware adversaries — would be
much lower.
One can also interpret such good performance of Viden equivalent to its effectiveness
in mitigating (naturally occurred) profile collision.
4.5 Discussion
Number of ECUs on CAN. As of 2017, the average vehicle is reported to have
approximately 25 ECUs, while luxury cars have approximately 50 [5], but not all of them
on CAN; some are installed on LIN, MOST, etc. Moreover, to accommodate a large
(increasing) number of ECUs on bandwidth-limited CAN, each vehicle is equipped with
multiple CAN buses [40]. Accordingly, network architectures of various modern vehicles
(Audi A8, Honda Accord, Jeep Cherokee, Infiniti Q50, etc.) are shown to have 3∼20
ECUs per CAN bus [57]; a similar figure to which we considered in our evaluations.
Hence, if Viden was installed on each CAN bus in a vehicle, profile collision within
that bus is much less likely to occur than the case when all ECUs are (considered to be)
installed on one single CAN bus. Even in such a case with profile collisions, Viden can
still handle it via the execution of its Phase 4.
Multiple ECUs per ID. Viden may underperform when multiple ECUs are assigned
to send messages with the same ID, albeit unusual/rare. For example, although message
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ID=0x040 is scheduled to be sent, in turn, by ECUs A–D, Viden would construct only one
voltage profile for 0x040. However, if such scheduling information is known in advance
(e.g., every 4n-th message of 0x040 is sent byD), which is in fact defined by the car-makers,
then Viden could construct voltage profiles accordingly, thus solving the problem.
Intrusion Detection. Timing-based IDSs exploit the periodic nature of CAN messages
and thus suffice to detect attacks on periodic messages, but fail to detect attacks on
aperiodic ones. Since Viden determines the transmitter ECU based on voltages, similarly
to [35, 64], it can complement those IDSs in detecting intrusions. However, since most
in-vehicle messages are periodic [33] and thus most intrusions are detectable, Viden’s
potential is maximized when it is used for attacker identification.
Attacker from Another In-vehicle Network. If the attack originates from a different
in-vehicle network (e.g., FlexRay, MOST, LIN) inside the vehicle other than CAN, the
corresponding gateway ECU will be the one that injects attack messages into CAN. Viden
will, therefore, identify that gateway ECU as the attacker, since Viden is designed just for
CAN. In such a case, the best both Viden and the gateway ECU can do is to look up the
message routing table (describing which messages/signals to forward to/from), and identify
the “compromised network”. Handling such a scenario is important in integrating Viden
in real vehicles.
Limitations. For Viden to identify the attacker ECU, it requires at least one voltage
profile to use. For the example shown in Fig. 4.14b, Viden referred to the voltage profiles
of {0x1EA, 0x1D0} to determine that the attacker ECU was D. Since most ECUs are
designated to transmit at least one message ID, one can identify the attacker ECU with
Viden. However, if the compromised ECU does not send any messages, Viden’s attacker
identification can be inaccurate. In such a case, the best Viden can do would be obtaining
the voltage profile of those ECUs during the manufacturing stage and updating them via
voltage profile adjustments.
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4.6 Conclusion
State-of-the-art vehicle security solutions lack a key feature of identifying the attacker
ECU on the in-vehicle network, which is essential for efficient forensic, isolation, security
patching, etc. To meet this need, we have proposed Viden, which fingerprints ECUs
based on voltage measurements. Via the ACK learning phase, Viden obtained correct
measurements of voltages only from the message transmitters, and exploited them for
constructing and updating correct voltage profiles/fingerprints. Using these profiles, we
showed via evaluations on a CAN bus prototype and two real vehicles that Viden can
identify the attacker ECU with a low false identification rate of 0.2%. Considering the
fact that vehicles are safety-critical, Viden is an important first step toward securing the
vehicles and protecting drivers and passengers.
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CHAPTER V
Who Killed My Parked Car?
5.1 Introduction
While various ways of attacking/controlling vehicles via security vulnerabilities have
been proposed and demonstrated, all of them are shown to be feasible and effective, only
when the vehicle is running. That is, attacks are commonly believed feasible and hence their
defenses necessary only while the ignition is on. This has led to a lack of understanding of,
and attention to, what an adversary can do while the vehicle’s ignition is off.
In this chapter, we show such a common belief does not hold by proposing and
demonstrating two new attacks—Battery-Drain (BD) and Denial-of-Body-control
(DoB)—through which an adversary can disable parked vehicles with the ignition off.
Such attacks are critical and difficult to diagnose because their resulting symptoms are the
same as those of typical/usual mechanical/electrical failures (e.g., depleted car battery,
malfunctioning key-fob). This will likely delude their forensics, which may, in turn, trigger
unnecessary repairs, extend their service outage, or even blame wrong parties (vehicle
OEMs/suppliers) for the problem.
By mounting the BD attack, an adversary first gains access to the in-vehicle network
then controls various standby functions of the car, and finally drains the battery to a
level where the car (doors) cannot be started (opened). We will henceforth use the
word “immobilize” as an action that prevents the driver from starting or operating his
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vehicle. As the ignition is off, one might think that no matter what message(s) the
attacker injects, none of the in-vehicle ECUs would receive, and respond to, the injected
messages. Surprisingly, however, our analyses of various in-vehicle network standards
and their protocol implementations reveal the feasibility of controlling ECU functions
via message injections even when the ignition is off. Ironically, the main reason for
this feasibility is the “wake-up functions”—which are intended to enhance the driver’s
experience/convenience—let the adversary wake up ECUs (of a parked vehicle) and then
control them. That is, the wake-up functions that were originally designed for a good
cause become an attack vector. Wake-up functions are standardized, implemented, and
thus provided in various in-vehicle networks so that car manufacturers can provide remote
standby (not powertrain control) functions, such as remote diagnostics, door control, and
anti-theft.
Thus, exploiting such a standardized standby function, the attacker (i) wakes up ECUs
by injecting a wake-up message, (ii) controls the awakened ECUs by sending certain
messages (e.g., those that control lights, unlock/lock the door, change power mode), and
therefore, (iii) achieves his goal of draining the vehicle’s battery. In order to control such
functions, the attacker must know which messages (more specifically, with which message
IDs) to inject, usually requiring some (painstaking) reverse-engineering with fuzzing [31,
32]. However, for the purpose of BD attack, we propose a driver-context-based scheme,
which significantly lowers the technical barrier for the adversary to reverse-engineer the
required control messages, i.e., figuring out which message IDs to use, thus helping the
attacker succeed in BD attack.
Through the proposed Denial-of-Body-control (DoB) attack, in addition to simply
waking up ECUs (as was also done in the BD attack), an adversary can force all awakened
ECUs to enter the “bus-off” (i.e., shut-down) state. The attacker does this to exploit the
fact that, depending on their software configuration, some ECUs do not recover from a
bus-off; a policy specified in the ISO standard [7]. We find through evaluations of real
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vehicles that a DoB attack can, in fact, lead to a case where important ECUs, such as a
Remote Control Module (RCM)—which is an integral part of remote key and security
functionalities—do not recover from a bus-off, i.e., remain shut down. As a consequence,
the communication between the key-fob and the RCM is cut off, thus making the driver
unable to enter or start his vehicle.
Only a few ECUs of a parked vehicle can be awakened and thus be controlled. This
prevents the adversary from controlling certain ECUs. For example, an adversary cannot
control the turned-off powertrain ECU (as if the owner could have) when the ignition is
off. Interestingly, however, even under such restrictions, the two proposed attacks are
still feasible, mainly because they are achieved via controlling ECUs that are asleep, but
not completely turned off. According to our in-depth evaluation of which ECUs can be
awakened, these two appear to be the most critical attacks that are feasible, given the
restricted set of controllable ECUs. It is also important to note that they are very practical
and very different from the attacks known to date for the following reasons.
• One common irony of the two proposed attacks is that the wake-up function
of in-vehicle networks, which was originally for enhanced user convenience, is
exploited as an attack vector.
• The ease of mounting the attacks stems from the fact that the wake-up signal
was defined to be very simple. A simple (agreed-on) wake-up message facilitates
extended battery operation time, which is defined as how long the battery can last
to provide enough power for the driver to start the car. From a security viewpoint,
however, this battery-saving feature makes it easier for the attacker to wake up ECUs
and then drain the vehicle’s battery.
• The two proposed attacks can be achieved without leaving any traces, except
an immobilized vehicle. In fact, their resulting symptoms—drained car battery
and inoperable key-fob—are identical to those that may occur in our daily lives
due to mechanical/electrical failures (not attacks), thus making their forensic
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reconstructions difficult.
• The simplicity of the wake-up signal makes message encryption or use of Message
Authentication Codes (MAC) (some state-of-the-art defenses) unable to prevent an
attacker from waking up ECUs.
Through extensive experimental evaluations of 11 real vehicles—i.e., 2008–2017
model-year (compact and mid-size) sedans, coupe, crossover, PHEV (Plug-in Hybrid
Electric Vehicle), SUVs, truck, and an electric vehicle—we show that all (except one 2008
model-year) of our test vehicles are equipped with the wake-up functions, rendering both
BD and DoB attacks feasible. Moreover, we show that by mounting a BD attack, the
adversary can speed up the average battery consumption by at least 12.57x, drain the car
battery within a few hours, and therefore immobilize the vehicle. We also demonstrate the
proposed DoB attack on a real vehicle and show that the attacker can shut down an ECU
indefinitely and thus prevent the driver from starting or even entering the car.
In summary, this work makes the following contributions:
1. Analysis and application of in-vehicle network protocols, standards, and
implementations on 11 different real vehicles, showing the feasibility of waking up
ECUs via message injections;
2. Discovery of two new and practically important attacks—BD and DoB
attacks—through which an adversary can immobilize vehicles while the ignition is
off; and
3. Demonstration of the new attacks on a real vehicle.
5.2 Background
5.2.1 Terminal Control
The car battery powers in-vehicle ECUs not only when the ignition is on but also when
it is off. When and how much battery/power an ECU drains depends on the terminal it is
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connected to. In the DIN 72552 standard [4], terminals are defined as follows. Connected
ECUs attached to
• Terminal 15: switched on with ignition on and (totally) off when ignition is off
• Terminal 30: permanently powered on but usually runs in sleep mode, while the
vehicle is parked and locked (i.e., ignition is off).
This definition of differentiation in terminal control is to provide different functionalities
in vehicles when the ignition is on/off. As an example, consider the Passive Keyless
Entry and Start (PKES) system, which allows users to open and start their cars while
keeping their car keys in their pockets [42] and is equipped in most contemporary vehicles.
In order to provide the keyless entry feature, the ECU running PKES will have to be
connected to terminal 30 and be permanently powered on, continuously sensing whether
the owner’s/driver’s key fob is within a certain range. Meanwhile, if the power modes of
such permanently powered on ECUs are not properly managed, they will quickly drain
the car battery. Thus, to minimize their power consumption, as described in the DIN
72552 standard, they operate in sleep mode in which only their transceiver (not their
microcontroller) is powered on. This is for the ECU’s transceiver to still be capable of
detecting and therefore responding to any wake-up signals. For this reason, transceivers
have a separate power supply [44]. This way, while the ignition is off, ECUs asleep switch
to, and operate in normal mode, i.e., wake-up, only when required, thus preventing fast
drain of the battery and typically keeping cars continuously parked/idle for 25∼40 days
without losing battery power. The battery doesn’t get charged by the alternator until the
vehicle engine runs back again with the ignition on.
5.2.2 Operation Modes of ECUs
The need of ECUs asleep to be awakened is increasing for enhanced user/driver
experience/convenience. For example, vehicle OEMs are introducing new useful
functions, such as PKES, overnight remote diagnostics, remote temperature & door
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Bus Data Rate Industry Standard Wakeup
CAN
500 kBit/s
ISO 11898-1
ISO 11898-2/5 Global
125 kBit/s
ISO 11898-1
ISO 11898-3 Global
33.3 kBit/s GM LAN Global
LIN 19.2 kBit/s LIN Global
SAE
J2602 10.4 kBit/s SAE J2602 Global
FlexRay 2.5/5/10 MBit/s FlexRay Global
MOST 0.1/1 GBit/s MOST -
Table 5.1: In-vehicle networks’ wake-up capability [53].
control, and anti-theft while the vehicle is parked and turned off. We refer to such
functions that are executable/executed while the ignition is off as standby functions.
Safety-related controls such as powertrain/engine controls are not standby features since
the ECUs controlling them are usually configured to be completely turned off when parked
with the ignition off. To meet such an increasing need, those ECUs asleep are configured
to be awakened via local or bus wake-up.
A local wake-up is triggered when a switch attached to the ECU (e.g., a receiver for
the remote key) is turned on. This drives a logic state change on its WAKE pin and thus
re-activates the whole ECU. Another mechanism in which an ECU wakes up is whenever
it sees a specific (i.e., wake-up) message/signal on the bus. Upon detection of a wake-up
signal by the ECU’s transceiver, which remains ON even while the ignition is off, it turns on
the power supply of the ECU, wakes up the whole ECU, and thus enters normal operational
mode. We will later elaborate on what the wake-up signals are when we discuss how the
proposed attacks work. If no additional wake-up signal is received within a certain (preset)
time period, the ECU goes back to sleep.
Table 5.1 summarizes in-vehicle network standards/protocols that define such a
wake-up function/capability of providing a pathway for driver-friendly standby features.
Note that it is standardized, implemented, and used not only in CAN but also in all other
in-vehicle networks, except for MOST.
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5.2.3 Related Work
Exploiting a remotely compromised ECUs, researchers have shown how various
vehicle maneuvers can be (maliciously) controlled by injecting packets into the in-vehicle
network [26, 50, 56]. Although such attacks were effective, they were mounted and thus
considered malicious only when the vehicle is running. To the best of our knowledge, there
has been no study on what the adversary can do while the ignition is off. We fill this void
by discovering and applying two new attacks, BD and DoB, that are practical, effective
and important especially when the ignition is off. They work very differently from existing
attacks since the type of ECUs that an adversary can control (when the ignition is off)
are far more limited than when the vehicle is running. For example, the adversary may
control the door control ECU, but not the powertrain ECUs. For this reason, in the BD
attack, the adversary targets those ECUs controllable while the ignition is off, such as
body control, door, and trunk instead of steering, brake, or engine—those that would have
been the main targets in previously known attacks. In fact, for a parked vehicle with the
ignition off, control of those ECUs equipped with standby features can be much more
“critical” than others. The steering under malicious control is clearly safety-critical when
the vehicle is running, but not so when the vehicle is completely turned off; illumination of
exterior/interior lights via a door unlock/lock might be a more important problem in such
a case!
5.3 Threat Model
As in previously known attacks [31, 32, 50, 58], we consider the adversary capable
of remotely (but not physically) compromising an in-vehicle ECU via numerous attack
surfaces and means, and can thus gain its control; physically compromising an ECU
requires physical access and is thus out of our scope. That is, the adversary can 1)
compromise a (third-party) OBD-II dongle/device in advance, and gain remote control of
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the vehicle once the driver plugs it into his car [41] or 2) compromise an in-vehicle ECU
(e.g., telematic unit) remotely so as to access the in-vehicle network [31,58]. Since such an
adversary would have access to the vehicle’s CAN bus, we call such an adversary a CAN
attacker. Through the compromised ECU, the CAN adversary can inject any message with
forged ID, DLC (Data Length Code), and data—which we refer to as attack messages—on
the bus. Also, since CAN is a broadcast bus, the adversary can sniff messages on CAN.
While previous studies have mainly focused on threats made while the vehicle
is running, we consider a different, unexplored threat: the adversary’s objective is
to immobilize the victim’s vehicle while the ignition is off and make its forensic
investigation/reconstruction as difficult as possible. Immobilizing the vehicle prevents the
driver from starting or driving the car. In order to make forensics difficult, the adversary
also aims to immobilize the car before the driver tries to enter/start it without leaving any
trace, except the crippled vehicle. The adversary may even delude forensics by making
the symptoms resulting from the attacks resemble typical mechanical/electronic failures,
thus misleading the owner/mechanics to wrong causes of the symptom/failure(s). This will
likely result in replacing wrong parts (wasting money unnecessarily), extending service
outage, or blaming wrong suppliers/OEMs. Although the adversary may immobilize a
vehicle by simply flooding the in-vehicle network when the driver tries to start the car, thus
preventing any other ECUs from receiving/processing commands, we do not consider such
an adversary since its symptom is very different from usual/typical mechanical/electronic
failures (thus exposing itself for easy detection and removal).
As the attacks under consideration focus on parked vehicles with the ignition off, the
adversary must “play” within the given boundaries of its CAN bus. In parked vehicles,
only those ECUs that contribute/relate to standby features are asleep, while others are
completely turned off. This imposes a certain restriction on the CAN attacker: he can only
control ECUs that remain asleep (i.e., not completely off), once the ignition goes off. That
is, the attacker’s capability is limited to controlling only those ECUs equipped with standby
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Immobilize!
Wake up ECUs
Driver-context-based 
Reverse Engineering
DoB AttackBattery-drain Attack
Figure 5.1: An overview of the proposed attacks.
features, e.g., door and lighting ECUs. So, we consider the CAN attacker to be incapable
of, for example, driving/crashing a car since the powertrain/engine ECUs are completely
turned off when its ignition is turned off, due to its irrelevance to standby features.
5.4 Immobilizing a Vehicle
We now introduce two new attacks through which a CAN adversary can compromise
the vehicle’s availability while it is parked with ignition off.
5.4.1 Overview of the Proposed Attacks
Through a compromised in-vehicle ECU, the CAN adversary has access to the CAN
bus irrespective of whether the ignition is on or off. However, especially when the ignition
is off and thus all ECUs are asleep or turned off (until the ignition is turned back on again),
an attack message injected by the adversary may not be delivered to those ECUs. That is,
no matter what messages the adversary may inject, these ECUs may not respond.
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Fig. 5.1 presents an overview of how the CAN adversary immobilizes a vehicle in
such a case. In order to control/attack ECUs on the bus, s/he first wakes them up and
then immobilizes/cripples the vehicle via a BD or DoB attack. In the case of BD attack
(Section 5.4.3), the adversary will attempt to exploit the awakened ECUs for controlling
certain functionalities of the vehicle (e.g., illuminating exterior/interior lights) and thus
draining its battery. In order to figure out which message ID to use for such a control,
the attacker goes through a message reverse-engineering process based on driver context,
which will be detailed in Section 5.4.3.3. That way of reverse-engineering messages allows
the attacker to succeed in BD attack much easier than via conventional reverse-engineering
such as fuzzing. In case of DoB attack (Section 5.4.4), the attacker need not go through
the reverse-engineering process, because the DoB attack does not control ECUs but shuts
them down by exploiting their error handling and recovery mechanisms. By mounting a
BD and/or a DoB attack, the adversary immobilizes the vehicle.
To immobilize a vehicle, the two proposed attacks rely on standby feature ECUs,
which can normally be awakened in any car, and the natural design of the CAN standard.
Therefore, they are critical, yet feasible on parked vehicles with ignition off despite the
restriction in number/type of ECUs that the adversary can control.
5.4.2 Waking Up ECUs
When the ignition is off, some ECUs are configured to run in sleep mode and
continuously monitor if there is any incoming local or bus wake-up signal. Taking this into
consideration, using the compromised ECU, the CAN adversary attempts to wake up all
other ECUs by delivering a bus wake-up signal to them. Then, what type of bus wake-up
signal should the adversary use in order to wake up the ECUs?
Standardized wake-up. The remote wake-up behavior of a CAN ECU was first
introduced and specified in the ISO 11898-5 standard which defines the bus wake-up
behavior as “One or multiple consecutive dominant (0-bit) bus levels for at least tFilter,
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each of them separated by a recessive (1-bit) bus level, trigger a bus wake-up.” While
tFilter is defined to be within [500ns, 5μs], its actual value depends on the transceiver being
used.
In a CAN bus with bit rates up to 200kBit/s, i.e., bit width longer than 5μs, any 0-bit
within a CAN frame/message triggers a wake-up. For bit rates up to 500kBit/s, the wake-up
condition is always met for any normal CAN data message since its 1) RTR, 2) IDE, and 3)
r0/FDF bit are all defined to be dominant (0s) as shown in Fig. 2.1. That is, in a 500kBit/s
bus, since those three bits—each with width 2μs—are sent consecutively, the resulting
duration of dominant bus level becomes at least 6μs, thus always guaranteeing/satisfying
the wake-up trigger condition.
Note that the ISO standard specifies such dominant bus levels to be separated by a
recessive bus level. This is easy to achieve since CAN always 1) stuffs a recessive 1-bit
after 5 consecutive 0 bits, i.e., bit-stuffing [2, 32], 2) has certain fields fixed with a 1-bit
(e.g., CRC delimiter, ACK delimiter as shown in Fig. 2.1), and 3) the user can determine
what value(s) to fill in such fields as ID, DLC, and DATA. The same also applies to the
extended CAN format which has a 29-bit ID. However, in this chapter, we only consider
the basic/standard CAN data format since the extended format is seldom used (due to its
bandwidth waste) in contemporary vehicles; most vehicles use the basic/standard format
with 11-bit IDs.
The reason for OEMs’ agreement on a standardized and simple wake-up signal was to
not only guarantee a 100ms link acquisition time [44] but also to allow for a low-power
design (e.g., RC-circuit) of wake-up detection, i.e., an energy-efficient sleep mode [44].
That is, the simple design/definition of a wake-up signal was to prolong the battery
operation time.
Similarly to CAN, other in-vehicle networks such as FlexRay and LIN define the
wake-up signals to be simple for energy-efficiency. FlexRay specifies the signal to be long
high/low [44] and LIN specifies it to be a dominant bus level within the interval [250μs,
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5ms] [6]. The wake-up signal in those networks also wakes up all ECUs asleep on the
bus; see Table 5.1. An adversary can, therefore, easily wake up ECUs while the ignition is
off, in not only CAN bus but also other in-vehicle networks. However, in this chapter, we
focus on CAN for a more in-depth treatment of the attacks.
CAN adversary waking up the bus. As the wake-up signal is simple and standardized,
all the CAN adversary needs to do is inject a fabricated wake-up message/signal into the
bus, which s/he has access to. As mentioned earlier, due to its simple definition, a wake-up
message with any content (i.e., ID, DLC, and DATA which are controllable by a remote
attacker) will wake up ECUs. Note, however, that only those ECUs which are asleep (i.e.,
not completely off) will be awakened. This is ironic/paradoxic since wake-up signals are
made simple for energy-efficiency, i.e., to minimize battery consumption, but such a simple
design helps the attacker wake up ECUs, thus making the vehicle less energy-efficient.
Power source. One remaining requirement for a CAN adversary to achieve this is that
his (compromised) ECU has to remain powered on. The attacker achieves this fairly easily
thanks to two interesting facts.
First, the ECUs which a CAN adversary would (or can) compromise and thus use
are most likely to be continuously powered on, or (at least) have a separate power
source/supply during their operation. A typical example ECU that an attacker would
target (to compromise) is the telematic unit due to its wide variety of external/wireless
connectivities. The practicability of the telematic unit being compromised has already been
demonstrated in [31, 50, 56]. Interestingly, the telematic unit—which is regarded as one
of the most vulnerable ECUs [31–33, 41]—is usually completely (or at least periodically)
powered on so as to respond to external events (e.g., requests for remote diagnosis, remote
door/temperature control, anti-theft) even after the ignition key has been taken out [1].
Moreover, a telematic unit is usually equipped with an alternative power supply so that
it can operate even when the car battery or electrical system is faulty [54]. Similarly, an
OBD-II device/dongle, which is also a good target for an adversary to compromise (as
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demonstrated in [31, 41]), can also be completely powered on (by the attacker) since it is
also normally equipped with an external power source (e.g., battery). In summary, ECUs
which a CAN adversary will likely compromise via their exposed attack vectors are the
ones which are completely/always powered on either by the car battery or their own power
supplies.
Second, although the operational mode of a (compromised) ECU is preset to run
in sleep mode when the ignition is off, it does not restrict the adversary to change
such a setting. Two most common CAN controllers—Microchip MCP2515 and
NXP SJA1000—both allow modification of their operation mode (e.g., normal, sleep,
listen-only) through software commands [10,15]. For ECUs with the Microchip MCP2515
CAN controller, the Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) remains active even when the
MCP2515 is in sleep mode, thus allowing access to all registers. Thus, through the
SPI, it is also possible for the user/adversary to read/write the CAN controller registers,
including the operational mode register [10]. Such user-level features for configuring the
CAN controller allow attackers to easily switch from sleep to normal mode via software
commands.
As a result, a CAN adversary can inject wake-up messages to the CAN bus while the
ignition is off. The transceivers of ECUs asleep observe a wake-up signal on the bus, switch
on the ECUs’ power supply (usually via an interrupt), and boot up the microcontroller.
Hence, the ECUs return to normal operational mode. Since CAN is a broadcast bus, even
a single injected message from the CAN adversary wakes up all ECUs asleep.
5.4.3 Battery-Drain (BD) Attack
We now give a detailed account of how an adversary can drain the battery of a vehicle
via message injections, i.e., mount a BD attack. Here, we only give the details of how
the BD attack can be mounted. Section 5.5 will detail their consequences via in-depth
evaluations on real vehicles.
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5.4.3.1 Attack 1 — Waking up ECUs
While the ignition is off, the CAN adversary can first attempt to wake up ECUs via
message injections. Once the ECUs asleep wake up, they switch to, and run in normal
operational mode. Note, however, that an awakened ECU goes back to sleep after a certain
period of time (configured by the OEM). Hence, by waking up ECUs as much and as
frequently as possible, the adversary can continuously force those ECUs to run in normal
mode, although they should remain asleep. If ECUs are configured to stay in normal mode
(after waking up) for a duration of Twakeup, the frequency of wake-up messages from the
attacker has to be at least 1Twakeup . Since the adversary can read/sniff messages on the CAN
bus, s/he can easily infer Twakeup from the monitored traffic.
With continuous injections of wake-up messages, ECUs (that would usually be asleep)
will be forced to stay up in normal mode and thus draw much more current from the
battery. In contrast to the ECUs asleep, which normally consume less than 100μA of the
battery current, normal-mode ECUs consume several mA. Therefore, by simply waking up
ECUs—the simplest BD attack—the CAN adversary can significantly increase the battery
current consumption and can thus reduce the battery operation time. We will later in
Section 5.5 detail the amount of current drained by simply waking up ECUs, and how
that affects the vehicle battery operation time.
5.4.3.2 Attack 2 — Controlling ECUs
An interesting consequence of waking up ECUs is not only the increased battery current
consumption but also the pathway it provides for the attacker to control ECUs. After
waking up, since ECUs previously asleep now run in normal operational mode—the same
as when the ignition is on—the CAN adversary becomes capable of controlling them. We
refer to “controlling an ECU” as executing the ECU’s function(s) via message injections.
For example, an attacker may inject an attack message with ID=0x11, which is usually
sent by some other ECU. If message 0x11 is processed and used by the brake ECU in
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engaging/disengaging the brake, an injection of 0x11 will control that ECU’s brake function
and thus the corresponding vehicle maneuver.
However, the criticality levels of some (malicious) controls would be different from
when the vehicle’s ignition is on and moving, compared to the case when the vehicle is
parked with its ignition off, i.e., different from existing attacks. For example, ensuring
that the brakes do not unwillingly engage/disengage in a moving vehicle is safety-critical.
It might not be critical when the ignition is off and the vehicle is parked. From the
battery/energy consumption perspective, the controls that would be considered malicious
are different.
Controls that increase battery consumption. Since the activation of interior/exterior
lights is one of the highest battery-consuming functionalities, the adversary can attempt to
control them to increase the battery current drain. Instead of attempting to directly control
the interior/exterior lights (via light-control messages), we exploit the following vehicle
functions which indirectly illuminate various lights inside and outside the vehicle.
C1. Changing the vehicle’s power mode;
C2. Repeatedly unlocking and locking doors; and
C3. Opening the trunk.
The reason why we exploit such indirect functions is that their control messages are far
easier to reverse-engineer (i.e., figure out the meaning/purpose of messages) than the direct
(light-)control messages if done based on driver context.1 This fact counters the common
belief that reverse-engineering CAN messages is a non-trivial painstaking process [32].
We will later in Section 5.4.3.3 detail how the message reverse-engineering process can be
eased, especially for BD attack.
C1. Changing the vehicle’s power mode. Depending on the ignition switch position,
vehicles run in different power modes such as off, accessory mode, run, and start. An
adversary exploits this fact and can first reverse-engineer the control message (via driver
1To control vehicle functions, we must know which message ID(s) to use/inject. However, since that
information is OEM-proprietary, we must reverse-engineer them.
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Figure 5.2: Consequence of controlling the power mode of a parked vehicle.
context) which determines/reflects the vehicle’s power mode, wakes up ECUs on the bus,
and attempts to change the power mode using the reverse-engineered message/ID.
Fig. 5.2 shows why changing the power mode of a vehicle can be considered as an
indirect way of illuminating lights and thus increasing the battery consumption, i.e.,
mount a BD attack. It shows what happened when we tried to alter the power mode of
one of our test vehicles via message injections. Here, every procedure and consequence
was executed and happened while the ignition was off. We will later in Section 5.5
provide the evaluation settings and general methodologies in accessing the CAN bus and
injecting messages. Note that it was fairly easy to reverse-engineer (or figure out) the
power-mode control message, especially when using the context—a main reason why we
attempted to mount the BD attack via power-mode control instead of (direct) light control.
When we controlled the power mode of a parked vehicle, as shown in Fig. 5.2, various
indicators on the dashboard were (temporarily) illuminated. Similarly, albeit not shown
in Fig. 5.2, the infotainment system was also booted up. When we periodically injected
the reverse-engineered “power-mode control” message to the bus, the indicators on the
dashboard continuously flickered and the infotainment system was intermittently turned
on. Although the vehicle ignition was off, a (fabricated) power-mode control message was
injected successfully since the vehicles’ power-mode master is the Body Control Module
(BCM)—the ECU which has to be at least asleep but never completely off due to its
important role in providing various standby functions, e.g., Remote Keyless Entry (RKE),
Passive Anti-Theft System.
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In summary, if a CAN adversary not only wakes up ECUs but also reverse-engineers
and injects power-control messages, s/he can continuously illuminate various
lights/indicators and further increase the overall battery consumption: an enhancement of
BD attack.
C2. Unlocking and locking the door. In addition to the previous two types of BD
attack — waking up ECUs and controlling the power mode—a CAN adversary can also
attempt to repeatedly unlock and lock the vehicle (while parked). The reason why a CAN
adversary would mount a BD attack in this way is not only 1) the unlock/lock messages
are easy to reverse-engineer but also 2) it activates various light functions. When the
driver (or the adversary) unlocks the car, welcome lights of the vehicle illuminate for an
enhanced visibility for the driver. Note that the numbers and types of the welcome lights
that illuminate may vary with the vehicle manufacturer/year/model, and also depending on
whether the lighting control system is set as “automatic,” which is the default setting for
most drivers [31].
During daytime, lights such as marker lights, interior lights, exterior footlights (on
side mirrors), and coming-home lights will/might illuminate when the driver unlocks the
vehicle. At night time, the vehicle will turn on its headlights. By reverse-engineering and
injecting “door lock control” messages to the bus and then exploiting these driver-friendly
lighting controls, an adversary can continuously illuminate all the welcome lights and thus
significantly increase the average battery consumption; another enhancement of BD attack.
Similarly to the attack case C1 where the power mode was controlled, the door control
module is another ECU which has to provide a standby function and must thus be not
completely off (i.e., must be asleep instead). This allows the attacker to control the door
locks even when the ignition is off.
C3. Opening the trunk. The adversary can also attempt to open the trunk of a
car similarly to the attack cases C1 and C2. Again, the trunk control module/ECU is
another ECU that would have to be asleep, not completely turned off. Therefore, by
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reverse-engineering the trunk control message, an adversary can (remotely) open the trunk.
When the trunk is opened, for enhanced visibility for the driver, (almost all) vehicles are
configured to illuminate its interior map, dome, and trunk lights. Again, thanks to such
user-friendly lightings, the adversary can illuminate more lights inside/outside the vehicle
and thus further increase the battery consumption, i.e., reduce the battery operation time.
In contrast to C1 and C2, the attacker is only required to inject a single trunk-control
message into the bus if the lights remain on while the trunk is open (as some vehicles
do). Even if the lights automatically go off after some time, the attacker can re-inject the
trunk-control message to re-illuminate them. Note, however, that opening the trunk could
be a bit (visibly) intrusive, which is a limitation of this approach, although for some vehicles
we observed that it is not. However, if the adversary can deplete the battery before the
driver/passenger notices and thus attempts to close it, such an intrusive approach will still
succeed in immobilizing the vehicle. When mounted overnight, since the driver/passenger
would notice this only when s/he attempts to start the car in the following morning, the
attacker could be given approximately half a day or even a few days (e.g., weekends) in
succeeding it!
5.4.3.3 Driver-Context-Based Reverse-Engineering
In controlling an ECU (as in C1–C3), since the message IDs that have to be used
are different for different vehicle manufacturers and models, adversaries would have to
reverse-engineer messages for each vehicle that it targets. This fact generally becomes
a (high) technical barrier for the adversary, especially when mounting state-of-the-art
attacks on different vehicles. However, for the purpose of BD attack, the message
reverse-engineering can be achieved very differently, i.e., not via fuzzing. Specifically,
by reverse-engineering messages based on the driver-context, it becomes much easier
for the adversary to figure out which messages to use in succeeding the BD attack on
different/various vehicles.
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Figure 5.3: Driver-context-based reverse-engineering.
The proposed driver-context-based reverse-engineering works as follows. First, when
the ignition is off, the CAN adversary continuously wakes up ECUs and records/logs the
CAN traffic as Ωo f f as illustrated in Fig 5.3. If the adversary knows when the driver
usually starts the car (e.g., 9am in the morning), s/he can start such a process just before
that time. We define the sets of distinct IDs sent while the ignition is on and off as Son
and So f f , respectively. Then, once ECUs are awakened via a wake-up message from the
adversary, |So f f | distinct message IDs would be observed on the bus and that number would
be lower than |Son|, since the number of ECUs running in normal operation mode (and thus
periodically sending messages) would be less.
Next, the adversary continuously logs the CAN traffic as Ωo f f and marks the bit
positions of messages’ (∈ So f f ) data fields that continuously change as Δo f f . One example
of Δo f f can be the last byte of the data field where OEMs usually put their 1-byte
checksum [32, 58]. When the CAN adversary finds that the ignition is (now) turned on,
onwards, s/he records/logs the traffic (of an “ignition on” vehicle) as Ωon. The CAN
adversary can acknowledge this by observing a suddenly-increased number of distinct
message IDs—from |So f f | to |Son|—on the bus. Since So f f ⊂ Son, the CAN adversary
analyzes how the data values/fields, excluding Δo f f , of those message IDs (∈ So f f )
changed during the period of just before to right after the ignition being started.
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An interesting yet important fact about So f f ’s data values (excluding those in Δo f f ) is
that they reflect the driver’s actions before driving the vehicle. Imagine a person who tries
to start and drive his/her car. S/he would first unlock the vehicle and then change its power
mode, i.e., turn on the ignition. Perhaps, s/he might even open the trunk to put items there
before starting the vehicle. Such a routine of accessing and starting the vehicle, which we
define as the driver context, is embedded/reflected in Ωo f f , i.e., the CAN traffic obtained
while the ignition was off. Specifically, when the driver makes some action (e.g., unlock the
door) while the ignition is off, the data value of an ID (∈ So f f ) would change. Note that such
a change would not incur in any of the data fields in Δo f f , i.e., the bit positions which their
values normally continuously change, since the driver’s action and thus the corresponding
change in the data values are “temporary”. So, by observing the temporary data changes in
So f f incurred right before the ignition is turned on, the CAN adversary can easily figure out
which messages relate to those driver-context-related controls. Interestingly (and luckily
for the CAN adversary), as discussed in Section 5.4.3, such driver-context-related controls
lead to illuminating various indicators/lights. As a result, especially for a CAN adversary
attempting to mount a BD attack, reverse-engineering the required control messages (e.g.,
door lock/unlock, changing power modes) becomes far more easier! The same can be
applied when the driver stops and leaves the vehicle, since s/he would again change the
power mode, perhaps open the trunk, and of course, lock the vehicle.
Given below is an example of how we reverse-engineered one of our test vehicle’s
door-control messages. When describing the procedures, we do not use the actual ID value
nor the bit positions, since they are proprietary to the OEMs. When comparing two sets of
Ωo f f , one before pressing a remote key fob and another during it, we found that the data
fields of message ID=0x01 had changed from [00 10 00 00 FF 00 AB CD] temporarily
to [00 30 00 00 FF 00 BC EF]. We verified in advance that the last 2 bytes of message
0x01 continuously change, even without any actions taken on the vehicle. That is, we
verified that the last two data bytes of 0x01 belong to Δo f f . As a result, we were able to
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easily figure out that the second byte of message 0x01 controls our test vehicle’s lock and
unlock functions. We will later show through evaluations that such an approach was indeed
successful and thus let us easily unlock & lock the car, illuminate the welcome lights, and
therefore, mount the BD attack.
5.4.4 Denial-of-Body-control (DoB) Attack
In addition to the BD attack, the CAN adversary can mount a Denial-of-Body-control
(DoB) attack in order to immobilize a vehicle.
Error handling is built in the CAN protocol and is important for its fault-tolerance. If an
ECU experiences or incurs continuous errors while transmitting or receiving a message, the
CAN protocol specifies that its Transmit Error Counter (TEC) or Receive Error Counters
(REC) should be increased, respectively [2]. If its TEC exceeds a pre-defined threshold of
255 due to continuous errors, the ECU is forced to enter the bus-off state and shut down.
Exploiting such a standardized CAN feature, in Chapter II, we proposed the bus-off attack,
which enforces other healthy/uncompromised ECUs to shut down. The proposed DoB
attack is mounted in a similar way to the bus-off attack, except that it further exploits the
following fact specified in the ISO 11898-1 standard [7] and thus immobilizes the vehicle.
The standard specifies that “a node can start the recovery from the bus-off state only upon
a user’s request,” where the user’s request depends on the ECU’s software configuration.
The proposed DoB attack thus exploits such a definition of bus-off recovery as follows.
While the ignition is off, the CAN adversary wakes up ECUs so as to make them
responsive to his injected messages. Then, the adversary switches its bit rate (e.g., from
500 kBits/s to 250 kBits/s). According to the CAN error-handling scheme, this makes all
awakened ECUs on the bus continuously experience and incur errors, and therefore enter
the bus-off state, i.e., shut-down. This way, the adversary not only mounts the bus-off
attack on a targeted ECU (as demonstrated in Chapter II) but also on all ECUs on the bus.
Instead of changing the bit rates, changing internal/net resistances or capacitances can be
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an alternative method in achieving this. As a result, per bus-off recovery specification,
depending on the ECUs’ software configurations, some ECUs would recover from the
bus-off state, whereas some will not.
Depending on the car manufacturer and year/model, ECUs such as BCM or RCM,
which is the security ECU that authenticates each message to and from the remote key
fob, can in fact be configured/defined not to recover from the bus-off state, mainly for
safety, since the bus-off is a serious problem, or for anti-theft purposes. Hence, if the CAN
adversary were to mount the DoB attack on such a vehicle, then s/he can indefinitely shut
down the BCM or RCM, and thus cut off the communication between the (driver’s) remote
key fob and the vehicle. Contemporary/newer vehicles are mostly equipped with the PKES
system, which allows users to open and start their cars while having their key fobs in their
pockets [42] and is installed either in BCM or RCM. For the vehicle to be opened/started,
PKES must verify that the legitimate key fob is in the vehicle’s vicinity. Therefore, shutting
down BCM/RCM (and thus PKES) would mean that the vehicle will not be able to receive
and authenticate any remote key signals (sent by the key fob), thus preventing opening or
starting the vehicle, i.e., the CAN adversary immobilizes the vehicle via a DoB attack.
Once the attacker succeeds in mounting DoB attack, there is no need for the attacker
to mount the attack, again; some ECUs that have entered bus-off will never boot up again,
anyway. This allows the attacker to not only succeed in mounting the attack in a very
short period of time but also do not leave any trace, thus making its forensic difficult. We
will later show through evaluations that such a configuration of BCM/RCM not recovering
from bus-off actually exists in real vehicles and thus makes the driver unable to open the
door/trunk and start the vehicle even with his/her legitimate, perfectly-functioning key fob.
5.5 Evaluation
We now evaluate the feasibility and criticality of the two proposed attacks on various
real vehicles.
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Figure 5.4: Vehicle architecture of one of our test vehicles.
5.5.1 Waking Up ECUs
To verify whether ECUs in real vehicles can indeed be awakened via simple wake-up
messages while the ignition is off, we connected a Vector CAN device to our test vehicles’
OBD-II port. We then injected wake-up messages/signals to the CAN bus. The wake-up
message we used had its ID, DLC, and DATA fields—that a user/adversary can control at
the application layer—all filled with 1s. This was to verify that messages with the minimum
number of 0s can also function as a valid wake-up message.
In-depth analysis on a test vehicle. Fig. 5.4 shows the in-vehicle network architecture
of one of our test vehicles—a 2017 year model—and the ECUs that responded to the
wake-up messages. Note that this network architecture of the test vehicle is not unique
for the OEM of our test vehicle but is valid for the vehicles built by other OEMs except
for only slight variations in the network architecture [57]. We verified which ECUs were
awakened by logging the CAN traffic that contains the message IDs observed on the bus,
and by mapping those IDs to the corresponding transmitter ECUs using the test vehicle
OEM’s CAN Data Base Container (DBC). The CAN DBC describes the properties of the
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Figure 5.5: Verifying wake-up messages in 11 different vehicles.
CAN network, the ECUs connected to the bus, and the CAN messages and signals. For the
purpose of this research, the CAN DBC file was provided by the test vehicle’s OEM.2
When the wake-up message/signal was injected, one can see from Fig. 5.4 that not
all ECUs were awakened. This would be most probably due to different ECUs being
attached to different terminals (with different terminal control policies) in order to minimize
battery/power consumption and, at the same time, provide various standby functions. In
CAN-1 which connects ECUs performing safety-critical functions, only 4 of 13 of them
were awakened. On the other hand, in the CAN-2 bus where ECUs responsible for vehicle
body control were connected, almost all ECUs but two were awakened. Considering the
fact that contemporary/newer vehicles provide various standby “body control” functions
such as keyless entry, hands free (foot) trunk opening, and anti-theft, more ECUs being
awakened in CAN-2 than CAN-1 would be the norm.
Verifying wake-up functionality in various vehicles. Using the OBD-II device,
we also verified how different vehicles (OEMs/years/models) react to the injection of a
wake-up message. To confirm that the wake-up functionality exists in different cars, we
chose various types of test vehicles: (compact and mid-size) sedans, coupe, crossover,
PHEV, SUVs, truck, and an electric vehicle with model-years 2008–2017.
Fig. 5.5 shows the number of distinct messages observed on the CAN bus 1) when the
2Due to its proprietary information, such DBC files are not shared without permission from the OEMs
and their suppliers.
153
ignition was on, and 2) when we woke up ECUs on the bus by injecting a wake-up message
while the ignition was off. Since the feasibility of wake-up stems from how the in-vehicle
network standard is specified and implemented, instead of OEMs’ design decisions, we
have chosen not to identify/reveal the particular make and model used in our evaluation.
Note, however, that the 11 test vehicles (shown in Fig. 5.5) we examined are from different
OEMs and also represent different models. For some vehicles, since their OBD-II pinout
was configured to not provide full access to all of their buses, we only show those that were
awakened in the accessible bus(es).
When waking up ECUs in some old cars (most with low-level trims), far less distinct
message IDs and lower percentages of them (compared to the case with the ignition on)
were observed on the bus than other newer cars. Since the number of ECUs is proportional
to that of distinct message IDs—although it is not linearly proportional—we can infer that
there were less awakened ECUs transmitting them in older cars; not all messages can be
sent by a single ECU due to the overhead. This would most probably be due to the fact that
the older cars do not require/provide any (or not many) standby functions (e.g., PKES).
For example, no standby functions (e.g., keyless entry, hands-free trunk opening) were
provided in the 2008 and 2013 model-year test cars; this is the reason why none and only
one ECU was awakened, when a wake-up message was injected on the bus.
On the other hand, when a wake-up message was injected on the buses of nine
2015–2017 model-year test vehicles, we observed that 49.12–94.95% (75.44% on average)
of the distinct message IDs sent while the ignition was on, were also sent when ECUs
were awakened while the ignition was off. Such a high number/portion of ECUs being
awakened by a wake-up message and thus sending more message IDs on the bus is
because they had numerous standby functions installed for enhanced driver’s experience
and convenience (e.g., PKES/RKE, hands-free trunk opening, anti-theft)—a trend that is
expected to grow. These results corroborate the fact that vehicle ECUs are indeed equipped
with the wake-up functionality (adhering to the standard) and can thus be exploited by the
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Figure 5.6: Setup for measuring battery consumption.
CAN adversary as an attack vector.
5.5.2 BD Attack
After verifying that the ECUs in our test vehicles can be awakened via basically
any wake-up message (even with all 1s in ID, DLC, and DATA fields), we mounted 4
different types of BD attack on one of our test vehicles: 1) simple wake-up, 2) power
mode control, 3) repetitive door unlock & lock, and 4) opening the trunk. We were
able to reverse-engineer the control messages for those functionalities via the proposed
driver-context-based reverse-engineering.
In order to measure the drained/discharged current from the car battery, we
disconnected the negative cable from the negative battery terminal and connected
our multimeter in series to the battery, i.e., one probe to the negative cable and the other to
the battery terminal. We conducted the battery current draw test from the negative side to
prevent accidental shorting and while the vehicle was parked with its ignition off. Then,
as shown in Fig. 5.6, we injected (iterative) sequence of control messages to the vehicle
through the OBD-II port.
Current drain. Table 5.2 summarizes the average amount of current measured to be
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Attacks Discharged Current [mA] Amplification Factor Max. Battery Operation Time [Days]
None 12.2 Baseline 30.7
+ Wake-up 42.0 x3.44 8.92
+ Change Power Mode 74.5 x6.11 5.02
+ Lock & Unlock Door 101.1 x8.29 3.70
+ Open Trunk 153.3 x12.57 2.44
Table 5.2: Maximum battery operation time under different BD attacks.
drawn from the vehicle battery when each attack was mounted additionally. When the
ignition was off and no ECU was awakened, 12.2mA was consumed. As expected, this
value was below the parasitic drain threshold, which is about 30mA. However, when we
just woke up the ECUs, the discharged current exceeded that threshold and drained 42mA.
Exceeding the parasitic drain threshold even slightly is considered to be a serious/critical
problem. As we controlled more functions that indirectly illuminated exterior/interior
lights, the average battery consumption increased further to 74.5, 101.1, and 153.3mA.
More worse cases. It is important to note that, depending on the vehicle model, there
would be (much) more of such controllable functions, thus allowing the attacker to drain
the battery more quickly and easily. However, we only show 4 controls as examples for
the proposed BD attack since they are already very critical. Moreover, if the attacks are
launched at night time when the exterior brightness is low, the car headlights will always
come on (as one type of a welcome light) when the car is unlocked. As a result, the current
drain will increase sharply, i.e., drain the battery very quickly. However, in order to show
the minimum drain/discharge, i.e., the worst possible case for the adversary, we conducted
all our experiments outdoor during day time.
Expected battery operation time. In order to better understand how the increased
battery current consumption relates to how quickly the attacker can immobilize the car, we
determine the battery operation time as follows. Consider a 45Ah battery, which is the
standard car battery capacity, with a State-of-Charge (SoC) of 70%—the average battery
SoC of a passenger vehicle—when parked. Then, since the minimum SoC for a cold
start is considered to be 50% in the worst case [44], i.e., worst-case for the adversary,
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our test vehicle’s battery can theoretically remain idle/parked for up to 45Ah×(0.7−0.5)12.2mA =
737.7 hours ≈ 30.7 days; something that is normally expected. Note that this is the
theoretical maximum battery operation time since we considered the worst possible case
for its derivation.
One can see from Table 5.2 the reduction of the maximum battery operation time while
mounting different types of BD attacks. Theoretically, with the 4 control functions, it only
takes a maximum of 2.44 days for an adversary to immobilize the vehicle via BD attack,
i.e., can be achieved over the weekends. It is important to note, however, that it could
take much shorter especially when the temperature is low and the battery is aged. More
interestingly, in reality, the actual battery operation time is known to be much shorter than
the theoretical/ideal value, i.e., much shorter than the times shown in Table 5.2. According
to the Peukert’s Law, because of intrinsic losses and the Coulombic efficiency being always
less than 100%, the actual battery operation time is much lower than the theoretic value
in which the latter assumes the battery to be ideal [38]. Since the intrinsic losses in the
battery escalate as load increases, the battery capacity is known to drop sharply as the
drained/discharged current increases. This implies that as the adversary controls more
functions, he can not only increase the battery consumption but also decrease the available
battery capacity at the same time! So, he can significantly reduce the battery operation time
via a BD attack, thus crippling the vehicle quickly, perhaps overnight.
5.5.3 DoB Attack
Through experiments on one of our test vehicles, we also verified the consequences of
the proposed DoB attack. Using the connected OBD-II device, we mounted a DoB attack
as described in Section 5.4.4.
After launching the DoB attack on one of our parked test vehicles, taking only a few
seconds, we confirmed from the CAN traffic that all ECUs on the bus were continuously
incurring and/or experiencing errors, causing all the ECUs to enter the bus-off state. After
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Figure 5.7: Consequence of a DoB attack.
mounting the DoB attack, we observed most, but not all of the ECUs recovered from the
bus-off state as configured. We observed that the number of distinct message IDs sent
on the bus was actually reduced by 6 after the DoB attack. By mapping those missing
IDs to the actual transmitter ECU using the DBC file, we found that the RCM (Remote
Control Module) did not recover from the bus-off, i.e., remained shut down, most probably
due to its distinct recovery policy configuration (perhaps for anti-theft/engine-immobilizer
purposes). Since the RCM was indefinitely off, the key fob was not authenticated and thus
could not establish a connection to the vehicle. As shown in Fig. 5.7, the vehicle could
not detect that the key was in its vicinity; the key was in fact placed right in front of the
dashboard. This consequence of the proposed DoB attack was reproducible on our test
vehicle.
Of course, remote key fobs are now equipped with RFID chips that can be used for
authentication, connection establishment, and thus starting the vehicle in case of a dead
key fob battery. However, since the communication between the key fob’s RFID and the
vehicle was also configured to be governed by the RCM, the RFID-based (emergency) start
did not work either. More interestingly, after mounting the DoB attack, when we tried to
open the doors or trunk to enter the car, we could not, because the RCMwas not functioning
and thus failed to authenticate the key fob. The only way to get in was actually using the
back-up physical key hidden in the key fob. Note, however, that the car did not start anyway
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(as shown in Fig. 5.7) even though we were able to enter it!
As discussed earlier, this consequence comes from the fact that OEMs (or their ECUs)
may have different bus-off recovery configurations. In our test vehicle, the setting of an
RCM to not recover from the bus-off “favors” the attacker in mounting a critical DoB
attack. We found the only way to restore the vehicle back to its original state after a
DoB attack was to disconnect the battery, wait for a few minutes, and re-connect the
battery. Such a process resets the states stored in each ECU and thus lets them run in
their original/intended states. However, imagining a victim confronting the symptoms of
DoB attack, i.e., the key fob neither working nor being detected, he might first try to change
the key fob battery. Obviously, since that won’t work, he would consider the car battery
completely dead and therefore, would probably have the car towed to the service station
for a battery replacement, wasting money and time unnecessarily!
5.6 Discussion
Countermeasures. As the proposed BD attack and DoB attack are mounted with
the ignition off, the design principles of their countermeasures have to be very different
from the state-of-the-art defenses, which are mostly concerned with attacks on “running”
vehicles. For example, as of the current CAN standard, since the wake-up itself
can be achieved with any CAN message having a 010 bit-sequence, adding MAC or
message encryption cannot prevent the adversary from waking up ECUs; a message with
MAC/encryption will still have such a sequence.
The cornerstone of BD attack and DoB attack is to wake up ECUs asleep on the bus
while the ignition is off. So, as their feasible and effective countermeasure, one can think
of continuously running an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) even when the ignition is off
in order to capture any abnormal wake-up messages; wake-up messages usually should not
be seen very frequently. However, since the operation of an IDS would increase the current
drawn from the battery, such an approach may defeat the very purpose of reducing battery
159
consumption. Like other ECUs asleep, the IDS ECU can also be configured to sleep most
of time and wake up only when it sees a wake-up message. As a countermeasure against
both types of attack, the wake-up pattern of an IDS can then be modeled and used to detect
any abnormal wake-up requests on the bus without continuously running it. Similarly,
the IDS can be configured to wake up periodically, check the battery SoC—if there was
any significant drain recently—and react accordingly. Moreover, especially for the DoB
attack, how to recover from the bus-off state has to be re-examined in order to prevent the
consequences of the DoB attack, as we had demonstrated.
Enhanced wake-up functionality. Partial deactivation of subnets within a given
network—or partial networking—has been discussed and planned to be installed by car
manufacturers. This is to reduce energy consumption and thus CO2 emissions [53]. In
such a setting, only the pre-defined wake-up messages that pass the wake-up masks/filters
of selective ECUs can wake up those ECUs during operation. However, since that message
is “pre-defined” and can easily be learned by observing the CAN traffic and its sudden
change in the number of message IDs (as in Section 5.4.3.3), the wake-up message itself
can still be learned and used by an adversary. In fact, the introduction of partial networking
will increase the number of ECUs to sleep rather than being completely turned off, and
thus provide a larger attack space for mounting the proposed attacks.
Limitations. We assumed that the CAN adversary has access to the in-vehicle network
via a compromised ECU to mount the proposed attacks. However, we must not overlook
the fact that the adversary might not even need a compromised ECU to mount the proposed
attacks. To further enhance the driver’s convenience, companies such as Volvo [21],
Lexus [22], and Tesla [23] let car owners unlock/lock their cars by using their smartphone
apps with an eventual goal to totally replace key fobs with smartphone software. This
means the existence of another (new) attack vector for mounting BD attack: compromising
those apps! As more of such vehicle-related technologies evolve and get deployed, there
may be more (intelligent) ways of mounting the proposed attacks.
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Although we succeeded in mounting BD attack and DoB attack on our 2017 model-year
test vehicle, not many ECUs were awakened when a wake-up message was injected in
older vehicles, because they had less standby functions than newer models, and thus had
less ECUs asleep while the ignition was off. The proposed attacks will likely be easier and
more effective to be mounted on newer models as we observed in waking up more ECUs
in newer vehicles (Fig. 5.5). For the DoB attack, however, since its success/feasibility will
totally depend on how the OEMs configured their “bus-off recovery” for different ECUs,
it might not be as feasible as BD attack. The BD attack will still be feasible unless the
standard wake-up procedure is changed or standby functions are not installed.
5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have discovered two new important vulnerabilities in vehicle
availability: Battery-Drain (BD) and Denial-of-Body-control (DoB) attacks. They are
counter-intuitive in that attacks are commonly believed to be possible and effective only
while the ignition is on. Specifically, an attacker is shown to be able to wake up ECUs on
the bus, even while the ignition is off, mount the proposed attacks, and then immobilize
a parked vehicle with its ignition off. Through extensive experiments on real vehicles,
such attacks are shown to be easy to mount and very critical to vehicle availability.
Ironically, the adversary exploits, as attack vectors, the in-vehicle network features
originally designed for either energy-efficiency (e.g., simple wake-up signals) or enhanced
user/driver experience/convenience (e.g., standby functions). There could still remain
different types of unknown and unintuitive vehicle vulnerabilities. It is therefore important
to analyze and understand what consequences existing built-in/standardized functionalities
can lead to. This calls for concerted efforts from both academia and industry on this
possibility and countermeasures thereof in order to build secure vehicles.
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CHAPTER VI
Conclusions and Future Work
The paradigm shift of vehicles being equipped with more and more electronics
and external connectivities has led to new security breaches in vehicles, thus making
automotive security one of the most critical issues. In this dissertation, through analyses
of in-vehicle networks and state-of-the-art countermeasures, we have shown that there still
remain several undiscovered attacks/vulnerabilities on in-vehicle networks and a large gap
between what state-of-the-art defenses should achieve and can achieve. As a result, we
discovered three new attacks/vulnerabilities and proposed two new defense schemes that
outperform existing ones. We summarize the contributions of this dissertation and present
some future research directions.
6.1 Dissertation Contributions
This dissertation looks at the vehicle security problem from two different perspectives:
as an attacker and as a defender.
New Unveiled Attacks
In Chapter II, we unveiled a new vulnerability, called the bus-off attack, of in-vehicle
networks. Since the proposed bus-off attack exploits in-vehicle networks’ error handling
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scheme in disconnecting an uncompromised ECU and/or even shutting down the entire
in-vehicle network, its consequence/symptom was shown to be very similar to an erroneous
bus, i.e., difficult to distinguish the attack from a functional error. Moreover, since it has the
capability of nullifying state-of-the-art solutions and is easy to launch, the bus-off attack
must be thwarted with high priority, thus making it even more important to design and
deploy its countermeasures.
In Chapter V, we discovered two new practical and important cyber attacks — called
Battery-Drain (BD) and Denial-of-Body-control (DoB)—on real vehicles, invalidating
the conventional belief that vehicle cyber attacks are feasible and thus their defenses are
required only when the vehicle’s ignition is on. The former can drain the vehicle battery
while the latter can prevent the vehicle owner/driver from starting or even opening/entering
his car. These attacks were shown to delude forensics since their symptoms were very
similar to typical mechanical/electronic failures, thus triggering unnecessary repairs,
extending service outage, or even blaming wrong parties (vehicle OEMs/suppliers) for the
problem.
One common ironic fact of the three proposed attacks is that in-vehicle network
features, which were initially designed and built for either driver’s safety (e.g., error
handling) or enhanced experience/convenience (e.g., wake-up function), were exploited
as attack vectors. Hence, similarly to the three proposed attacks, there could still remain
different types of attacks/vulnerabilities that are critical but undiscovered and unintuitive.
It is therefore important to further analyze and properly understand — from a security
viewpoint — what consequences existing built-in/standardized functionalities can yield.
New Defense Schemes
Based on our analyses of various types of vehicle cyber attacks, we were able to find
that state-of-the-art defense schemes lack certain features in meeting the need of a secure
vehicle. To address such issues, in Chapter III, we first proposed a new anomaly-based IDS
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called CIDS, which can cope with various attacks including those that existing solutions
cannot, e.g., masquerade attack. Based on our experiments on a CAN bus prototype and
on real vehicles, CIDS was shown to be capable of detecting various types of in-vehicle
network intrusions.
Another key feature that state-of-the-art vehicle security solutions lacked was
identifying the attacker ECU on the in-vehicle network. Without an accurate attacker
identification, it is impossible to achieve an efficient forensic, isolation, and security
patching. To meet this need, in Chapter IV, we proposed Viden, which fingerprints ECUs
based on voltage measurements. Via the ACK learning phase, Viden obtained correct
measurements of voltages only from the message transmitters, and exploited them for
constructing and updating correct voltage profiles/fingerprints. Using these profiles, we
showed via evaluations on a CAN bus prototype and two real vehicles that Viden can
identify the attacker ECU with a low false identification rate of 0.2%.
Considering the fact that vehicles are safety-critical, CIDS (for detection) and Viden
(for identification) are important steps toward securing the vehicles and protecting drivers
and passengers. The fact that these schemes can be simply deployed in real vehicles as
software — i.e., does not require any changes in the protocol or hardware — makes them
efficient, low-cost, and practical.
6.2 Future Research Directions
Here, we discuss future research directions that can be built on top of this dissertation.
6.2.1 Secure In-vehicle Gateway
Researchers have proposed several message authentication methods in order to
secure in-vehicle network communications [81, 83, 86]. Although they provide message
authentication between ECUs connected to the same network, i.e., homogeneous network,
they all lack consideration of the current in-vehicle network architecture in which more
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than one type of networks are usually used, i.e., heterogeneous network. Accordingly, for
messages that have to be transmitted and exchanged between two different networks, such
as between CAN and Ethernet or a high-speed CAN and a low-speed CAN, previously
proposed schemes cannot provide proper authentication. Such exchange of messages
between heterogeneous networks is expected to be more prevalent, considering the trend
that the new emerging x-by-wire functionalities are realized using those messages.
Messages exchanged between at least two different networks, either having the same
protocol but different speeds or having different protocols, are governed by an Internal
Gateway (I-GW), which is connected to those multiple heterogeneous networks. To
provide proper message exchange between those networks, I-GW possess and performs
the following functionalities:
• Routing: transfers messages between different networks;
• Filtering: filters out messages so that only the pre-determined ones are delivered;
• ID modification: modifies the ID value of the message to conform to the ID
assignment on the target network;
• Repacking: packs several short messages into one long message;
• Splitting: splits the payload data into segments so that only the required ones are
delivered to the target network;
• Translation: converts the message from the source to target network’s protocol
format; and
• Scheduling: schedules message delivery based on its given priority on the target
network.
In contrast to the basic network functionalities of ECUs, since I-GW has to perform
much more, the approach of message authentication between heterogeneous networks
should be approached differently from the case of homogeneous networks, i.e., the existing
authentication schemes won’t work. Moreover, since there is also a possibility of the I-GW
itself being compromised, messages passing through that I-GW cannot be authenticated,
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indicating the limitations of existing authentication schemes. Thus, an enhanced level of
authentication has to be applied at the I-GW. Therefore, it is important to investigate how
to design a new authentication scheme that provides message authentication in not only
homogeneous but also heterogeneous in-vehicle networks.
6.2.2 Security Analysis of Other CAN-based Systems
There are hundreds of millions of CAN nodes currently in use around the world.
As mentioned before, CAN is widely used in various cyber-physical systems such as
passenger cars, buses, drones, factory automation, work machines, and submarines. Such
uses of CAN are expected to further grow in the future due to its fault-tolerance, efficiency,
and low-cost. CAN provides high immunity to electrical interference and ability to
self-diagnose and repair data errors.
Despite such an expected growth of CAN usage, we are yet to fully understand the
security implications of CAN in those cyber-physical systems. One might simply think
that defense schemes for vehicle CAN — including those that have been discussed in this
dissertation — can be used in other cyber-physical systems such as drones and submarines;
assuming those solutions would be as effective as they were in vehicles. However, we must
be cautious about such an approach due to the fact that those systems would most likely
have different network architectures, remote endpoints, and system requirements due to
differences in provided functionalities and deployment cost. Such different configurations
and conditions may provide more room in implementing a higher cost but more effective
solution, or they might impose more restrictions on the design and deployment of defense
schemes, than those that we had for analysis of CAN security in vehicles. Therefore, even
though the same protocol might be used, it is imperative to first assess the security of those
systems individually based on their unique functionalities, roles, and system configurations,
and then build defense schemes based on such an assessment.
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6.2.3 Post Detection and Identification
Through CIDS (Chapter III) and Viden (Chapter IV), we can not only detect attacks but
also pinpoint the attacker ECU. However, there still remain unanswered research questions
after detection: 1) what reactions/counterplans should we make? 2) can/should we simply
alert the driver (e.g., check engine light)? 3) can/should we simply enforce the vehicle
to enter “limp home” mode? The answers to these questions are non-trivial due to the
following facts.
First, since ECUs have different ASILs (Automotive Safety Integrity Levels),
post-detection reactions should be different. That is, since some ECUs would be more
safety-critical than others (e.g., brake ECU definitely considered safety-critical whereas
heating/ventilation ECU might not be), if those safety-critical ones were compromised,
simply alerting the driver would be insufficient. Similarly, if the compromised ECU turns
out to be not as safety-critical as others (e.g., heating/ventilation ECU), enforcing that
ECU to not transmit/receive messages to/from the bus but still letting it independently run
with its pre-set parameters (and thus with reduced functionality) might be an appropriate
counterplan. Enforcing the car to enter limp-home mode due to a security (or even
a functional) problem in the heating/ventilation ECU might be unacceptable to the
driver/passenger(s). Second, the effectiveness of such alerts or post-detection reactions
will, in fact, be dependent on various physical factors. Specifically, depending on the
vehicle speed, location, its surrounding, and, more importantly, the driver’s awareness
(e.g., attentive vs. non-attentive), an alert itself might not be sufficient. Therefore, in order
to (properly) determine which type of post-detection reaction to make, there should be an
in-depth understanding/analysis of 1) the criticality of different vehicle cyber attacks and
2) how to take into account the physical factors that might affect the effectiveness of the
counterplan(s). Without a proper design of post-detection/identification counterplans, the
driver will still remain unsafe.
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